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“The success of visionary companies – at least in part – comes from 
underlying processes and fundamental dynamics embedded in the 
organization and not primarily the result of a single great idea, or some 
great all-knowing, godlike visionary who made great decisions, had great 
charisma and lead with great authority… The American Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 rejected the good-king frame of reference. Thomas 
Jefferson, James Madison, and John Adams were organizational visionaries. 
They created a Constitution to which they and all future leaders would be 
subservient. They focused on building a country. They rejected the good-
king model. They took the architectural approach. They were clock 
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Prologue : Why, how, and when was this research undertaken  
 
This book had its genesis when solutions were being sought in the mid 1990s to problems 
and questions raised in the management of the water resources of the Dnieper River Basin. A 
project, managed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), provided research 
grants and assistance to Ukraine to help it design a relevant program for the river basin 
rehabilitation: it began in 1994 and ended in 2001. Because the Dnieper River flows through 
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, its management requires international cooperation between those 
three sovereign nations. In 1998, it became obvious that it was necessary to draft a Strategic 
Action Plan for the entire River Basin, which would involve Belarus and Russia in addition to 
Ukraine. The resources of the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) were sought for that purpose by 
UNDP. Nations, however, are unlikely to delegate the drafting of national policy and parts of its 
sovereignty to any international or even regional organization. As well, existing technical 
assistance management models often fail to bring about the changes in mentality essential to the 
task. This challenge prompted the IDRC team involved in assisting Ukraine to draft and propose 
an alternative management model as a means to better manage and develop policies for the 
rehabilitation of this most important European body of water.  
 
Aid to developing countries and emerging economies is often confronted with two 
sources of resistance. On the one hand, donors are met with suspicion of foreign ideas and of the 
motivation of foreigners, with the result that money is welcomed by recipients but the ideas that 
come with it may not be. Those ideas are often rejected or politely shelved, and donors wonder 
why their ideas are not accepted. On the other hand, there often exists a deep conviction that the 
country’s problems come from outside, and are manufactured by foreigners. Implicitly, those who 
believe this also believe that the solution must come from outside the country. Populations and 
governments often wait out the good donor who has the solution to the country’s problems, with 
the result that ideas embedded in project activities often wait for appropriation to take place.  
 
In this respect, IDRC’s approach is almost unique among donors, because it rests entirely 
on the capacity of the beneficiary to design and undertake its own development. It is essentially 
based on self-help. This method seems more likely to produce long-term results, because the 
proposed policy comes from research carried out in the country by local experts and institutions, 
and is therefore more likely to be quickly adopted.  
 
This leads us to ask whether we can expect cooperation between nations, especially 
countries such as Belarus and Ukraine that have recently acquired independence from Russia. 
Can they work together to design common policies and a joint approach without feeling they are 
compromising sovereignty?  
 
In the autumn of 1997 I became convinced that the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) offered a tested and proven method for negotiating policy 
among sovereign nations. Since 1947, OECD (originally OECE) members have been doing 
exactly that: negotiating, harmonizing, and ensuring compliance with new policies, without 
challenging existing sovereignty. Its distinctive approach is close to IDRC’s practices: it rests on 
the principle of self-help, peer review, peer pressure, and the design of new policy based on the 
scientific search for facts. OECD’s rigorous negotiating process adds the elements necessary to 
debate adaptations to local circumstances, and to arrive at joint regional policies.  
 
 In early 1998, the IDRC team for Eastern Europe transformed these disparate ideas into a 




Russia, and Ukraine, who were seeking United Nations Development Programme/Global 
Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF) funds for the rehabilitation of the Dnieper River Basin.  
 
The IDRC and OECD methodological approach is explored in this book, and answers are 
provided to the specific questions that were raised as we attempted to persuade various 
participants of the validity of this approach. It must be kept in mind that Ukraine and other former 
USSR countries were secluded for 70 years, and many ideas that characterized Western evolution 
during the Twentieth Century were and are still misunderstood and often ignored there. For 
example, the notion of win-win negotiation has yet to become practice within eastern 
bureaucracies. Also, the concept of cooperation among nations raises questions, doubts, and even 
suspicions. 
 
The concepts and ideas are discussed in a sequence that should help the reader. The basis 
of our reflection rests on the premise that a major paradigm change took place after World War 
Two as a means to reduce conflicts among traditionally warfaring nations. The cooperation 
paradigm involved the creation of a multitude of international organizations and systems. It was 
a most innovative idea in 1947, one that went against all accepted ideas of the time, especially 
ideas that considered protectionism as central to the wealth of a nation. The creation of OECD 
was at the core of this new paradigm.  
 
The relationship between market economy and democracy is perplexing to many, 
especially those who have spent their life under a socialist model of governance. Why does it 
work? Why are OECD countries richer than others? What is central to this success? I believe that 
good information is so central to wealth that we might argue that we have gone beyond freedom 
of the press (or information) as essential to protect democracy and human rights. Instead, I 
believe that the role of democracy is to guard the abundance, availability, and quality of 
information, without which development will simply not take place. 
 
 Secondly, development and growth has become dependent on the proliferation of 
networks: small and informal networks, structured and somewhat more formal scientitifc and 
technical networks and lastly, formal multinational networks. It is my view that managing 
networks, especially those that are made up of sovereign nations, is fundamentally different from 
managing companies, organizations, or ministries that fall under a single authority. In essence, 
the dominant management approach for companies and institutions rests on cybernetics, with the 
view of keeping communications and accountability simple and clear. Managing methods that are 
successful in such a context is counterproductive when managing networks. Networks by 
definition must retain the same level of flexibility and ambiguity that characterize the behaviour 
of its members. Network management, based on IDRC, is discussed in the following chapter.  
 
In chapters 3 and 4, the praxis of OECD is discussed. How are things done in this unique 
organization? How were the traditions that govern its internal relations created? The practical 
application of fundamental values (democracy, market economy, and cooperation) is discussed in 
Chapter 3 in an historical context. From this, we conclude how these factors have led to specifics 
for conducting business. In essence, what is the etiquette prevalent in this institution? What are 
the unwritten rules of conduct? Why is it so? The chapter contains explanations and 
demonstrations of how a network such as this has to organize according to principles that are 
profoundly different from those that structure traditional organizations, such as ministries, large 
corporations, or even other international organizations. 
 
Tools and skills necessary to arrive at consensus among various cultures to foster 




how to preside over committee meetings, how to draft persuasive documents, and how to manage 
the iterative process leading to agreements and to their applications by members. 
 
In Chapter 5, answers are given to the confounding question: why does it work? In my 
view, the ever-increasing complexity of international exchanges that marked the turn of the 
Twentieth Century demanded the injection of simplification, the increase of our collective 
intelligence, and our capacity to deal with complicated and protracted common issues. OECD 
came as a response to this new problem: its mechanics are simple – search for consensus using 
peer pressure, and provide clarity and intelligence on many obscure problems. The chapter 
demonstrates this thesis through examples of clear successes as well as illustrative failures. 
 
The final Section contains two useful appendixes. The first one describes the Peer Review 
process as practiced within OECD. The original text was prepared at OECD, and has been edited 
and shortened to suit the purposes of this book. Second, a set of Definitions is included to help 
readers from other parts of the world who are less familiar with concepts, ideas, conventions, and 
references that have become common usage in OECD member countries.  
 
Planners, policymakers, and researchers in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine may benefit 
most from this material. Their counterparts in industrial and developing countries will hopefully 
find the book instructive and revealing, particularly for those people in the countries that may 
soon become members of OECD, or for those groups, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), who are attempting to introduce Peer Review as a mean to improve 
national governance. Hopefully, this book will also attract a broad audience, in industrial 
countries and in the emerging economies of Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It is written in a style 
that may be helpful to readers unfamiliar with some of the concepts and ideas. I have made 
generous use of metaphors, examples, and definitions in the hope this will improve both 
readability and understanding of the text.  
 
The governance and internal functioning systems of OECD have not been described thus 
far. We were unable to find formal publications on the subject, other than two books in French, 
one written by Jean Bonvin, 1998, former President of OECD’s Development Centre, and the 








I have borrowed heavily from the two authors who have published papers on OECD, Jean 
Bonvin and Henri Chavranski, and have translated sections of their material into English for 
inclusion in this book. I have had privileged access to a number of OECD internal reports, most 
importantly one key report prepared by Pierre Vinde, former Deputy Secretary General of OECD. 
Unfortunately, such reports are not part of the body of refereed literature. I have made liberal use 
of interviews with current and former staff of OECD. I have also used those sections from 
internal reports that can be communicated publicly without confidentiality problems; 
unfortunately, attribution is impossible in most cases. I have included in a set of References those 
papers and books that I believe will be of most direct relevance to my intended readers. Where 
possible, Internet website addresses are provided. 
 
I wish to thank the following for their comments and contributions: Henri Chavranski, 
1997, Derry Ormond and Pierre Vinde who reviewed the first draft of this text; Jean Bonvin, 
Anne de Lattre, Helmuth Fuhrer, Mark Pieth, Louis Sabourin, all former OECD senior 
executives, who provided sound advice; current OECD staff without whose help this text could 
not have been written: Christian Averous, André Barsony, Jim Carey, Jorgen Elmeskov, Vera 
Gündel, Raundi Halvorson-Quevedo, Jeremy W. Hurst, Peter Jarrett, Robert Ley, Alex Matheson, 
Hunter Mcgill, Fabrizio Pagani, Scott Wade, and Frederic Wehrle. I also acknowledge the 
comments and advice offered by colleagues on various drafts of this text: Ms. Carolyn Pestieau, 
then Vice-President of IDRC, and Ken Babcock, Fred Carden, Suzan Joekes, Kerry Franchuk, 
Carol Joling, Myron Lahola, and Réal Lavergne, of IDRC.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 have benefited immensely from Professor Martin Rudner’s 
collaboration. A number of sections of these chapters were drafted by him. Professor Rudner 
teaches at Carleton University’s Norman Patterson School of International Affairs and has 
authored more than fifty books and articles on international and development issues.  
 
Appendix 1, describing OECD’s Peer Review process, has been researched and written 
by Fabrizio Pagani, from OECD’s legal division. 
 
Caroline Bouchard provided valuable research and editing assistance. Elena Klimenko 
prepared the Definition of Terms and ensured the material is appropriate for readers in former 
Soviet Union countries. Reginald MacIntyre edited the text and provided advice on overall 
content and presentation. André Métivier provided many observations and suggestions. André 
Laplante and Laurier Trahan played a useful role in commenting on key chapters of this book. 
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“Build it, they will come...” 
In the movie “Field of Dreams” 
 
Chapter 1 : The conceptual framework  
 





Section 1  
Alliances and Cooperation:  
Emergence of a New Post-War Paradigm 
 
 
Subsection 1.1 Fifteen Hundred Years of War 
 
 
Since the time of Pax Romana in the Fifth Century, European societies have experienced 
recurrent war. The causes of war may be found in the pathology of nations, leaders, and 
communities. Wars were fought for political or strategic reasons, for religious motives, and for 
commercial advantage. In pre-industrial Europe, the economic doctrine of mercantilism that 
guided the policies of most trading countries transformed, in effect, commercial competition into 
state rivalries to control access to markets and/or sources of supply. The emphasis in 
mercantilism on the possession and accumulation of gold and silver, as the prime indicator of 
national wealth and well-being had far-reaching implications for conduct of states. Countries 
tended to focus their efforts and energies on maximizing the accumulation of coinage through 
conquest and protectionism at the expense of genuine trade and international cooperation. 
International relations were shaped by temporary alliances designed to foment coalition warfare 
against commercial rivals, with the victors winning the spoils. War represented, in that context, 
mercantilism by violent means. 
 
For almost 15 centuries European countries demonstrated their affinities for warfare and 
commercial jousting, which reached its most destructive levels in 1939 - 45 (though historians 





Using Traditional Games to Improve Understanding 
 
In an attempt to understand better the dynamics of inter-state conflict, two high-ranking 
French civil servants, Pingaud and Reysset (1995), wrote an insightful book comparing 
alternative approaches to what we might call “strategic games.” Their analysis compares the 
Asian game of Go and the European game of Chess in terms of their implications for strategic 
behaviour. They argue that these games exemplify the values, goals and behavioural patterns 
that characterize the strategic cultures of the societies whence they emerged. They further 




prescribes the behavioural propensities of the countries concerned, thus further reinforcing their 
characteristic strategic cultures. 
 
As Pingaud and Reysset point out, the objective of the game of chess is to capture 
("kill") the rival King. The game has a single, supreme goal: to eliminate the opposing King and 
thus to destroy the rival side. There is no ambiguity in purpose, values or ends. The strategic 
consequences are daunting: pawns and other chess pieces (except the King) are expendable if 
and when their sacrifice can confer a tactical advantage. A null, or a compromise, may be 
sought to avoid a humiliating outcome. However, in the last analysis, in chess victory for one 
side is absolute, and defeat for the other is total. 
 
By way of contrast, Pingaud and Reysset call attention to the more ambiguous, 
synergetic interplay associated with the Japanese game of Go. The object of this game is to 
enlarge one's vital space by gaining territory. However, the goal is not to kill or avoid being killed, 
but rather to live and to construct. The strategic dynamics of Go reflect this constructive thrust. 
Thus, pawns, if surrounded, become the possession of the adversary; they are not “eliminated” 
but rather are taken over, or subjugated. Because this may imply a certain ambiguity in relative 
strength, victory in Go is determined by agreement among the players following a general count 
of all points. Victory or defeat is often relative and reaching equality is a good omen rather than a 
null outcome. As compared to chess, where the loser is defeated and humbled, Go players are 
predisposed to try not to humiliate the adversary but rather to share an experience and comment 
upon it. 
 
Pingaud and Reysset claim that societies define their approaches to strategy and 
conflict, their societal relations and national goals, according to some fundamental, overarching 
paradigm. For Europe, the governing paradigm for international relationships between Pax 
Romana of the Fifth Century and the end of World War II in 1945 clearly parallels the game of 
Chess. 
Table 1 Using Traditional Games to Improve Understanding 
 
In 1947, the “Western” countries that allied together to form what later became known as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), underwent a major shift 
in favour of a fundamentally new paradigm for cooperative internationalism. Some might argue 
that the assumptions implicit in the traditional “chess paradigm” were so widely entrenched by 
that time that the emergence of a “cooperation paradigm” denoted something of a utopian 
counterintuitive fantasy. Be that as it may, the emergent post-war cooperation paradigm inspired 
and gave expression to the new pattern of cooperative international relations involving Western 
Europe and North America. This culminated, institutionally, in the formation of OECD, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Economic Community (now the 
European Union).  
 
The cooperation paradigm differs in its essentials from the conventional treaty alliances 
and coalition arrangements entered into by states. In the chess paradigm, alliances form an 
integral part of the game strategy, where powerful states seek pawns to deploy, and weak states 
seek the protection of mighty kings. European monarchs were prone to sign all manner of treaties, 
secret and open, to bolster their relative power. These treaties and coalitions did not, however, 
alter the essentially predatory rules of international behaviour, unlike the cooperation paradigm, 
which is predicated on the synergy of partnering and embraces connectivity, networking, and 
information sharing. The use of the term “alliance” to describe an arrangement like OECD, 
NATO, or EU would be misleading in the sense that it trivializes the scope and depth of the 
cooperation they embody. By contrast, the arrangements put in place by the USSR and its Eastern 
European neighbours were more akin to traditional alliance architecture, though subject to 





Subsection 1.2 - Five Characteristics of the New Paradigm 
 
The cooperation paradigm has several characteristics that distinguish it from the 
traditional chess-related strategy, and which seem to be more broadly consistent with synergetic 
strategic outlook associated with the game of Go. Four factors are especially significant in this 
respect:  
 
(1) The cooperation paradigm suggests that synergetic partnering among 
countries offers a more effective, more efficient, and more resilient approach to 
enhancing the wealth of each and all countries. This is a radical departure from the earlier 
assumption that the wealth of nations derives from possession and control of territories, 
people, and resources, which promoted policies of conquest and protectionism.  
 
It is important, however, to note that cooperation among countries may, in certain 
circumstances, itself give rise to perverse attempts to control the new wider markets by 
fostering monopolies and oligopolies or regional protectionist blocs. For cooperation to 
be effective in improving economic efficiency, therefore, any tendency toward market 
control must be counterbalanced by measures designed to stimulate competition among 
individuals and commercial organizations. 
 
(2) The paradigm for international cooperation considers information to be the 
life-blood of the new, wider economic system, and indeed it requires that information 
flow freely, openly, and according to the highest standards of reliability to all prospective 
users. From the outset, OECD has been tasked with maintaining for its member countries 
a flow of economic information, of safeguarding the reliability of its data even from 
distortions from members' own inclinations. This approach to information in the 
cooperation paradigm may be contrasted with the concealed treatment of information in 
mercantilist-type regimes, where economic or industrial data were usually deemed to 
have strategic value and were therefore protected as state secrets. Information was 
certainly not to be shared with competing countries. 
 
The open approach to economic information in the cooperation paradigm also 
necessitates some measures for protection of personal rights and of privately owned 
information such as patents and copyrights. Otherwise, cooperation in sharing 
information could have the perverse consequence of deterring the creation and 
development of new knowledge. For cooperation to be effective and efficient, the state 
must ensure that the ownership of intellectual property is protected with as much care and 
firmness as was the physical property of, say, landlords in times past. 
 
(3) It is implicit in the cooperation paradigm that a sense of confidence is a 
prerequisite for human creativity and development in an open, international system. The 
concept of confidence for present purposes covers a wide range of attributes to personal 
security, including: confidence in one's society; self esteem; openness of mind; tolerance 
of others and of new ideas; accountability for one's actions; responsibility; confidence in 
the value of scientific and technical innovation; and acceptance of diffusion of one's 
culture. 
 
The Peyrefitte (1995) essay on the source of wealth and development 
demonstrates the central role of confidence. Confidence is a generic term that refers to a 




for a faster acceptance of new ideas, new techniques and new values. In the context of a 
changing world, with scientific and technological progress moving at a very high speed, a 
high tolerance to new ideas is the most effective attitude in adapting to changes in a 
viable and sustainable manner. No society is totally confident or completely tolerant to 
change; resistance always exists. The significant question is: "Is the attitude of a society 
generally negative with respect to foreign or new ideas, values, products or peoples, or is 
it on average positive?” Countries that adopt a more open attitude have consistently been 
better performers economically. Conversely, countries where protectionist measures run 
high, which are hostile to things foreign, which consistently deny progress and new ideas 
because they do not fit with traditions, have demonstrated throughout history sluggish 
growth and increasing pauperization of their people. 
 
It is clear that within OECD levels of confidence in and among the member 
countries have heightened exponentially during the past 40 years along with, and 
contributing to, their economic expansion. 
 
(4) Connectivity complements confidence, and provides the pathways and 
linkages for the transmission and dissemination of knowledge and information pertaining 
to cooperation for development and growth. It is connectivity that enables the flow of 
ideas and of goods and services within the framework of cooperation, and this in turn 
bolsters confidence and is itself the result of increased confidence. Without connectivity, 
ideas cannot circulate and function as equalizing agents. Ideas, in the form of knowledge, 
may be embodied in material products, in technical services, in cultural artefacts, in 
books, film and electronic media. Increasingly they are being circulated via computerized 
telecommunication networks like the World Wide Web.  
 
The international dissemination of knowledge is intimately wrapped up with the 
flow of trade and investment. Given the increasing value attributed to knowledge as a 
factor of production, as demonstrated by the heightened attention to intellectual property 
rights, trade patterns and investment flows are increasingly tending to reflect differences 
in knowledge endowments and knowledge capabilities among countries. Countries that 
invest in knowledge creation and dissemination acquire important competitive 
advantages over those that lag behind in developing knowledge-based economies. 
Countries with otherwise poor natural resource endowments like Japan, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, and Israel have built up a strong capacity for trade based on knowledge-
intensive industries. Even large, resource-abundant economies like Canada and the 
United States saw their traditional areas of comparative advantage enhanced and new 
globally competitive industries emerge as a result of knowledge-based developments.  
 
Knowledge is the ultimate product of human resource development. The capacity 
for knowledge creation can move with human migrations, as countries gain and lose 
people with potential for new ideas. The global web of communications infrastructure 
facilitates exchanges and transfers of knowledge and ideas. If infrastructure for 
communications is low-cost and easy to access, this could help countries and 
communities that have a knowledge deficit to access the resources of knowledge-
intensive societies, and thus facilitate their own creative efforts and development 
potential. 
 
 Information, in the cooperation paradigm, is shared through networks that 
connect people, institutions, and/or operations. Connectivity through these networks has 




technological development and transfers of technology. Networks thus sustain and 
accelerate economic growth. 
 
(5) Closely related to information networking are the standards, the documented 
agreements on technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as 
rules, guidelines, or characteristics, to ensure that materials, products, processes and 
services are suitable for their purpose. Agreement on standards creates confidence in the 
reliability and effectiveness of the goods and services concerned. By ensuring the quality 
of information flowing through these networks, confidence can be built up among trading 
partners, whether countries or between producers and consumers, in a way that nurtures 
connectivity and supports trade expansion and economic growth. For cooperation to be 
effective, networks and quality standards are needed to bridge the information and 
knowledge gaps between partners, and thus they play an instrumental role in the 
promotion of development efforts (see http://www.idrc.ca/oceei/papers/confid_e.cfm) 1
 
Subsection 1.3 - Overall Impact of the New Paradigm 
 
The post-1945 shift to a cooperation paradigm served to open up new opportunities for 
economic and technological innovation by liberating and facilitating human creativity. The most 
valuable resource of the human mind is its capacity for creativity. Through the synergy associated 
with international cooperation and its elements of confidence, information openness, 
connectivity, networks, and quality standards, the cooperation paradigm can widen the horizons 
of creativity and facilitate the spread of knowledge products broadly among trading partners, and 
even beyond, to a lesser degree. In other words, the cooperation paradigm yields economies of 
scope and scale for creativity and innovation. These economies of scope and scale for their 
emergent knowledge sectors contributed substantially to the sustained growth of OECD 
economies since 1945. 
 
Countries that did not participate in this cooperative effort incurred significant 
opportunity costs in terms of the development that was foregone. Once the cooperation paradigm 
shift occurred, so substantial was its developmental momentum that other countries could not be 
indifferent to its potential. Some, like the developing countries of East and Southeast Asia, 
realigned themselves by opening up to certain elements of the cooperation paradigm, though not 
all. To that extent these countries were able to participate in the upsurge of developmental 
cooperation. Other countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe remained more-or-
less closed, and therefore found themselves excluded from the synergy of international 
cooperation. Not only did these countries forego opportunities for a knowledge-based 
developmental transformation, but their lagging economies actually degenerated into an anti-
development syndrome, as they lagged farther and farther behind. In the USSR, for example, this 
process of anti-development was associated with a worsening failure of confidence, inadequate 
connectivity (even internal), ambiguous quality standards that were never universally applied, and 
networks that were structured vertically rather than horizontally, thus militating against the spread 
of creativity and innovation.  
 
Paradigm shifts, it should be noted, do not necessarily occur immediately, coherently, or 
holistically. Behavioural patterns and attitudes change slowly and gradually, and sometimes even 
partially and incrementally. Every society faces a complex variety of individuals, groups, and 
attitudes, some flexible, others rigid; some outward-oriented, others inward-oriented; some 
                                                     





amenable to innovation and progress, others resistant to change. Most modern societies tend to 
respond to this complexity of expectations by simultaneously promoting developmental change 
and encouraging stability, pushing on both the accelerator and the brake, as it were. This 
perceived ambiguity could sometimes complicate the observation of paradigm shifts. In such 
cases, the extent of the paradigm shift may only be fully revealed over time.  
 
The operation of many cooperation mechanisms enabled OECD countries to attain 
progressively higher levels of confidence. This, in turn, encouraged more human creativity 
touching most areas of life: new solutions were found to old problems, and new challenges were 
addressed and solutions found. Along with creativity came new employment opportunities. This 
nexus between cooperation, creativity and employment led to increases in both levels of income 
and social equity in OECD member countries that are unparalleled historically. 
 
 
Subsection 1.4 - Role of Human Rights and Democratic Governance in 
Functioning of OECD Methodologies  
 
The OECD process for promoting international economic cooperation is predicated on a 
consensus with respect to basic political values, most notably human rights, multiparty 
democracy, transparency in government, freedom of expression, and reliance on market rules for 
management of the economy. These values were highlighted in clear and unambiguous language 
in the opening paragraphs of the OECD Convention signed in 1961. (See Statement of 
Preliminaries table ). OECD partners are expected to accept and implement these core values in 
order for the process of international cooperation to succeed and to become effective.  
 
Several factors account for the prominence of human rights among OECD member 
countries. First, shared memories of the Second World War, in which hundreds of thousands 
fought and died in the defence of freedom and liberty reinforced the urgency of human rights and 
democracy in the public mind. Moreover, there emerged a widespread belief in public and official 
circles that the harmonization of human rights practices among member countries and their being 
anchored in the day-to-day operations of governmental and intergovernmental institutions would 
empower the international community to deal with the prevention and resolution of future 
conflicts. Human rights acquired ethical primacy in international affairs, wherein civil liberties 
and democracy have come to be generally associated with the principles of a just society and 
good governance. In essence, human rights represent a moral imperative in western political 
culture.  
 
The universality of human rights principles has become a core value and expectation for 
the global agenda for the 21st Century. As will be explained, it would be a profound error to 
assume that human rights represent a western artifice and are, in some sense, alien to the political 
cultures of other societies. Likewise, it would be folly to conclude that human rights are a luxury 
that poorer countries cannot afford. A shifting competitive advantage in favour of information-
intensive industrial and marketing processes gives renewed emphasis to human rights as a key 
component of an emergent knowledge-based economy.  
 
Why is information, the specific application of knowledge, important for economic 
policy and enterprise? Information is vital to economic managers because it enables them to 
assess past and present performance and therefore to anticipate better the future and to exercise 
improved control over prospective policy options. In some ways, knowledge and information are 
like commodities: they are costly to produce and have market value, in that others may be willing 




they can be transmitted to others yet still remain entirely in the possession of the producers, and 
they can be utilized over and over again without being diminished.  
 
Several types of knowledge can be distinguished in terms of economic utility: technical 
knowledge, used in the production of goods and services; knowledge relating to the management 
of economic systems, such as identifying markets and routine information like the gathering and 
sorting of statistical data. There is, as well, intuitive knowledge, which derives from accumulated 
experience, learning-by-doing and the personal evaluation of lessons learned from practice: it is 
not readily transmittable. In an economy, the demand for knowledge will reflect the actual 
capacity of producers to utilize information efficiently in their productive and marketing 
processes. Those who know how to benefit from this knowledge will invest in its acquisition and 
utilization and, in turn, will gain improved control over their economic future. Knowledge-based 
industries and organizations will thus tend to outperform others, just as knowledge-based 
economies will demonstrate competitive advantages over those lagging behind in the acquisition 
and utilization of knowledge.  
 
In a knowledge-based economy, the highest value-added in production is attributable to 
human creativity. Many high-value tradable goods are products of intellectual creativity, among 
them music, films and videos, books, and computer software. Moreover, many other products, 
which were once considered to be merely land- or labour-intensive, are today produced with 
significant technological or scientific inputs. Knowledge embedded in the human mind has now 
become of prime economic significance in determining the competitiveness of firms and 
industries, the wealth of nations and even the security of countries.  
 
Societies that are able to draw out the best of their knowledge resources by releasing the 
creativity of all individuals without exclusion for extraneous reasons like race, religion, ethnicity, 
age, gender or sexual orientation, will tend to perform better as knowledge-based economies than 
societies that discriminate. Societies that demonstrate superior performance as knowledge-based 
economies tend to be those that ensure universal access to knowledge while stimulating the 
pursuit of excellence. This provides for the free pursuit of research and creation with all of its 
ramifications, which put in place the infrastructure for wide-ranging and openly accessible 
communications networks, and which protect private property and personal rights while 
encouraging population mobility, since physical mobility often embodies intellectual agility.  
 
In the ordinary course of actions within OECD, human rights and democratization issues 
are for the most part unspoken and essentially implicit notions. Most OECD procedures and 
processes emphasize mainly empirical and practical matters and tend to adapt to the 
circumstances of the group and its ability to sustain changes.  
 
OECD involvement in human rights concerns is usually subsumed into governance 
issues, tending to focus primarily on operational matters such as the transparency of government 
operations, rather than on ideological or normative questions.  
 
Some may argue that OECD has not been entirely consistent in observing human rights 
standards for membership, especially during the Cold War period. For example, Spain and 
Portugal were allowed to join when they were still governed by dictators. Greece was not 
suspended during its Colonels’ regime. However, others would respond that the OECD approach 
was incrementally goal oriented, that respect for human rights was promoted progressively and 
indirectly as is spelled out in the first sentence of the OECD preliminaries: “Considering that 
economic strength and prosperity are essential for the attainment of the purposes of the United 




deemed more critical to adhere to market economy and free trade. OECD members’ behaviour 
was dictated by practical considerations, in particular the Cold War, which pitted its members 
against the Soviet Bloc and its regime of state control and “proletarian dictatorship.” 
 
Discussions with OECD colleagues and former delegates have revealed that the 
willingness to tolerate these three transitionally delinquent member countries was “geo-
strategically mandatory and politically convenient,” and hinged on the commanding hypothesis 
that OECD membership would in itself facilitate and expedite the process of democratization. 
OECD members were apparently prepared to be tolerant of some deviations, implicitly believing 
that, over time, the OECD general philosophy would prevail. History proved them right when in 
the 1970s all three countries moved toward democracy. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, OECD 
members have become increasingly confident, in some cases overconfident, in their approach and 




HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROGRESS 
 
Given the value placed on human rights in public discourse, it may seem paradoxical that 
people and governments in OECD countries may sometimes appear to be ambivalent about human 
rights concerns relating to other non-OECD countries. When efforts to promote economic, political, or 
security objectives come up against concerns for the defence of human rights, the support for the 
latter is sometimes compromised. In particular, most governments and firms are unwilling to forego 
the promotion of commercial opportunities even in countries with a poor human rights record. Some 
may even attempt to rationalize their ambivalence by arguing that human rights principles are moral 
matters with little direct relevance to economic performance.  
 
In pre- and early industrial periods, economic advantages accrued to those who controlled 
physical resources, land or minerals. Human beings were considered a labour resource; and in some 
countries, they were regarded only slightly better than animal labour. Hierarchical social structures 
were generally embedded in coercive force; inequality and privilege were the concomitant of 
governance. Since physical resources were and still are essentially linked to land, landed property 
and its protection became the predominant factor in political and economic management. Thus 
feudalism was, in essence, an orderly pyramidal arrangement for empowering landed classes.  
 
To the extent that these land- and resource-based social systems succeeded in maintaining 
effective control over their physical resources, they were able to remain relatively stable for very long 
periods of time. Technology and knowledge evolved slowly in such circumstances and had merely a 
marginal, incremental impact on these closed traditional societies. Since populations tended to 
expand over time, large numbers of people had to be employed in marginal, often sub-economic, 
occupations, sometimes in conditions of serfdom or even slavery. Economic value-added was 
abysmally low and poverty was rife. The Renaissance marked a radical transformation of this pattern 
of political-economic organization, as Europeans began to rediscover the power of human creativity, 
the vitality of knowledge, and its ability to innovate. Steadily, progressively, knowledge and 
inventiveness came to be recognized as vital resources in the wealth of nations.  
 
It is this knowledge-based value-added environment that enables modern industrial 
economies to obtain competitive advantages in traditional agricultural and manufacturing products at 
high and rising levels of income. The competitive advantages provided by investment in knowledge 
resources are such that it can be argued that as basic a commodity as wheat, for example, produced 
with traditional methods would have to price labour at zero or close to zero in order to be tradable 
internationally.  
 




need plastic and other materials; data communications are often printed out on paper; people require 
physical shelter; social identity is often represented in concrete landmarks, whether edifices, 
monuments, or physical infrastructure. A socially just system of land tenure remains an important 
ingredient in good governance. However, it is the knowledge embodied in the human mind that today 
determines the wealth of nations, enabling societies to achieve material and cultural progress and 
even to defend themselves: even warfare has become knowledge-intensive, as demonstrated by the 
"Desert Storm" campaign in the 1991 Gulf War. 
  
Human beings who suffer enslavement, imprisonment or discrimination are typically deprived 
of access to knowledge creation. Arguably, denying people access to markets - as happens with 
women, for example, in some countries - will constrain their potential contribution to knowledge 
development. In order to optimize their human capacity for knowledge development, communities 
must ensure and protect the rights of all individuals - without discrimination - to access existing 
knowledge resources so as to develop and enhance their potential for creativity and innovation. 
 
Investments that stimulate and protect the creativity of the human mind will help reinforce the 
elements of confidence and connectivity, which are deemed vital for the new co-operative approach 
to international relations. Moreover, competition between countries and regional country groupings 
will, in turn, tend to stimulate the dissemination of these ideas and values more or less broadly 
throughout the connected domain. However, societies that fail to uphold these rights and values 
could find themselves lagging increasingly behind the leading innovators, and will likely form the next 
bloc of "underdeveloped countries" in the new millennium. 
 




Section 2:  
From Paradigm Shift to Institutional Activities 
 
Implementation of the new post-war cooperation paradigm involved the establishment of 
various kinds of institutional mechanisms and policy regimes at different levels of partnering and 
for various purposes. These may be grouped together in terms of the following typologies:  
 
Subsection 2.1 - Multilateral organizations with universal membership 
 
The United Nations specialized agencies 
 
The specialized agencies of the United Nations are open to all member states and even 
non-members, in certain cases. Among these are UNDP, FAO, WHO, UNIDO, UNESCO, IFAD, 
ITU, ILO, ICAO, IMO, UNICEF, UNEP, and WMO. Most of these multilateral agencies have 
specialized, sector-specific mandates. Each has its own governing body, composed of delegates 
from member countries, which meet annually, to adopt policies and programs and approve 
budgets. Member states have one vote in the governance of these multilateral organizations, 
irrespective of country size, population, income level or financial contribution. Executive 
responsibilities are vested in a chief executive and are administered by a professional secretariat. 
Staffing of these bureaucracies is typically representative of the diversity of the membership. 
Operating and program costs are shared according to some burden-sharing formula based on 
relative affluence.  
 





Although the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund are also specialized 
agencies of the United Nations, their structure differs in that membership is open only to those 
countries willing to pay subscriptions and purchase shares. The USSR declined to join initially. 
Governance of the World Bank and IMF is vested in their respective annual meetings of 
Governors (usually the Ministers of Finance of member countries). Voting is weighted in 
proportion to the number of shares held by each country, with the United States obtaining the 
largest number of shares and votes and other countries getting shares/votes according to a burden-
sharing formula based on their relative economic attainments. Each multilateral institution has a 
Board of Directors to supervise the flow of programs and activities. Since there are a limited 
number of Executive Directors (15 to 25), each Director represents several countries, which 
become their "constituencies." 
 
The multilateral financial institutions are managed like banking organizations, which is 
how they define themselves. Each institution must remain financially viable in its own right, since 
it operates as a financial intermediary raising funds in world capital markets for on-lending on 
favourable terms to client countries. Their programs, and especially their lending, are expected to 
be disciplined and adhere to sound financial and risk-management criteria. In principle, loan 
approval decisions should be free of political considerations, though some important shareholding 
countries have occasionally breached this principle. The loans they issue are repayable, with 
interest. Borrowers must repay real cost of the loans plus a fee for administration. Defaults would 
carry severe sanctions, and there have been none.  
 
To address the economic development requirements of poor countries, the International 
Development Association (IDA) was set up in conjunction with, and complementary to, the 
World Bank. IDA does not have staff of its own, but operates through the World Bank, which 
receives a management fee in compensation. This arrangement ensures that IDA-supported 
programs and projects are subject to the same rigorous standards as World Bank-financed 
activities. Like the Bank itself, IDA is also a financial intermediary, mobilizing grants 
("replenishments") from donor countries for on-lending. Eligibility for IDA concessional credits 
(0 interest, but with a service charge of 0.75% annually) is restricted to the poorest and least 
creditworthy developing countries, and is reviewed periodically.  
 
IDA funding is allocated to eligible countries in accordance with criteria that are laid 
down at each tri-annual replenishment. Current criteria emphasize poverty reduction in an 
environmentally sustainable manner and per capita income. There are also guidelines for the 
geographic distribution of IDA resources. Southern Africa is targeted for 45-50% of IDA 
funding, and so-called blend countries (countries that are IDA eligible but also borrow from the 
World Bank) 30-35%. Until the mid 1980s, IDA credits were repayable over 50 years with a 10-
year grace period; currently the maturity period is 40 years for the poorest countries and 35 years 
for others. 
 
The IDA replenishment process also provides a mechanism for donor countries to 
achieve consensus on the overall thrust of IDA programming for the upcoming three-year funding 
cycle. The consensus that poverty reduction should have priority has been translated into a 
strengthened operational focus on basic human resource development and social services, while 
emphasizing the importance of policy developments that encourage broad-based economic 
growth. 
 






Regional financial institutions 
 
Regional development banks have been set up for Asia (Asian Development Bank), 
Africa (African Development Bank), the Americas (Inter-American Development Bank), the 
Caribbean (Caribbean Development Bank), and most recently Central and Eastern Europe 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and are modelled broadly on the World 
Bank. All engage in financial intermediation to mobilize funding for on-lending to regional 
members. Except for the EBRD, all have a concessionary financing facility funded by grants from 
donor member countries. 
 
Regional cooperation institutions 
 
Various regions have experienced the emergence of regional organizations designed to 
promote more-or-less comprehensive economic and social cooperation among countries in the 
grouping. Membership is typically limited to countries within defined geographic parameters, 
often by invitation from a core group. Prominent examples include the European Economic 
Community, now the European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). These organizations are typically mandated to facilitate a broad range of interactions 
and to foster closer collaboration in policy and outlook.  
 
Some regional groupings may tend to focus mainly, if not exclusively, on particular 
issues or sectors of shared interest or concern, like the Club du Sahel, and may thus function more 
like sector-specific organizations. 
 
Specialized sector-specific regional institutions 
 
There are specialized international institutions whose mandate was determined by some 
specific concern, interest, or agenda. Membership is typically plurilateral, embracing countries 
that have a shared interest or concern regarding the issue(s) at stake. Examples include Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which largely limits itself to certain defined areas of 
activity pertaining to economic cooperation, or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). These sector-specific types of international or regional organizations may 
form around any issue that countries deem appropriate for collaborative efforts, and where 
plurilateral synergy and financial support can yield advantages that exceed what might be 
expected from unilateral action.  
 
Subsection 2.4 - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 
 NATO was originally established as an instrument of traditional alliance politics to deal 
collectively with the defence of Western Europe. Gradually, however, it evolved into a security 
component of the new post-war cooperation paradigm. In keeping with this transformation, 
NATO military officers, defence planners, and strategic thinkers were gradually but 
systematically co-opted into this new way of managing security policy. Signed on April 4, 1949, 
it comprises 19 West European and North American countries. In accordance with the Treaty, the 
fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by 
political and military means. During the last fifteen years, NATO has also played an increasingly 
important role in crisis management and peacekeeping partially as a result of the end of the Cold 
War, and the creation of a stronger compact of European Nations under EU. These modifications 
of the international environment have opened up many possibilities for the future of NATO, 






Subsection 2.3 - International Policy Regimes and Coordinating institutions 
 
Implementation of the cooperation paradigm has been accompanied by the creation of 
new types of international institutions designed to promote closer coordination and even 
harmonization of national policies in areas where international synergy is sought. In the past, 
powerful countries attempted to impose on others the same policy standards it took upon itself. 
During the post-war period, the Western democracies initiated new forms of policy coordination 
through the establishment of policy 'regimes,' such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), providing agreed rules-based frameworks for the conduct of international 
activities. The development and enforcement of these international regimes through the 
coordinated policy efforts of the countries concerned has militated against arbitrary actions by 
individual states, on the one hand, and anomalous double standards, on the other. Dedicated 
organizations were established to help service and enforce the application of these international 
regimes. The operations of rules-based policy regimes served to create balance and equity among 
partner countries of varying sizes, populations, and economic capabilities, while reinforcing the 
value of international cooperation. 
 
These new types of policy arrangements played an important part in making the post-war 
peace sustainable. By promoting the equal application of agreed rules to international activities, 
they helped construct a congenial post-war environment that was conducive to transforming 
former enemies into partners in international cooperation.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
 
The establishment of the predecessor to OECD in 1948 proved to be a landmark event in 
the development and application of the cooperation paradigm. The Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was set up to manage the Marshall Plan, with membership 
limited to the countries concerned, and by 1961 this had evolved into the somewhat broader-
based OECD.  
 
OECD groups together countries that share the same political outlook (democracy), 
economic system (market economy), and level of industrial development. Its purpose has been 
and is to facilitate policy dialogue and coordination among its members, with a view to creating 
common frameworks for economic and social policies, common definitions for national 
accounting purposes, and common standards for assessing performance. It conducts studies and 
proposes policy designs intended to improve the quality of economic management, or to derive 
lessons learned from comparisons of sector performance (e.g. agriculture, transportation) across 
different countries. OECD does not disburse funds and does not engage in programming for 
specific sectors of concentration. OECD member countries are themselves expected to adhere to 
mutually agreed principles, policy norms, and definitions.  
 
For most observers of international affairs, OECD is both a paradox and a mystery. 
Although many are familiar with the initials OECD, few understand the influence the 
organization has had in good governance and on economic progress. Its actual role is opaque, 
since a significant portion of its activities and deliberations take place behind closed doors and 
are limited to senior civil servants representing member countries. Often the outcome of these 
sometimes protracted processes appear so prosaic or even trivial that they are not covered by 
media reports. The modus operandi of OECD, of conducting complex negotiations over years 
rather than months, has not been described fully in the past, and very little has been published 




achievements. After 50 years of effort, and judging from the achievements of its member 
countries, OECD must be doing something right.  
 
In conceptual terms, OECD may be best described as one of the central institutions forming the 
international policy “regime” that governs the policy dialogue amongst the “Western” industrial 
democracies (including, of course, non-European/American members). A substantial portion of 
the policy dialogue that constitutes this international regime takes place within the framework of 
OECD. A policy “regime” may be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actors, i.e. “states” or “governments,” 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Koehane, p.57), including 
subjects such as regional economic cooperation. Ruggie (1982) offers a slightly different 
definition: “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and 
financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.” These definitions help 
characterize OECD as an international policy regime. This concept of regime reflects the notion 
of the paradigm shift, highlighted in Chapter 1. Movement toward a new cooperation paradigm in 
international affairs implies that some of the attributes of sovereignty be sacrificed voluntarily in 
order to reach a new type of consensual discipline. 
 
I will demonstrate throughout this book how OECD has played a catalytic role in the 
creation of wealth among its member countries. Such is the power of information as a public 
good, and such is the significance of international policy regimes.  
 
International Policy Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
The Economic Division of OECD (ECD) has established certain mechanisms to help 
address the challenges of enforcing international policy regimes in the absence of more formal 
systems of global governance. These mechanisms functioned within the consensus arrangements 
of OECD, and were managed through OECD itself, without permanent staffing or administrative 
systems of their own. For delinquent borrowers of official loans the mechanism was the so-called 
“Club of Paris,” an ad-hoc arrangement of the OECD; for unfair trade subsidies the mechanism 
was the OECD “consensus arrangement”; for matters concerning aid policy and criteria it was the 
Development Assistance Committee of OECD. This approach to enforcement enabled OECD to 
achieve a fair measure of coherence and consistency (if not participatory universality) in the 










Section 3  
International Development Cooperation 
 
The initiation of international cooperation for post-war reconstruction and development 
represented a conceptual watershed in the formulation and application of the cooperation 
paradigm. Beginning with the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction and continuing through 




international economic relationships in post-war Western Europe, and in developing countries 
after independence. The establishment of programs and mechanisms for the transfer of assistance 
from better-off donors to needy recipient countries was not merely complementary to commercial 
flows, but also in many instances aid actually led the rehabilitation of trade and investment. Aid 
was not a substitute for trade and investment; rather it exemplified a shift from traditional 
mercantilist precepts to a new perspective that situated commercial relations within the 
cooperation paradigm. Moreover, the precedent of economic cooperation helped almost 
everywhere to bolster the political sense of confidence and institutional capabilities. The 
structural symmetry thus induced, facilitated, and stimulated the expansion of international 
economic linkages.  
 
Subsection 3.1 - The Marshall Plan 
 
The principles of aid were initially formulated in conjunction with the Marshall Plan for 
post-war European reconstruction. This transfer mechanism was designed to provide American 
capital goods, equipment, and resources on concessional terms to war-damaged Europe, to help 
accelerate the rehabilitation of their production systems. Though invited to participate, the Soviet 
Union refused to take part and even prevented its satellites in Eastern Europe from doing so. Not 
only did this act of denial deprive these countries of economic assistance, it effectively severed 
Eastern Europe and the USSR from the newly emergent patterns of cooperation that were 
reshaping the economies and societies of Western Europe and North America.  
 
Meanwhile, the Marshall Plan helped restore the productive capacity of Western Europe 
in a relatively short time, and paved the way for closer regional cooperation within Western 
Europe, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community and culminating in the European 
Communities/European Union. Europe repaid its debt to the Marshall Plan both financially and 
through its subsequent achievements in sustained economic growth.  
 
Subsection 3.2 - The Colombo Plan 
 
The Colombo Plan had its conceptual origins in the British Colonial Welfare and 
Development Acts of 1940 and 1945. Encouraged by the Marshall Plan, but constrained by the 
chronic weakness of the post-war British economy, countries of the Commonwealth (including 
Canada) grouped together to formulate a plurilateral framework for transferring resources from 
richer Commonwealth countries to Asian developing countries, based on the same principles of 
international assistance. This became the Colombo Plan, inaugurated in 1950. Transfers of 
assistance through the Colombo Plan emphasized capital goods, equipment, and industrial raw 
materials deemed necessary to help the developing economies overcome infrastructural 
bottlenecks to their economic growth. The Colombo Plan, however, provided as well for food aid, 
technical assistance, and transfers of technology and knowledge, to help countries maintain social 
stability and advance to higher stages of development. 
 
Subsection 3.3 - Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
 
The evolution of ODA since the Colombo Plan and until the present has been guided by 
principles and rules adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These 
principles and rules are generally designed to enhance the elements of development cooperation 






Neo-mercantilism always looms in aid transfers, inasmuch as ODA involves subsidized 
procurements and deliveries of tradable resources - whether goods or services or knowledge - 
from donors to recipient countries. Early on, the donor community decided that it would be 
advantageous to them, for local political and economic reasons, to tie their respective aid 
contributions to procurements from domestic sources. This was known as “tied aid.” When the 
subsidy element in tied aid threatened to undermine commercial trading relationships, the donor 
community through OECD/DAC decided to adopt rules to mitigate the deleterious effects of 
concessional funding on trade and investment. Thus the ethos of cooperation that had been built 
up within OECD enabled the donor community to constrain their own otherwise predatory, neo-
mercantilist impulses. DAC likewise formulated rules and standards for areas where ODA could 
become ambiguous, such as aid quality and concessional requirements, eligibility, associated 
financing, and the principles underpinning various transfer mechanisms. 
 
Subsection 3.4 - Aid and the International Projection of Ideas 
 
ODA was involved from the outset, explicitly and implicitly, in the global ideological 
struggle with communism, and was envisaged by the Western donor community as a means of 
projecting the values of democracy and market economics to non-aligned developing countries. 
Certainly the Colombo Plan was, strategically, a Commonwealth-led effort to bolster the capacity 
of newly independent India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (followed later by other countries) to 
withstand communist subversion by promoting a more effective development model.  
 
In this ideological struggle, the West saw itself as enjoying a clear competitive advantage 
in the use of ODA to project values, though it remains questionable whether any real leverage 
was obtained thereby. In response, the Soviet Union and certain Eastern European countries 
offered their own forms of assistance, with a strong military component, which was particularly 
effective in cultivating ties with Arab countries. Western ODA excluded military transfers from 
the definition, and instead deliberate emphasis was placed on the linkage between development 
assistance and stability and peace. Indeed, ODA was officially conceptualized in OECD/DAC as 
“development cooperation,” expressing the notion that aid ought to project the ethos of a 
cooperation paradigm onto the developing countries. 
 
The notion of development cooperation carries with it the idea of connectivity, linking 
people and institutions horizontally and vertically. Aid has thus tended to emphasize the 
strengthening of communication linkages between and among institutions and communities. 
There has been aid support for regional cooperation, in South and Southeast Asia, Southern 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as an intermediate step toward more widely based, 
global economic and political arrangements. Innovative aid instruments were introduced to 
encourage the sharing of resources and knowledge to demonstrate the power of sharing ideas to 
developing countries. This has contributed to the emergence of a wide array of new 
communications networks between “North” and “South,” between OECD countries and 
developing countries. 
 
Along with information sharing has come the related idea of sharing standards and 
measurement norms for economic and social development. The availability of standard 
performance indicators for economic and social development was critical for multinational 
companies seeking to invest in unfamiliar new markets. Direct foreign investment by 
multinational countries in developing economies provided significant inflows of capital and 
technology transfers that combined with local labour and newly created infrastructure (often 
financed with ODA) to diversify and expand local production capacity. This has resulted in 




countries concerned, and an expanding supply of labour-intensive products from developing 
economies to world markets. Linkages between industrial and developing countries, between 
multinational enterprises and host economies, between direct foreign investment flows and aid-
financed infrastructure, between productive sector activities and public sector concern for good 
governance, social development, and environmental sustainability, have become increasingly 
pronounced as part of this globalization trend. 
 
The Marshall Plan was formulated in unique post-war circumstances. The Allied War 
Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the imposition of a new democratic Constitution onto post-
war Japan, signalled clearly that victorious powers intended to promulgate human rights and 
democratic values into recently liberated Western Europe and Japan. The founding of OECD was 
seen as instrumental to the propagation of these values, and to the harmonization of their practices 
among its member countries. Key partners shared this perspective, including the US, UK, France, 
and Canada, and all were prepared to face the challenges of democratization for post-war Europe 
and Japan.  
 
The times and circumstances were strikingly different with respect to aid to post-colonial 
emerging nations. In response to the spread of the Cold War to the emergent Third World, 
western donor countries chose to focus on the economic and social dimensions of the post-war 
paradigm shift in addressing the challenges of development in post-colonial Asia and Africa. 
Western aid was thus directed mainly at infrastructure development, agriculture, education, and 
health, a predilection that was shared also by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating 
at the so-called “grass-roots” level. By contrast, there was little, if any, aid involvement in the 
more politicized dimensions of the new post-war paradigm: in matters of human rights, personal 
liberties, governance, and democratization.  
 
This bias toward economic and social development, to the neglect of political 
development, reflected the ambivalence and ambiguity of Western donor and developing country 
objectives. Developing country governments invoked the high principle of National Sovereignty 
to exclude external donor interventions in politically or culturally sensitive domestic affairs. 
Multilateral and bilateral donor agencies were prepared to accept this exclusion, as did most of 
the NGO community. Aid donors were, in general, willing to rationalize their activities in 
countries ruled by dictators, where human rights were abused, or where governmental 
transparency was absent. It would seem that a considerable degree of complacency accompanied 
this attitude on the part of donor governments and NGOs. Thus, Jacques Chirac, then a former 
Prime Minister and candidate for President of France, declared in 1991 that, in his opinion, 
"...Africans were not ready yet for multi-party democracy." That perspective, which prescribed 
democracy as pertaining solely to the more sophisticated industrial countries, was widely held 
both in the donor community and in the developing countries. 
 
Progressively, the past 20 years have seen heightened attention being devoted to 
environmental and governance issues in aid discussions within OECD/Development Assistance 
Committee, and beyond. Renewed attention has been given to human rights and democratization 
and to promoting ecologically sustainable developments consistent with the principles of market 
economies. Among the considerations that prompted this sensitivity to governance and 
environmental matters was the manifest failure of the centrally planned economies, compared to 
accelerated growth and improved social equity attained by OECD countries. A conclusion was 






Subsection 3.5 - Aid Volumes and Impact 
 
In assessing the developmental impact of aid, I believe far too much emphasis has been 
placed on the sheer volume of ODA. It has often been argued, in both donor and recipient country 
circles, that the high overall levels of ODA commitment, which peaked at US$70 billion in 1994, 
could offer almost interminable support for large-scale infrastructure and social program 
development in recipient countries. In fact, ODA never represented more than one-third of total 
financial flows to developing countries. Even for lower-income developing countries, ODA 
disbursements averaged only about 5% of their gross national product, or about one-sixth of gross 
domestic investment. For some very small, poor countries, the share of ODA may be larger, since 
other resource flows were scarce. However, the proportional contribution of aid tended to shrink 
relative to the actual requirements of larger, more populous economies. It is necessary to adopt a 
realistic perspective on aid resource availability in order to avoid reaching misleading conclusions 
or raising unrealistic expectations. 
 
From my perspective, the essential purpose and role of ODA is to test ideas relating to 
development in a large scale, and in a relevant, developmental context. Thus, the ultimate 
significance of aid can only be evaluated with reference to ideas embodied in the project/program 
design and their developmental implications; for example, a hydroelectric dam and its economic 
utility; a telecommunications facility and its effects on connectivity; universal primary schooling 
and its consequences for increased income distribution and growth; a particular technology 
transfer and its ramifications on employment creation. It is the responsibility and benefit to the 
recipient country to make appropriate use of this evaluation. The information yielded should help 
define future development strategies, investment priorities, technological choices, and - very 
importantly - management models. 
 
 
Section 4:  
The Cooperation Paradigm and the Former Eastern Bloc 
 
In the heady aftermath of the destruction of the Berlin Wall, OECD countries found 
themselves confronting a dramatic and unprecedented challenge: what to do to assist the USSR 
and its Eastern European satellite countries achieve a peaceful, stable transition to 
democratization. Some maintained that the task of political and economic reform was of such 
magnitude that OECD countries would be called upon to offer a full array of ODA instruments to 
help these countries overcome their lagging development, while others responded that average 
real income levels in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union exceeded the eligibility criteria 
for ODA. 
 
Subsection 4.1 - The “Magic” of the Market 
 
One of the key arguments was that most of the countries of East and Central Europe and 
the Newly Independent States (NIS) already possessed, in fact, the human resource and 
technological endowments necessary to achieve considerably higher levels of economic 
performance. Accordingly, they insisted that these countries required only certain elements of 
market “know-how,” which arguably could be transferred through normal commercial 
mechanisms and bank loans. To this end, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development was established as a regional financial institution, albeit without an aid facility 





Subsection 4.2 - Reform: A Complex, Multifaceted Process 
 
If one accepts the premise of this paper concerning the emergence of a cooperation 
paradigm, then it becomes clear that the extent of the transformation required in order to bring 
about the reforms called for in East and Central Europe are overarching and all-embracing in 
scope and purpose. There are three considerations that ought to be taken into account in this 
regard: 
 
• Paradigm shifts can range in significance from a comprehensive transfiguration of the 
conceptual mindset to more singular changes in intellectual method. Be that as it may, 
they reflect, at once, a reoriented perception of the realities in one's environment, and 
indeed a new perspective of oneself in that reality. A paradigm shift may take hours, days 
or even years for the new perceptions of reality and changed perspectives of self in that 
reality to become internalized. 
• A decision to reform a part of a social system usually invokes corresponding changes in 
other related parts of the system. For example, transforming a Russian collective farm 
(“kolkhoz”) into a market-oriented enterprise involves substantial changes in the lifestyle, 
corporate identity, leadership, hierarchy, and incentives framework in the organization. It 
is just not possible to simplify and reduce this to merely changing the method of 
production, or even the ownership structure, as some have suggested. 
• A stable market economy is neither the outcome of some “Hobbesian” solution to social 
disorder, nor is it the product of relentless, unfettered acquisitive individualism. Markets, 
to function efficiently and effectively, require the rules and structure of civil society, and 
must be subject to surveillance and controls by a civil authority to keep them honest, to 
enforce contractual relationships, to sustain competition, and to mitigate socially unjust 
outcomes. Market economies thus involve a balanced, dynamic tension between 
entrepreneurial initiative and the societal precepts of cooperation. This balance can 
operate through law or custom, and in a modern market economy they will be 
administered by government and enforced by the courts. Governments, in turn, have their 
propensity to control kept in check by balancing mechanisms in their political and 
economic systems, and in particular their desire for markets to create and grow wealth.  
 
The challenge confronting advocates of structural reform is how to bring about a 
transformation away from an equilibrium situation that exists, and which offers some sense of 
stability and familiarity, even if the outcome - in economic terms - is not satisfactory, and move 
to a more dynamic yet orderly equilibrium that would offer improved prospects for economic and 
social development. The impulse to reform is simple to comprehend but extraordinarily difficult 
to implement. Its processes are poorly understood, and the path to change is uncharted. It is a 
question in search of an empirical answer. 
 
Subsection 4.3 - Need for New and Relevant Aid Instruments 
 
When the donor community focused on aid for newly independent emerging economies 
in the 1950s, it was necessary for donors to design new and relevant concepts of development 
cooperation and invent new instruments for the transfer of assistance. Today, conditions in the 
NIS region are substantially different from previous situations in either post-war Europe or the 
Third World. One would assume that an array of new instruments for cooperation and assistance 
would have been designed to respond to this dramatically new situation. In fact, except for the 
establishment of the EBRD, which had few innovative qualities, little new has been attempted to 




of assistance, and support for a paradigm shift that must accompany effective reform, remains by 
and large unrecognized among Western donor agencies.  
 
This gap, and the imperative for innovation in the development of new and appropriate 
forms of assistance, seems likely to become increasingly salient issues in the policy dialogue 
between Western aid donors and the NIS. 
 
The challenge of creating a relevant new transfer mechanism will be addressed later in 





Section 5  
Relevance of the IDRC and OECD Experience to Eastern 
European Countries 
 
The challenge of systemic reform is not unprecedented historically. Indeed, the countries 
of Western Europe and Japan also underwent sweeping reforms of their institutional and policy 
frameworks after the Second World War. At the heart of these reforms lay the adoption of a 
common definition of human rights and the introduction of democratic forms of governance 
within the context of a market economy. Previously, the political systems of Germany and Japan, 
and also of other countries such as Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, were volatile and 
repressive. This rendered Europe chronically vulnerable to internal and external conflict. The 
situation of Western Europe after World War Two was in some ways analogous to that of Eastern 
Europe following the collapse of communism.  
 
Certain OECD methods have been introduced into some central European countries since 
1982, and have contributed to the revitalized connectivity between Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia and Western Europe. The acceptance of OECD procedures helped to 
create an enabling regime that expedited the adoption and adaptation of new policy designs, 
institutional norms, and principles of governance in these countries. Today, most if not all of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union are becoming, to a greater or lesser degree, integrated into 
the global economy. The 1998 ruble crisis is indicative of this, in a perverse way: The monetary 
shock of the collapse of the ruble highlighted the need to strengthen the capabilities of these 
countries to manage their economic systems in a manner consistent with the OECD policy 
regime, which in turn would enable them to participate effectively in the world economy.  
 
It is important to emphasize the empirical character of the OECD negotiation process. 
The OECD approach to negotiations is designed to lead incrementally and over time to 
consensus-based policies and structures, which may be implemented by all member countries. In 
essence, the OECD process produces outcomes that are seen - by member countries - to be 
reasonable and acceptable. These policy outcomes are generally considered relevant and timely, 
and can be readily adapted to the specific needs of the member countries concerned.  
 
Some commentators and observers of the transformation of Russia and of other ex-USSR 
countries are coming to the conclusion that excessive emphasis was being given in policy 
development to World Bank and IMF prescriptions and interventions. The policy 
recommendations of these two multilateral institutions, perceived at times as externally imposed 




malevolent nor irrelevant per se. Their actual appropriateness and adaptability to local 
circumstances, however, can depend on whether they demonstrate an understanding of the 
premises explained previously, especially the central role of information in building a strong and 
modern economy.  
 
For example, some IMF critics may fail to understand the significance of maintaining a 
market-sensitive exchange rate, a cornerstone of international financial discipline, if they do not 
appreciate the role of exchange rates as a significant piece of information required by economic 
enterprises in making sound investment, production, and marketing decisions. Exchange rate 
information is one of a wide range of market-related data that must be kept current, reliable, and 
transparent at all times. Similarly, now that a significant and growing share of international trade 
is subject to ISO standards, which in essence is another form of information, individual 
enterprises find themselves compelled to adopt these standards in order to participate in and 
benefit from this new, standardized international trading environment. No modern market 
economy can be run with multiple standards, as occurred, for instance, in the USSR, where 
standards were generally high in the military, science, culture and sports, but for consumer goods 
and for basic infrastructure were relatively low. Therefore, a significant change of attitude is 
required with respect to availability and transparency of information. However, recent debates in 
the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments about curtailing access to the World Wide Web indicate 
how problematic it can be to internalize the concept of information as a resource for economic 
development and good governance.  
 
The rehabilitation of the Dnieper River Basin will require international cooperation, 
knowledge and information in development processes at the level of enterprise and municipal 
management, as well as for whole economic sectors like agriculture and mining. In all of these 
sectors of production, sound practices are called for to achieve high-quality production and, at the 
level of policy management, well-designed policies have to be drafted and rigorously enforced 
internationally. From our perspective, there are significant parallels and similarities between the 
project for restructuring the Sahel ecological situation and the present challenge of cleaning up 
the Dnieper River Basin. In the mid 1970s, the entire Sahelian region comprising nine countries, 
was faced with a devastating famine. This food crisis was inextricably linked with desertification 
and soil erosion. To resolve this problem, a well conceived collective effort was required. The 
consistent involvement of donors rested on them being confident that things could change and 
that Sahelian countries were prepared to do what was necessary to resolve this massive problem. 
Sahelian representatives, for their part, needed to be reassured that donors were really there to 
help and were determined to “go the distance” with them. This dual predicament rested on fears. 
To surmount this obstacle, an entirely new form of dialogue between potential partners as well as 
a new way of gathering knowledge in order to establish agreed upon policies were required. This 
is what the Club undertook to do.  
 
The task ahead with respect to the Dnieper River is critical for humankind as scarce water 
resources are going to become increasingly vital to ensure world peace in the coming years: 
currently up to 50 million people depend on the waters of this river for their day-to-day survival. 
This complex task is likely to span a 30 to 40 year period and will be an immensely costly 
undertaking. The best international cooperation practices will be called for in order to reach such 
goals.  
 
We are confident that “policy-driven coordination” can be a more durable and resilient 
means of intergovernmental collaboration than any other form of cooperative endeavour. A 
"virtuous cycle" can be initiated by building on a combination of interrelated instruments as 




those immediately concerned with the problem rather than by spending on costly and often 
irrelevant foreign expertise. This approach prepares the basis for informed policy dialogues 
among riparian countries, as well as with international partners. The result will be not just a better 
plan of action in the technical sense, but also synergy arising from the subtle interplay of peer 
pressure to follow up with implementation. National policies that are built on consensus have a 
greater chance of being implemented, and this in turn builds confidence among the various 
sources of external grants, loans, and investments. Project compliance follows naturally.  
 
IDRC's relevant experience, especially its seven-year involvement in the rehabilitation of 
the Dnieper in Ukraine, is discussed in Chapter 2. The basic elements of what we believe to be an 













Section 1 : Experiences in Development 
 
The Twentieth Century saw a large number of experiments concerning governance 
systems. Various forms of fascism in Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, and socialism in the 
USSR, Central Europe, Vietnam, Korea, and China, replaced the Nineteenth Century evolution 
toward liberal economies and the emergence of democracies. By 1945, fascism was more or less 
a defunct ideology, but Soviet-style socialism remained as an alternative to market economy and 
democracy until the early 1990s. In contrast to previous centuries, which operated more or less in 
accordance with only a few ideologies and governance systems, the second half of the Twentieth 
Century was marked by a great diversity of social and economic experiments. Even within 
Western style market economies, economists of all schools of thought had a field day as 
successive governments tried various ways to generate wealth, and to promote their development. 
Even the notion of development gave rise to an abundant literature and to various definitions and 
practices. All these ideas were exported in some form or another to developing countries. 
Successes were as diversified as the recipes, so to speak. 
 
In the final analysis, development seems to be the attributes of governments that adopted 
sound policies. Successful governments fostered the following basic conditions. They created a 
state of law and adopted rules that correspond well to their population’s aspirations, and dealt 
appropriately with existing cultural constraints and imbedded reflexes. Fundamental laws of 
economics must prevail for creativity, innovation, and freedom to thrive. At the same time, major 
social conflicts are averted and individuals are capable of getting justice. Governments, in turn, 
have their propensity to control kept in line through checks and balance mechanisms in their 
political and economic systems.  
 
This being said, it leaves a most haunting question unanswered: “Which policy or set of 
policies are likely to foster economic growth with a real measure of human satisfaction, as well as 
fostering long-term sustainable development?”  
 
In the following chapters, we will argue that some very broad policies seemed to work 
better than others, and have rallied a consensus as to their likelihood of achieving development 
goals. However, the devil is in the details. Democracy is multiform and so are market economy 
rules of conduct and know-how. Faced with a multitude of choices, governments must exercise 
clever judgement and appropriateness. Which management of public dialogue process is most 
likely to help in this task?  
 
 
Subsection 1.1 Lessons Learned from the Japanese Experience 
 
Comparing many types of experiments, we have come to the conclusion that all things 
considered, the most pertinent example of an effective approach to development is probably to be 





From 1630 onward, Japan closed itself from all outside influence. It closed all ports and 
barred all trade, except for a very limited amount of luxury goods that Dutch merchants were 
allowed to bring in through Nagasaki, under strict government control. Thus, for a period of two 
centuries, Japan avoided all cultural influence from abroad. It also missed out on the European 
technological revolution that started to gather speed and momentum in the 17th and 18th century. 
In 1843, Britain defeated the almighty Chinese army in order to gain trade access to China. In 
1853-54, the American Commodore M.C. Perry, heading a fleet of eight ships, forced Japan to 
sign a trade treaty and open its ports to American and European goods. The combination of those 
two shows of strength on the part of “distant foreigners” had the effect of altering Japan’s foreign 
policy, and it shook the entire country. In 1868, the young Emperor Meiji, with the help of a 
cadre of progressive samurais, stripped the Shogun of its power and embarked Japan into massive 
changes and modernization of all aspects of its economy and political systems. 
 
In December 1871, the Emperor of Japan sent a large diplomatic mission (up to fifty 
delegates) to America and Europe with the mandate of renegotiating treaties signed in the 1850s. 
A number of officials who accompanied the mission had been “tasked to study Western political, 
economic, and military institutions, with a view of identifying those that could most usefully be 
transplanted to Japan (Beesly, p.116). The mission was advised by American, British, and 
German ministries of Foreign Affairs, that Western nations were reluctant to renegotiate former 
treaties unless a variety of reforms, including a complete revision of Japan’s legal system, were 
carried out. Only then would the powers accept to enter into a new relationship with Japan. 
Furthermore, “the envoys had the evidence of their own eyes to show them that Japan had far to 
go before she would be in a position to negotiate on equal terms” (Beesly, p. 114). 
 
One can only surmise that the members of the Iwakura mission were astute and 
remarkable observers of Western knowledge and know-how. As a result of an “18 month 
worldwide search for best developmental practices,” the Iwakura Mission identified the following 
best applications: “at first a contract was passed with the Dutch to learn about their industrial and 
military technology. A Prussian military organization was soon retained with a general staff, a 
general college and a divisional structure. In 1869, the Japanese constitution, based on a Prussian 
model, was promulgated. Codes of law, based on the French and Prussian model, were adopted. 
A program of translation of Western scientific works was initiated, and as early as 1870, students 
were sent abroad to study sciences and Western science teachers were imported. A massive 
program of patenting and licensing was developed” (Beesley, p. 138). One should add that 
Japanese experts identified that England had the best or most appropriate manner of managing a 
navy, and it also proceeded to copy its organization. The result was that 30 years later, a country, 
which had not had a navy for two centuries, was able to defeat the somewhat powerful Russian 
navy in the Bay of Kamchatka in the war of 1905.  
 
Many analysts have regretted that the Japanese development model took the path of 
regional imperialism that was fostered by a military compact. On the other hand, hardly anyone 
can deny that the Japanese approach was extremely efficient to bring about modernity into a 
technologically and economically backward nation. Many lessons can be learned from that 
development process. 
 
First, Japan was informed without any ambiguity that its archaic (and perceived as 
barbaric) legal system was an obstacle to becoming a full member in the concert of nations. This 
forced an awakening within Japan’s governing body, leading to the adoption of a constitution, but 
equally and most importantly to drafting a civil code, a modern land tenure system, as well as a 
more liberal criminal code. Japan also introduced a great variety of modifications to its old ways 




from the West. In essence, powerful peer pressure from other sovereign nations was exercised. 
Peer pressure and peer review are central to progress and change and will be discussed at length 
in the following chapters. 
 
Second, what stands out in the Meiji development process is the discriminative analysis 
leading to the selection of western management systems. In other words, officials of the Iwakura 
mission studied and compared various organizational systems and selected from among all those 
the one that corresponded best to Japan’s tradition, culture, and developmental goals. It preferred, 
for example, the French Civil code to that of other European nations; it selected the British 
management of its navy, or Germany’s commercial code. And once these choices were made, 
Japan’s own trained specialists proceeded to adapt them within its tradition and culture. In 
essence, appropriation took place at the very early stages of development. It is my view that 
appropriation is not the result of foreign transfer of technology, but is, as demonstrated by the 
Meiji Restoration process, at the very core and at the beginning of any change process. 
 
In contrast, Development Assistance or Foreign Aid is premised on the belief that ideas coming 
from any industrial country are in the best interests of the recipient. In this way, each donor feels 
empowered to insist on exporting its own way of doing things, even if this means that different 
value systems will have to co-exist and contradict each other, thus generating discomfort and 
cynicism. Contrary to the Japanese restoration process, recipients of aid are often disenfranchised 
from developing activities. They do not take part in program frameworks, in the project design, 
nor in its implementation, and are seldom part of the post-facto evaluation team. Donors often 
moan about the absence of appropriation by recipients. Development is not something that is 
done to others, but something that must come from the inside. In other words, the acquisition of 
knowledge and technology must be internalized from the outset, not hoped for as an end result. If 
we were to draw lessons from the Iwakura mission, donors would open a dialogue with would-be 
(and presumably cooperative) recipients, help them identify which system best fits their own 
traditions, culture, and goals, and from then on, follow the lead from each recipient. The reverse, 
that is defining an “agenda for change” in donor capitals, is unlikely to breed the results one 
would hope for.  
 
Section 2 Era of Cooperative Undertakings 
 
From 1870 onward, Japan made tremendous achievements all by itself. Today’s world 
has changed; no country would go at it alone. The aftermath of the Second World War saw the 
creation of Interpol, NATO, and a number of scientific networks. These helped to promote 
research, innovation, and generally speaking, change. The creation of OECD to manage the 
Marshall Plan and to improve policies in Europe is a key example. Networks more or less 
happened, and became a fixture of everyday life. People such as Robert Lattès, one of the 
founders of the Club of Rome, have very aptly demonstrated the tremendous power of networks 
in the context of scientific and technological progress that have propelled our economies after the 
Second World War and still do. Lattes (R. Lattes, p.28) argues that scientific and technological 
progress as well as the ensuing economic growth have been accelerated significantly by networks, 
formal and informal. In his mind the West would not have experienced the technological boom 







“Standard organizations have a defined functional purpose, a clear domain of operation. It 
may provide a particular kind of service to a certain group of client.” For that purpose, it is organized 
in a very structured way. To ensure clear communications between the top echelons and the lower 
ones, as well as to minimize redundancies and conflicts, most standard organizations rest on a 
simple organizational chart where hierarchy prevails, as the guiding principle. The typical 
organizational structure of a firm or a ministry essentially replicates cybernetic arrangements, whose 
characteristics are simplicity and clarity Such arrangements also provide a clear and succinct road 
map for everyone to see who does what in the organization. For that reason, it fits well with the 
principle of accountability. Evaluation is possible and attribution easy to track and demonstrate. 
 
Lusthaus et al. have noted that networks are collaborative organizations between free 
entities such as researchers, universities, institutions, or a combination of these. It may also gather 
government representatives, as is the case in OECD. The needs of the group may not necessarily 
be very well defined at the onset, or they may change as the network progresses. Furthermore, it 
may not be clear as to who is doing what in the partnership; here again, this may change over time. 
They may or may not have legal existence. Instead, they are built around shared interests and 
business relationships. They are not clearly owned by one individual or one organization. Ownership 
is spread across the group. Because members may have multiple loyalties, they may adopt 
ambiguous behaviour depending on time and circumstances and multiple boundaries, the 
boundaries themselves being somewhat fuzzy. Because boundaries are fuzzy, performance 
assessment that is concerned with efficiency is problematic and attribution elusive (Lusthaus et al., 
p. 169-170). 
 
Sidebar 1 Organizational Forms 
 
Subsection 2.1 Informal Networks 
 
Networks are increasingly recognized as key instruments for knowledge acquisition and 
as sources of innovation. They are also heralded as central instruments for policy changes, 
because policy is often the product of better knowledge and wider citizen’s and civil society’s 
commitment. In various departments of the American Government, for example, the ability “to 
network” is part of the standard annual appraisal form. Employee performance is measured by 
one’s ability to manage and/or expand his/her specific network. 
 
There are many types of networks, including informal ones, such as we find among 
scientists in any specialized or multidisciplinary domain. There will be a few researchers who 
know each other, get together regularly at international symposia, and are used to exchanging 
views, ideas, and even their discoveries. There is no one officially in charge of making such a 
network operate. It runs by itself, in a sense, and its cost is small. It can be argued that, relative to 
its cost, it is a most efficient model: it can lead to great advantages, pecuniary and otherwise, 
while its operating costs are negligible. Such informal networks play a recognized role in the 
creation of knowledge and are often associated with new inventions.  
 
 
The Power of Informal Networks 
 
The dissemination of scientific and technical information does not come free. The key to 
the game is the rule of reciprocity. Trading information enhances and speeds up everyone's 





Back in the 1950s, when he was working at the Atomic Studies Centre of France, he had 
to deal with a tricky problem. Atomic research was then clouded in secrecy, for obvious security 
and commercial reasons. Nevertheless, scientists who met at international conferences had 
developed the habit of sharing discoveries. In one particular instance, British researchers had 
given to their French counterparts their plans for a new reactor being built in England. Reviewing 
the British calculations, French mathematicians and physicists were puzzled: their calculations 
suggested that the designs they had in mind should pose no risk of melting nuclear fuel 
cartridges, but when they tested these calculations on the British model, they discovered that 
there were in fact serious risks inherent in that model: they prepared a report on it. By 
coincidence, the very afternoon that they finished their calculations, they learned that some of the 
fuel bundles in the British reactor had melted, forcing them to shut the reactor down for several 
weeks. Needless to say, the French experts fired off their report to the British scientists as quickly 
as possible. Lattès marvels at the costs that were thus saved by the British and by the French 
atomic industries through this simple exchange. Speed in technical and industrial development 
was enhanced for the benefit of both countries. I would also argue that a measure of confidence 
was added to the confidence level of those trading partners. 
(R. Lattès, p. 133-134, translated from French by the author) 
 





Subsection 2 Multinational and Formal Networks 
 
At the end of a highly diversified range of types of networks, there are formal 
international networks, with imposing secretariats and structures and a respected identity. OECD 
and INTERPOL are two examples. They generally have legal existence in the country where the 
network has its secretariat; they may also enjoy international recognition. Furthermore, the Head 
of the Organization and the staff enjoy diplomatic status and privileges similar to those granted to 
country representatives. Members are representatives of sovereign nations, and they themselves 
are part of highly formalized and structured systems. Because of that, such networks may have 
the appearance of a standard organization. Appearances, however, are deceptive. These are 
networks with all the characteristics of networks as described earlier.  
 
Thus, the internal governance systems remain structurally different from those of a 
standard organization and should never be confused. Methods that are useful in standard 
organizations are destructive in any network arrangement. Because members retain sovereignty 
attributes throughout, command and control mechanisms and management approaches are the 
antithesis of network management. Because national representatives cannot adopt unambiguous 
behaviour, the organization itself must be able to retain ambiguity in its midst. Finally, because 
they wish to maintain flexibility and multicultural attributes are characteristics of the group, it 
follows that redundancies are an integral part of network adaptation. The attributes of 
productivity characterized in standard organizations are unlikely to work in networks, either 
informal or formal.  
 
Networks have to invent their own forms of productivity that are best related to their 
goals and membership. For instance, “standard organizations” strive to maximize efficiency by 
ensuring that the goals of the organization are well understood by everyone and enforcing those 
through corporate discipline. Redundancies can thus be reduced to a minimum. Networks on the 
other hand must encourage voluntary participation and ownership. In so doing members taking 




Secondly, as members retain their capacity to change their goals it follows that no network can 
have well-defined goals in a manner equivalent to those that characterize a well-run “standard 
organization.” Thirdly, country representatives constantly change as they are promoted or moved 
within their own bureaucracy. This creates discontinuities and needs for constantly re-explaining 
things to newcomers. Thus more time is needed to bind the group together, to define a typical 
style for the group so that members learn gradually how to behave and how and when to take 
initiatives. Two meetings per year might be needed instead of one. More documentation may 
have to be produced and the staff of the secretariat might have to work longer hours to ensure the 
proper functioning of a given network. In other words, a network feeds on redundancies.   
 
An interesting knowledge deficit has appeared in IDRC’s literature review on knowledge 
utilization and public policy processes. None of the various authors surveyed, at least before 
December 2001 when IDRC’s Study on Public Policy was published, were aware of the role 
played by OECD in policy formulation. Hopefully, this book will help reduce this gap.  
 
Section 4  
The Case of Former Soviet Countries 
 
Networks existed under Soviet regimes, at the national and international levels. The 
COMECON acted as a regrouping of Eastern and Central European economies. Internally, the 
Communist party was itself a major network, and a network of networks as well. However, a 
position of monopoly, it behaved as monopolies generally do: it worked hard at eliminating 
competition, or at enslaving nascent networks. In this manner, creation, innovation, and the 
emergence of new ideas were stifled. In all its doings, the Soviet system rested primarily on 
“command and control” techniques and methods of management. This is a Russian tradition that 
runs deep in its history. Under Stalin, this was pushed to caricatured extremes with devastating 
human and economic effects. But even after Stalin was discredited, soviet-style bureaucracy 
continued to run things in a highly centralized and authoritarian way. 
 
Perestroika introduced the dual desires to move toward democracy and market economy 
at the same time. It did little, however, to change ingrained bureaucratic reflexes. As a matter of 
fact, the ill-planned economic liberalization that ensued gave rise to perverse forms of anarchy. 
This compounded the fear of bureaucrats who still are not sure how to liberalize while 
maintaining law and order. In the Ukraine, independence created another series of related 
problems. In the past, all scientific or commercial networks were coordinated in Moscow. Once 
that link was severed, institutions and nascent ministries stood erect and alone like freshly cut 
straw. They instantly became stove-piped to the extreme. Horizontal cooperation between them 







Scientific Networks: IDRC Experience 
 
 




A third category of networks can also be identified that may be no less effective. It blends 
informality within a structured arrangement: these form a significant portion of IDRC’s research 
grants recipients.  
The promotion of networks to foster quality research, to build capacity, and to induce 
knowledge-based policy changes has been IDRC’s approach since its creation. Participants may 
include groups of individuals and organizations around a well-defined theme. This was the case, 
for example, of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) (see 
box) A network might evolve or give birth to even more structured knowledge networks, where 
the purpose is clearly to further the application of the knowledge generated, and to influence the 
drafting of national or state policy through participatory research and advocacy. These types of 
networks might enjoy legal existence, and a formal constitution. They usually generated their 
own governance systems in the form of a council, a board, or a governing committee. They might 
have a secretariat that is generally kept small. 
 
 
IDRC and CGIAR 
 
IDRC’s association with the CGIAR is typical of IDRC’s modus operandi. The CGIAR, 
established in 1971, is an informal association of 58 public and private sector members that 
supports a network of 16 international agricultural research centres. CGIAR's mission is to 
contribute to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through research, 
partnership, capacity building, and policy support. In 2002, it was accountable for funded 
research programs valued at US$331 million. IDRC was one of the founding members of CGIAR. 
Nine of the current 16 member research centres were either co-creations of IDRC (ICARDA, 
ICRAF, ICRISAT, IFPRI), were derived from IDRC existing networks (ICLARM, ILRI, IPGRI), or 
received substantial support during their critical early years (IRRI, WARDA). Supporting local 
research networks rather than relying on foreign expertise and technical assistance was based on 
the profound conviction that developing countries could do more for themselves than any other 
form of assistance. As the CGIAR illustrates, investing in networks and networks of networks can 
lead to resilient and durable instruments for development. (Hulse. J.R.1981)  
 
Table 4 IDRC and CGIAR 
 
 
But first, I must introduce IDRC to the reader. 
 
 
 IDRC’s legal foundation 
 
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a public corporation created 




its legal mandate "...to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the 
developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting knowledge to the 
economic and social advancement of those regions."  
 
To enable IDRC to meet the challenges of its mandate, the Parliament of Canada 
determined that the Centre would benefit from an extraordinary degree of autonomy. It is not an 
agent in law of the government, nor are its employees government employees. Yet, despite this 
measure of political autonomy, IDRC remains accountable to the Parliament of Canada and the 
Office of the Auditor General audits its operations annually. Unique to IDRC as well is its 
governance structure. A 21-member international Board of Governors leads it. The IDRC Act 
stipulates that a majority of members, including the Chair and Vice-Chair, must be Canadian. By 
tradition, ten governors come from developing and other OECD countries.  
 
The core of IDRC's funding is an annual appropriation from Parliament. While this 
funding is critical to IDRC's work, provisions in the Act allow the Centre to seek external 
funding. The Centre enters into strategic partnerships with like-minded donors, development 
agencies, and other institutions in Canada and worldwide. Over the years, 146 donors have co-
funded Centre projects. 
 
IDRC works with governments, universities, private businesses, remote communities, 
development organizations, and international agencies throughout the world. It has experience in 
consensus building and the development of multi-donor consortia for long-term support for 
research and training programs; for instance, it was named by Canada as a lead organization in 
the implementation of Agenda 21 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992.  
IDRC was also chosen to incubate the Institute for Connectivity in the Americas, one of 
Canada’s contributions to the 2001 Summit of the Americas. IDRC, in partnership with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, is also implementing Connectivity Africa, a 
Canadian response to the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan. 
 
The Centre hires staff from around the world, basing them in Ottawa and in regional 
offices located in Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi, New Delhi, Montevideo, and Singapore. It may also 
make use of project offices, like that in Kiev. It employs a multidisciplinary team of scientists, 
technicians, managers, and policymakers with broad experience in the physical, social, life, and 
information sciences, and is capable of administering large international projects. For support in 
its endeavours, IDRC draws upon a network of development experts from around the world. It 
has access to diverse networks of development thinkers and researchers, scientists, and 
policymakers worldwide and is unhampered by "tied aid" issues in choosing or hiring partners.  
 
Over thirty-four years, the Centre has provided more than CAD$2 billion in support of 
over 6,800 research projects in 126 countries involving more than 20,000 researchers and 2,800 
institutions. 
IDRC’s vision 
The Centre believes that sustainable and equitable human activity depends on people 
controlling their own social and economic progress, on commensurate access to knowledge of all 
kinds, and on an indigenous capacity to generate and apply knowledge. The mission of IDRC is 
"empowerment through knowledge," i.e. helping to optimize the creation, adaptation, and 
ownership of the knowledge that the people of developing countries judge to be of greatest 
relevance to their own prosperity, security, and equity. This mission represents an essential 




It is vital that the peoples of developing and transition countries be in a position to control 
their own "knowledge-based" development. Therefore, strengthening capacity for research, 
independent policy analysis, and accessing knowledge are critical. Analytical capacity in these 
countries must be strengthened to ensure that they can contribute as informed participants in 
major international debates, e.g. WTO and intellectual property rights over genetic resources. 
They must be able to deal directly with issues of domestic concern, like governance and 
economic policy, where, in the absence of indigenous capacity, the analysis by external actors 
may be all that is available and will carry undue weight. These considerations influence the 
program choices that IDRC makes.  
IDRC recognizes that respect for human rights and their promotion are integral parts of 
sustainable and equitable development, and are fundamental to research being carried out under 
conditions of intellectual liberty and unrestricted communication of results.  
As written in the Parliamentary Act, IDRC is enjoined "to enlist the talents of natural and 
social scientists and technologists of Canada and other countries," "to encourage generally the 
coordination of international development research," and "to foster cooperation in research on 
development problems between the developed and developing regions for their mutual benefit." 
These have all provided and will continue to provide direction to the activities of the Centre. The 
cornerstone of IDRC's future work will continue to be an ever stronger link to the aspirations and 
needs of the people in the developing and transition countries of the world. As stated in IDRC’s 
Corporate Strategy and Program Framework 2000-2005, the Centre’ strategic goals are to:  
• Strengthen and to mobilize the indigenous research capacity of developing countries, 
especially directed to achieving greater social and economic equity, better management 
of the environment and natural resources, and more equitable access to information.  
• Foster and to support the production, dissemination, and application of research results 
leading to policies and technologies that enhance the lives of people in developing 
countries. 
. 
IDRC's methodology  
Access to knowledge must be equitable. The ability to carry out analysis, to review 
options critically, and to write and to speak about them publicly - in short, to generate and to use 
knowledge - makes a vital contribution to social progress. This requires social innovation. There 
is no such thing as a technological fix. The technical ingenuity of humanity has far outstripped its 
ability to design and apply the policy, managerial, educational, governance, and institutional 
innovations required to improve well-being and to redress the stark inequities around us. Each 
society must devise its own solutions while learning what it can from the experience of others.  
Organizations like IDRC must contribute to strengthening the scientific and analytical 
capacity of developing countries. In the Centre's case, this continues to mean creating 
opportunities for our developing and transition country partners to carry out research and to work 
as equals with their peers in the rest of the world. Developing and transition countries must be 
able to be full participants in the discussions and arrangements that are driving, and responding 
to, profound global changes.  
In fulfilling its mission of "empowerment through knowledge," the Centre has 
concentrated on encouraging and supporting researchers in the developing countries to carry out 




in the Act of Parliament, "...to build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills, and the 
institutions required to solve their problems." Unlike most development agencies – this includes 
many NGOs as well, which hire outside consultants to study a problem, to conduct training, and 
to issue a report, IDRC's proven methodology utilizes local institutions to determine their own 
needs and to carry out the necessary work. By looking first to indigenous institutions when 
providing research grants, IDRC not only helps to build self-confidence in those institutions, but 
also strengthens those institutions' research and technical capacities. Moreover, because research 
is carried out by locals for locals, a greater measure of "buy-in" is ensured than if the work, 
however valid and technically sound, were carried out by outside consultants. A risk in using 
local capacity is that output quality can suffer: IDRC therefore uses its in-house expertise and 
worldwide networks of researchers and experts to guide researchers and to provide input and to 
bridge knowledge or technology gaps as needed.  
“For IDRC, the most significant decisions on how to convert the ideas into practice were 
taken during the Statement to the Inaugural Meeting of IDRC’s Board of Governors, in October 
1970. The following quote is taken from the statement made to the Board by IDRC’s first 
President, David Hopper.  
“In establishing the Centre’s stance toward co-operating institutions and research 
workers, I hold that it must be founded on a confidence that they, not we, are the best judges of 
what is relevant to their circumstances. Until this confidence is proven misplaced, I will be 
content to leave the direct management of our support in the hands of our partners, reserving to 
ourselves only the rights of audit and periodic substantive review.”  
 
Hopper envisaged collaborative networks of researchers meeting and devising their own 
techniques for self-monitoring, so that a new style of international operation would emerge “that 
can remove the stigma of charity and donor control from the support of research in development” 
(McConnell, p. 20-21). 
From this initial “Statement of Intent,” IDRC staff proceeded to develop ten partnership 
principles that served to turn this into know-how and operational ways of doing things that now 
characterize the work of the Centre. These were outlined by P. McConnell in an internal paper he 
prepared for the IDRC Board of Governors in 1998. They read as follows. 
“ IDRC’s involvement in a partnership will be guided by the following 10 principles: 
 
1. A Shared Vision. 
 
 Effective collaboration entails much more than a transfer of funds. It requires a 
commonality of purpose and a full intellectual partnership. There must be a shared vision about 
the value of the research work, the intended objectives, the potential outcomes, and the soundness 
of the methodological approach. This will require a foundation of trust and mutual respect, in 
which both partners are aware of the risks as well as the anticipated benefits. IDRC will use all 
options open to it to ensure that the program of work adopted and the operational mechanisms 
are fully responsive to the needs, priorities, and aspirations of the developing countries. There 
will be substantive participation by the South in planning and decision-making on Centre 
policies, strategies, and program choices. 
 
2. Joint Ownership. 
  
 An essential characteristic of a partnership is that all parties share ownership of 
it, and thus seek to pursue it as a joint undertaking. There should be joint elaboration of the 




partners and clearly delineated. The relationship cannot be dominated by the financial transfer. 
Instead, the partnership must proceed equitably among compatible partners, giving full 
acknowledgment to the different strengths and particular roles that each one brings to the 
activity, and which are essential for its success. 
 
3. Shared Control.  
 
  The partnership must provide an environment that enables the developing 
country proponents to take responsibility, to innovate, experiment, and learn, thereby further 
developing local competence. Within the context of agreed objectives and shared accountability, 
maximum decision-making and operational authority will be exercised by the Southern partner 
for managing the project and its funds.  In order further to reduce constraints, IDRC financial 
support will not be conditional on satisfying narrow or arbitrary procurement requirements. 
Indeed, IDRC will encourage the use of local resources wherever possible. Decentralized control 
may entail acceptance of higher risk by IDRC, but this is imperative for the creation of 
responsible partnerships and evolution of genuine empowerment. 
 
4. Reciprocal Accountability. 
 
 In a frank and confident relationship, where there is agreement over the rights 
and obligations of each partner, criticism and advice must flow both ways. Each partner should 
be willing and able to provide constructive criticism, and should also seek feedback on its own 
efforts. This joint monitoring of performance and mutual accountability provide a mechanism for 
ensuring quality control, and for identifying problems and their resolution. This process should 
be dynamic and ongoing, using formal and informal channels to ensure productive interaction.  
 
5. Sustained Commitment. 
 
 Sustained commitment means more continuity, less uncertainty for the research 
activity. Short-term grant allocations pose problems for research budgets and development plans. 
Adequate time is needed to build a strong relationship between partners, who will work together 
to resolve problems. Perseverence over an adequate time-frame is required in order to strengthen 
research capacity and achieve meaningful results. Partners must provide sustained support for 
the required duration, confirming their reliability and commitment. 
 
6. Flexibility and Versatility. 
 
 Each research initiative has many stages, facets, and components. Success can 
be compromised by the constraints of excessively rigid policies, slow response time, and 
piecemeal funding criteria. An effective partnership, based on shared objectives and mutual trust, 
will demonstrate the flexibility and versatility necessary to adapt to changing circumstances. It 
should also accommodate the full range of research support, covering, for example, training, 
international travel, capital equipment, library services, telecommunications, staffing, local 
overhead costs, etc. 
This versatility is reflected in the eligibility of both individuals and institutions, broad 
geographical coverage, absence of “country quotas,” involvement of public and private sectors, 
no minimum or maximum grant size, etc. 
 
7. Effective Communications. 
 




much more than a simple contractual relationship, and the interaction should reflect this. 
Partners must actively promote information-sharing in an open, timely, and collegial fashion. 
They must also respect the communication culture, resources, and perspectives of their partners. 
Opportunities should be sought to enhance communication through face-to-face meetings, as well 
as more frequently via the new electronic options. For its part, IDRC has aimed to build 
credibility and understanding by recruiting a competent and mobile international staff drawn 
from around the world. 
 
8. Streamlined Administration. 
 Many collaborative efforts encounter unnecessary administrative delays and 
other inefficiencies that decrease their value and effect. The problems can arise within any 
partner institution. Partners need to recognize this risk and constantly strive to simplify, reduce, 
update, and harmonize their administrative rules and regulations. Clarity of administrative 
procedures can be verified and improved by seeking input and feedback from partners. 
Performance in this area can be monitored through introduction of quality standards - e.g., 
extent of reporting requirements, tracking response times, availability of administrative 
instructions, etc. 
 
9. Coordination of Efforts. 
 
 Partners can strengthen international collaboration by communicating with 
other institutions (including donors) and coordinating their research efforts. Coordination can 
help reduce duplicate or conflicting demands on developing country research institutions. 
Alliances with other funding and development agencies can also help mobilize additional 
financial, policy, and program initiatives of practical assistance to the partnership. 
 
10. Effective Follow-Up. 
 
 The work of a research partnership does not conclude with a set of research 
results. There is an onus on partners to ensure the dissemination of findings (through 
publications, conferences, electronic networks, and other channels) and to promote their 
adoption and use. In some cases, negotiation of intellectual property rights and licensing 
arrangements may be required. It is also possible that follow-up may involve building new 
institutional partnerships (South-South, South-North, Public-Private, Multilateral Consortium) to 
continue the next phase of work. 
 
For comparison, here is an excerpt from a USAID policy statement:  
 
 “Partnership is a two-way street based upon shared rights and responsibilities. 
Each partner brings different but complementary skills, expertise, and experiences to a common 
objective. Each contributes to areas of comparative advantage that complement each other and 
are fundamentally compatible.” (USAID, 1995)” (McConnell, p. 8-10). 
As an example of IDRC's method, the need to establish baseline data on water quality in 
the Dnieper River was identified in 1993 by local and international agencies as the most pressing 
need related to the management of the River. In order to carry out the study, IDRC brought 
together three Ukrainian institutions and granted them funding to perform the work. The 
institutions were the Institute of Hydro-biology, the Ukrainian Scientific Centre for the Protection 
of the Water (USCPW), and the Hydro-meteorology Institute. Interestingly, these three 
institutions had never worked together in the past. To add value to the contributions of the 




facilities, in this instance, two Canadian organizations well known for their proven capacity: The 
Canadian Centre for Inland Waters and the Fresh Water Institute of Winnipeg. Hands-on expert 
support was also provided through the purchase of specialized analytical equipment from the 
United States, Canada, and Germany.  
The report on the condition of the River was first published in Ukraine by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (MEPNS) and became the basis for the adoption by 
the Verhovna Rada (Parliament) of the National Policy for the Rehabilitation of the Dnieper. 
Bearing in mind this link, it can be argued that the report findings were immediately appropriated 
by local authorities and internalized. There was no need in fact for IDRC to sponsor intermediary 
policy papers. The findings of the study were eventually published in the Water Quality Research 
Journal of Canada.  
Would-be recipients of IDRC grants, often introduce research projects that demand more 
capacity that they can put to the task. They may need specialized equipment or knowledge or 
technology they do not possess. IDRC philosophy is to look at the immediate region to see if 
another institution may complement the shortfalls of the recipient. In this fashion, IDRC has been 
responsible for the creation of a multitude of indigenous networks. Networks have the distinct 
advantage of being highly flexible, multidisciplinary, and less expensive than formal institutions. 
From the beginning of IDRC’s history, networks have been perceived as ideal vehicles for 
innovations and creative thinking. Networks are the main features of IDRC funding, so much so 
they are in and of themselves direct outputs of research grants. It has been observed that up to 
30% of IDRC’s funds are expended in support of network arrangements (Bernard, p.2). 
 
 
Assessing IDRC sponsored networks 
 
Networks are, in essence, social exchange arrangements, a process that needed to be 
better understood in order to manage and monitor this form of assistance with effectiveness and 
efficiency. Following years of experience in this area, IDRC has undertaken major studies to 
evaluate networks and networking. In 1995, the IDRC Evaluation Unit tasked Anne Bernard to 
answer three critical questions concerning networking “What are networks, how do they function, 
and with what effects? (Bernard, p.11).  
 




The study found that networks are a mix of various defining characteristics. 
 
 Networks are clearly more than simply technical linkages. As social arrangements they 
depend for their success on durability on members who commit to one another on a personal level 
for joint exchange, action, and learning. One respondent of Bernard’s study went as far as saying: 
“Networks are metaphors rather than clear-cut concepts. They are as old as mankind and have to 
do with communication, with intermediation between people so that things can happen; with 
doing things together. No one is self-sufficient. We all built our networks of help in order to 
survive.” (Cariola quoted in Bernard, p.14; Ibid, p.7).  
 
Networks act as forums for social exchange and build shared ownership of ideas or 




how they think or what they do as a consequence of this interaction. Networks that are considered 
effective were those in which by doing things together, members added value to what they would 
otherwise have done individually. The process of networking is important, including the 
development of a network culture in which members come to realize an awareness of themselves 
as part of the group, sharing a common purpose and mutual rights and responsibilities. Expressed 
another way, the issue is of establishing Shared ownership (Bernard, p.7 or p. 15). 
 
They also open opportunities, often by enabling a broader base for the generation of ideas 
and action. “Most networks can easily be described, in a positive sense, as opportunistic: either 
ex post, a number of initially separate projects linked eventually together in recognition of the 
complementarity or cumulative value of their work or of the potential for joint training; or a 
priori, a network put together as such to enable the respective advantages of participating agents 
collectively to serve a wider and better end” (Bernard, p. 8, 15). 
 
Networks have been found not only to sustain existing capacity but also to strengthen 
capacities over the long term. To achieve such results, a network requires “sufficient long time-
lines and consistent mandates to allow staff to identify and adapt training needs, and create 
learning opportunities. The need to be involved for the long term, even up to twenty years, 
certainly presents problems for aid agencies faced with diminishing resources.  
 
“One network member in Latin America referred to the value of informal referent-group 
networking as a critical means of “protecting against the abuse of our institutions” during 
repressive regimes” (Bernard, p.10, 17). 
 
Networks enable creativity and risk taking, two essential commodities when fostering 
development.  
 
“Providing the critical mass for moving beyond simply sharing, to be able to advocate, 
lobby and operationalize change. They allow cross-sectoral perspectives into the policy debate… 
give protection in expressing alternatives… provide a space within and for professionals and 
policymakers to move, explore and create together, within a context of suspended responsibilities. 
They’re a venue to encourage lateral thinking, to develop new agenda which might eventually 
make it into the mainstream. They free members from institution al limitations”. (quoted by 
Bernard, p.10, 18, from a network review workshop in Singapore, Jan. 1994). 
 
Networks play other essential roles such as providing an interface between indigenous 
groups and foreign donors, or providing access to a wide and loose configuration of actors, 
businesses, researchers, civil society, and bureaucrats. They might provide a means for scientists 
from closed societies, such as those that became opened to the West at the division of the USSR, 
to become exposed to international networks of scientists. This is quite important in hard sciences 
and essential in social sciences. 
 
They might become platforms for action, and in this fashion, networks have become 
important in policy formulation. Bernard gives the case of the whole Philippine NGO community 
that is exemplary in that regard. 
 
“As programming capacity, political and social analysis skills and management 
sophistication increase, domestic NGOs and people's organizations in that country are creating a 
vast array of networking arrangements — at national and local levels; across types and sectors; 
with government, donors and internationally. Though with a variety of specific objectives, the 




things to happen... (This) demands the synthesis and synergy of a multitude of perspectives, to be 
able to create a vision... This is where networks are most useful because (they) facilitate the 
process of gathering people with different views and organizations with different expertise” 





IDRC’s experience points to a few key factors associated with the success or failure of 
networks. 
 
 Networks are stronger and ultimately more sustainable when they simultaneously create 
solidarity around a shared purpose, and allow members to work together on a common task. For 
that, internal management must be kept flexible and internally driven. “Networks need to have a 
culture of informality, to maintain a family character…At the same time, task and 
professionalism are necessary. There needs to be a balance; a family, but with a structure of 
professionalism” (Branzuela in Bernard, 1995, p.16). Ownership is key to network sustainability: 
it is both a condition and an outcome of a successful network. “While people and institutions may 
join a network because they expect to get something out of it, it appears they stay active when 
their goals, stated and/or unstated, remain coincident with those of other members and the 
network adds value to their own work” (ibid, p.17). Successful networks function to best 
advantage when they are not rigid in organization or in functions, but are encouraged to evolve 
according to changing circumstances. Learning through diversity, that is the diversity of its 
membership, and creating shared agreements are two last but significant characteristics of solid 




A number of specific problems are associated with networking. From the point of view of 
donors, networks are inevitably looser and more ambiguous in implementation than anticipated in 
initial plans. Networks tend to allow for only loose control over what is happening inside them. 
They are difficult to monitor, because they give few early warning signs of going off track 
(Bernard, p.19). In terms of money, time, and energy, the building of a network is costly, 
especially at the front end. Most networks require at least five to seven years to reach maturity, a 
longer period than donors can accept. Networks are labour intensive, which is another vanishing 
commodity among donor agencies. Donors, pressed for immediate results and with fewer 
resources, have created a new risk by “creating too much standardization; of stunting the chance 
of innovation and of new ideas coming out by gearing too much to the more conservative agenda 
of donors and senior institutions, and too rarely challenging the status quo in research questions 




Risks can be mitigated through realizing effective balances in an explicitly recognized 
and effectively negotiated fashion. Networks generally operate at different levels: international, 
regional, and local. This breeds tension that successful networks surmount by balancing the 
needs of all parties. Often this is achieved through networks of networks arrangements, 
strengthening in this fashion the “think globally- act locally potential of networks” (ibid, p.21). 
Secondly, a symbiosis or balance is needed between different members (whether institutional or 
individual) and their environments. Members require a different type and level of support, and the 




arrangement” of the network.” Networks, almost by definition, have a multitude of needs and 
goals, as they are loosely coupled systems with mixed memberships. Goals of donors, for 
example, may conflict with those that form the membership of the networks; a compromise must 
be struck that keeps money flowing while preserving the loyalty and ownership of participants. 
 
Main lessons  
 
• As social arrangements, networks are inherently messy. Their implementation 
environment is multiple, shifting, and difficult to predict. The critical role of individuals 
is a determining factor, further characterizing the unpredictability of networks. 
• Networks are most effective “where they: (a) engender mutual agreements among 
members to enhance the value of collaborating toward shared goals; and (b) provide the 
support for such collaboration in the face of complex and unpredictable environments” 
(Ibid: p. 29).  
• “They are effective where they enable all those members, users and donors, who need to 
commit to the network to make it work to participate in the … ‘complex assembly job (of) 
fitting together (their) different interests and priorities’ (Ibid: p. 39; Fudge and Barrett in 
Najam, 1995, p. 13) 
• “…responding to authoritative decree, to available resources, to a chance to escape from 
failing institutions or professional isolation — may be sufficient to initiate participation, 
but is unlikely to sustain it….. Networks begun as a consequence of pull, therefore — 
toward realizing a defined goal, filling a recognized gap or simply perceiving a value in 
coming together — are more likely to persist” (Ibid: p. 39). 
• “…networks are successful where they are learning organizations. Effective networks act 
not simply on the basis of optimizing within constraints (Metcalfe in Armstrong, 1995, p. 
27) by attempting to force-fit predicted, linear and regulated programmes of work onto 
dynamic policy and client communities. Rather, they hone capacities and create 
mechanisms for the regular feedback and reflected analyses that are needed to deal with 
the ambiguity of these environments, and to adapt interactively with them” (Ibid: p. 39).  
• Solid network arrangements are those “most likely to encourage in leaders and members 
the kinds of risk-taking behaviours research indicates as necessary to implementing the 
policy, programme and methodological innovations typical of networks” (Ibid: p. 40).  
• “Adaptation, as distinct from simple adoption or co-opting, implies that both the 
innovation and the environment change as a result of the interaction. It is this mutuality 
of adaptation that is perhaps most central to assessing the sustainability of a network: is 
it able to adjust to, and introduce permanent change within the conditions of knowledge 
and/or action it is intended to address?” (Ibid: p. 40)  
 
Subsection 2.3 Linkage between Research, Networks and Policy Setting 
 
Historically, IDRC has always been occupied, to one degree or another, with the idea of 
influencing policies in the South to effect positive change. In 1999, IDRC began a major study to 
develop a deeper, more distinct understanding of what is meant by “influencing policy” in order 
to improve programming efforts. To meet this need, the Evaluation Unit undertook a strategic 
study designed to answer three fundamental questions: (1) what constitutes public policy 
influence in IDRC’s experience; (2) to what degrees, and in what ways has IDRC-supported 
research influenced public policy; and (3) what factors and conditions have facilitated or inhibited 





In addition to a literature review, a conceptual framework was developed to guide the 
strategic evaluation. A second element of the study consisted of 25 field studies. These studies 
include more than 60 projects in over 20 countries. Since there is relatively little documentation 
and literature with respect to policy processes in developing countries, a broad scope was 
preferred to better understand and report on this area. 
 
There is a vast range of types of policy influence that rests on a continuum between 
“direct impact,” or research that directly affects legislation, and which are considered to be more 
broadly defined such as, for example, “changing the prevailing paradigm” or “enlightening” 
policymakers. Research for development is located “upstream” from any kind of actual 
development “impact.” Because a linear process is considered too simplistic in its presentation of 
policy processes, most policymakers and academics have discarded the notion of research directly 
influencing policies and policy processes. This renders attribution of results difficult in the best of 
circumstances, at times presenting an unrealistic challenge. 
 
For the purpose of the study, three forms of influence surface: 
 
• Expanding policy capacities by supporting new research, the development of new fields 
of research, enhancing researcher capacities to work on problems or issues as distinct 
from carrying out disciplinary research, as well as enhancing their capacities to 
communicate knowledge and ideas to diverse audiences. 
• Broadening policy horizons by increasing the accessibility and completeness of 
knowledge through multi-country networks of researchers or through networks that bring 
together researchers and others in the policy community. It may increase the stock of 
policy-relevant knowledge; introduce new ways of thinking into the policy arena; or 
ensure knowledge is available to policymakers in forms that make it possible for them to 
use it. 
• Affecting policy regimes is about the actual use of research in the development of new 
laws, regulations, or structures. The most important role for research in the policy process 
comes normally at the earlier stages of drafting research findings in ways they can find 
their way into the body of knowledge of policymakers, to be part of the decision process 
when laws, regulations, and policies are undergoing changes. This suggests it will always 




The role of networks in policy changes has always been recognized as central. They are 
the institutional mechanism that supports North-South and South-South cooperation, linking 
people and institutions in order to advance and utilize knowledge. In this way, researchers have 
been able to build skills by working with other researchers with common problems. Many 
research communities in the South are small, fragmented and significantly under-funded. 
Networks are thus useful and viable mechanisms that enable researchers to carry out their 
research as well as provide them with funding opportunities, information sharing and mutual 
learning, technical support, and training. Since networks are also a manifestation of “trans-
national knowledge” these cases also provide examples of the challenges of capturing evidence of 
any research uptake. 
 
The preliminary analysis of trans-national cases confirms the hypothesis that networks 
are strong mechanisms for influencing policy and provided evidence that is consistent with earlier 








Capacity building is not just about building the capacity of researchers to do research. It 
is also about building the capacity to carry out policy-relevant research and to communicate the 
findings effectively to policy and decision-makers. This can be achieved through career 
advancements, the credibility/reputation of the research and/or researcher(s), and through 
networking. As policymakers recognized the quality of the research, they became more accepting 




The notion of ownership is closely linked to capacity building. IDRC supports programs 
and projects that build the capacity of researchers and policymakers to use their own 
research/researchers. This encourages the uptake of research within, and therefore influences 
policy from within. If the developing countries are really to be ‘in the driver’s seat,’ they have to 
have the capacity to analyze the often difficult economic issues they face. Local researchers, 
combining the knowledge of local conditions – including knowledge of local, political, and social 
structures (with the learning derived from global experiences) provide the best prospects for 




Many projects in this study are long-term commitments. IDRC supported two successful 
networks over periods of 14 and 15 years, recognizing that building capacity to research takes a 
long time and that it’s not a “single project effort.” The same holds true for the uptake of research 
for the purpose of developing policies. 
 
Intent 
As much as possible, the intent to influence policy should be part of the project design, 
not an add-on at a later stage of the project. Trans-national knowledge, and its use, has a 
cumulative effect and this needs to be explicit. This takes time to develop, and in one case, this 
took over 14 years. A distinction must be made between supporting researcher capacity to 
influence policy with research, and advocating a particular position. The latter is not the mandate 
of the Centre; the former is. The distinction is most clearly drawn around the capacity-building 
dimensions. What is challenging is that the capacity is built most effectively through practice and 
engagement where the researchers begin to use the research findings as part of building their 
understanding of how to use findings. In this there is a fine line. 
 
Communication and dissemination 
 
Findings are consistent with the well-documented difficulties researchers face in terms of 
their ability to communicate their findings, especially in formats that enable policymakers to 
easily understand and absorb the information. The informal nature of policy influence is not well 
understood or accepted by many researchers. Enhancing the use of knowledge is often achieved 
through informal relationships and through creating windows of opportunity to speak with, and 
provide ideas to, policymakers. 
 
Review of the cases has clearly articulated the non-linear nature of the influence of 
research on public policy; it is multi-path, uncertain, and changing over time. Within donors, 




find the funds needed for communication and dissemination activities. The conservative 
approach, therefore, is to commit funds only when staff and partners know there is strong 
potential. As a result, dissemination is often too late. Rather, researchers need to be engaging with 
the policy community early. New modes of project support need to be explored, which allow the 
elements of the research to be exposed to the relevant communities on an ongoing basis. This 
might be as simple as creating multiyear flexible budgets and making communication and 























Section 1. Introduction  
 
Following the formation of democratic regimes in Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, 
OECD members considered extending Official Development Assistance (ODA) credits to the 
region to help finance the transition from centralized and planned economies to market 
economies. Within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, however, some 
members argued that Russia, Ukraine, and many other FSU countries were resource- and 
technology-rich, thus less in need of highly subsidized grants from aid budgets. Furthermore, if 
they were allowed to compete for scarce ODA funds, the poorer developing countries were bound 
to receive less aid. Aid would likely be displaced toward FSU countries as they appeared critical 
to geo-political interests of OECD members. In the end, OECD members decided that some 
newly created republics such as, for example, Central Asian countries, could be added to the 
existing list of poor countries and thus eligible to ordinary ODA funds. Others, such as Russia, 
could benefit from special funds created for the purpose of assisting their transition, by donor 
countries on a voluntary basis; however, these funds should not be used to measure donors’ aid 
performance. It was generally believed that these countries only needed some blend of subsidies 
and private capital to “kick start” the transition. 
 
In 1993, the Government of Canada created a $100 million “Renaissance Fund” for that 
purpose. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with implementing this fund. In 1995, 
however, the Government moved the management of this “Renaissance Fund” to a specially 
created branch of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Private entrepreneurs 
were invited to seek out local partners in FSU countries with whom they could restructure 
existing industries or enter into new joint ventures. It was believed that Canada had capital, 
technology, and know-how to offer that could blend with existing CIS industrial and resource 
capacity.  
 
In keeping with traditional development assistance etiquette, local governments were 
consulted on priorities for the usage of such funds. The Government of Ukraine at that time 
insisted upon receiving assistance toward the cleaning up of the Dnieper River. Seven years after 
the terrible Chernobyl accident, the Ukrainian population was still weary of the safety of this 
body of water from which thirty million people drew their water. It was said that “mothers fear 
giving the water from the River to drink to their infant.” What to do with this problem required 
careful consideration and research. For that purpose, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought the 
expertise of IDRC in environment and research. IDRC’s founding law constrained it to 
developing economies from the South, however, the Board of Governors allowed IDRC’s staff to 
work on this program with the strict proviso that all necessary resources for this program, 
including core administrative costs, come from outside sources. 
 
In 1994, IDRC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada initiated a program of 
activities called Environmental Management Development in Ukraine (EMDU), to be managed 
through IDRC's newly formed Office for Central and Eastern Europe Initiatives (OCEEI). The 
suite of activities focused on the Dnieper River Basin, and pursued a multifaceted approach to 
environmental management capacity building in relevant Ukrainian ministries, research and 
educational institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In 1997 a second phase, 





The goal of the program was to support and to strengthen the onoing reform process in 
Ukrainian institutions for better environmental protection activities, improved economic policies, 
and increased environmental awareness. The program objectives were to:  
 
• Promote business/investment activities that have a favourable impact on the environment 
of the Dnieper Basin. 
• Improve environmental management in manufacturing, the residential sector, 
municipalities, and agro-industry. 
• Increase the Ukrainian public's environmental awareness through the media and 
educational institutions. 
• Promote measures to improve the provision and optimize the use of drinking water. 
• Improve environmental management practices through training. 
• Enhance international environmental management of the Dnieper River through 
cooperation with riparian and other international partners.  
 
The EMDU program encompassed nine related projects broken down into specific 
activities. These included projects such as: Base Line Studies of the Quality of the River Waters, 
Water Management Information Systems, Public Outreach activities, Environmental Audits and 
the Introduction of Clean Production Methods, and a number of others. The contracting party 
representing Ukraine was the Ministry of Environment, known then as the Ministry for 
Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (MEPNS). 
 
Over a period of seven years, IDRC provided grants to 70 discreet research activities 
varying in size from CAD$10,000 to CAD$250,000 for one large undertaking. In total, CAD$12 
million was spent toward this objective. 
 
Section 2. Learning to work in Terra Incognita 
 
Sub section 2.1 Moving away from the Soviet era  
 
“International technical assistance to Ukraine did not really exist before 1991, when 
Ukraine gained its independence. Receiving grant money, especially receiving it from former 
foes, was definitely a new concept. At first, some influential officials were even against the idea 
of receiving any "paltry dole" from "capitalistic hands"; the "self-sufficiency" ideology 
dominated, with the world changing faster than minds. Many perceived that western donor 
agencies were coming simply to collect data about the current status of science and to state the 
problems, but were not there to help resolve these problems. When the first years of 
independence passed and the economic miracles did not happen, Ukainians realized that 
structural changes were necessary, and that without western money and know-how economic 
growth in Ukraine would remain elusive. Industrial countries started to be perceived, not as a 
source of danger, but as a source of funds and ideas. Fear and pride began to dissipate and 
Ukraine found itself in free competition with the South for the North's grant money. Yet, in the 
event, it became obvious that the absorptive capacity for western assistance was low.  
• During the Soviet era, numerous research institutes and ministries were accustomed to 
abundant budget financing. In particular, fundamental research found favour in the state 
budget. The strategy for receiving financing was to submit a proposal containing a thick 
folio full of scientific jargon, very detailed background information, and a long list of 
references. Budgets consisted of only the total project sum, which was intentionally 
doubled or even tripled. Peer review and systems of checks and balances were not 




related to an established network of decision-makers, government officials, and civil 
servants. Therefore, positioning one's institution well in those networks ensured a regular 
flow of research funds.  
• When international technical assistance became available, research institutes began using 
the same approach that they did in the past to get funds, with many perceiving the 
assistance as a continuation of budget funding. This was the first stumbling block for 
Ukrainian scientists and researchers looking for donor aid: the strategy that worked well 
for the Soviet bureaucratic machine became useless for foreign aid projects. Demands for 
"unwarranted details" were often perceived as fault-finding or even espionage. It was 
feared that by answering such probing questions, scientists might run into problems with 
authorities. The flexibility shown by some donors, along with their tolerance and 
understanding, were the main reasons for the acceptance of technical assistance in the 
first years of Ukraine's independence.  
• By the mid 1990s, almost all research institutions in Ukraine had had some exposure to 
the grant process. They formulated an assembly line approach to proposal preparation: 
identical proposals were sent to different donors, duplicate reports were submitted as 
outputs, and old data were used.  
• By the late 1990s, proposals fell more in line with donors' demands: years of teaching 
and learning yielded fruit. Nonetheless, the technical and budgetary content remained 
poor.  
• In the early and mid 1990s only US, Canadian, and UN agencies were working in 
Ukraine in the environmental field. By the late 1990s Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Finland also became active. Every donor has its own target areas, expectations, and, 
most importantly, implementation mechanism. From the perspective of Ukrainian 
recipients, most of the implementation mechanisms looked alike: to spend as much 
money as possible in the donor country itself. Some donors applied puzzling “tied aid” 
rules that forbid recipients from buying equipment outside the donor's country, while 
others refused to make use of local consultants, relying solely on western consultants. 
The main outputs of such assistance were reports that often were not even read by local 
officials and decision-makers. For this reason, the Verhovna Rada (the Ukrainian 
Parliament) and the Cabinet of Ministers admonished donor agencies. After much 
hesitation, international technical assistance was eventually exempted from VAT and 
import duties by President Kuchma's decree only on June 1, 1999, 8 years after 
independence. The exemption lasted exactly 2 months, with the Verhovna Rada 
overturning it on July 30, stating that the provisions of the proposed decree were 
insufficiently rigorous as "in many cases international assistance that is not required is 
given to Ukraine." In particular, the Verhovna Rada wished to ensure that such 
exemptions would not be turned into loopholes for tax-free commercial imports, nor 
become a means for western interests to rid themselves of poor quality products and 
services” (Guilmette and Iskra, 2001, p. 83-84). 
• At first, the high level of secrecy, euphemistically referred to as “soviet caution” 
characterized Ukrainian scientists’ behaviour. They were reluctant to share essential 
information among themselves, with their own civil society and, with foreign experts, 
including lending agencies such as EBRD. “Soviet caution” hindered the implementation 
of the program. On the one hand, the fact that foreign experts could use information was 
risky for those who provided such information. In particular, a 1937 law decreed that the 




otherwise, malevolent foreigners could poison an entire city. One scientist who was part 
of an IDRC-sponsored research project faced criminal prosecution for violating this law 
while conducting approved research. In addition, program participants had difficulties 
getting information from other government organizations. At times, they had to pay for 
data.  
• In Ukraine, decision-makers perceived the lack of concrete and applied scientific research 
as a major constraint for its utilization. Researchers for their part believed that the under 
utilization of their research product was related to the inability of the decision-makers to 
think globally, to define their needs, and to realize the importance of the issue. 
Disconnection between policy and research was also seen as resulting from lack of 
coordination among universities, institutes, ministries, and local administrations, except 
when research institutes were directly subordinated to a particular state body. 
 
Twenty-five years of partnership with the South did not fully prepare IDRC to meet the 
specific challenges prevailing in CIS countries. Eventually, we had to remind ourselves regularly 
that a vast majority of Asian, African, and Latin American countries shared many values and 
patterns of behaviour with us. Most developing country elites were trained in universities of the 
North, where they became familiar with northern governance systems through years of colonial 
rule. At independence, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain left behind various 
administrative and legal systems as well as diplomatic traditions that, for the most part, still 
operate today. In addition, most tenets of a market economy were never as profoundly challenged 
as they were under Soviet rule. On the other hand, countries under Soviet rule were closed for 
seven decades and missed out on many of the paradigm shifts that characterized western 
evolution in the twentieth century. In contrast with many countries in the South, however, 
education in CIS countries was widespread, and diverse scientific institutions operated within a 
well-structured system. Technological knowledge and equipment as well as the capacity to 
produce research equipment were well advanced, unlike the case of developing countries. 
 
Sub section 2.2 How IDRC Managed the Program  
 
To cope with this unique environment, IDRC had to adapt quickly and tailor its approach 
to resolving unprecedented problems. It became obvious from the outset that pragmatism should 
govern our work. As an example, one of IDRC's very first "research grants" was for the gathering 
of telephone numbers within the Ministry of Environment Protection and Nuclear Safety and the 
publishing of a phone directory.  
 
In the South, IDRC provides research grants directly to local institutions by making use 
of one of its six regional offices to transfer moneys and to provide technical and administrative 
support locally. It frequently makes use of existing research networks, or creates new ones, to 
guide the overall research process. In Ukraine different means had to be found. On the one hand, 
it was impossible for IDRC to provide cash grants to local research institutions or to NGOs. On 
the other hand, a strong tradition of centralized power and a deep suspicion of anything foreign 
barred IDRC from interacting directly with local institutions or from creating “bottom-up” types 
of networks. The cooperation of the Ministry of Environment became an essential element. The 
various ministers and deputy ministers who oversaw the Ministry during those seven years were 
determined to improve the quality of the water in the Dnieper, or as transliterated from Ukrainian, 
Dnipro, and to make good on Canadian cooperation. Their full collaboration and strong 





Dealing with management and project selection issues  
 
A Ukrainian Management Committee (UMC) was created at the outset of this diversified 
program to provide coordination between various departments and research institutions and with 
IDRC. In October 1995, the President of UMC, Dr Shevchuk, raised at the occasion of a private 
meeting an issue that was creating great strain within UMC. A contract had been let by IDRC 
with a Canadian firm. His view and that of his Committee was that this contract was costly for 
work that could be done by a local organization. He was also concerned that program resources 
had been appropriated by IDRC without the full consent of the Ukrainian Management 
Committee. In his view, this was reducing its authority and accountability over these funds. 
 
The contract had been let under CAP (Centre Administered Portion) in accordance with 
IDRC’s own rigorous rules. The Terms of Reference corresponded to an activity within the 
agreed project plan. The selection of the firm followed a tender that fully complied with rules and 
regulations. In sum, there was nothing inappropriate in the way it had been let. Nevertheless, I felt 
this issue was of significant importance and I took the decision to grant his wish. From then on 
and for the following six years, all program activities were first assessed and decided upon by the 
Ukrainian Management Committee. It was empowered to draft policy, to set priorities, to allocate 
research resources, to select local partners, to assess proposals, and to review scientific results. In 
sum, the Committee was providing overall governance to the program. Through this process, the 
UMC selected implementing agencies. In a number of cases, this involved a Canadian or 
international firm that would act as partner to a local organization. 
 
It has proven to be an invaluable mechanism that corresponded well with the culture of 
the region. It provided needed discipline and rigour as well as a forum for discussing problems, 
raising issues, and debating new ideas. Most of all, it fully involved Ukraine and Ukrainians in 
every decision, and significantly contributed to stimulating their feeling of ownership and 
responsibility. It may be argued that the Management Committee was the embryo of a peer 
review system. The commitment of Ukraine was constant and unfaltering throughout the duration 
of EMDU, and despite the fact that two elections took place, the head of the Committee remained 
in place and the Committee continued meeting monthly.  
 
OCEEI staff members were consulted throughout the process. They provided comments, 
suggested improvements, and did due diligence on every case to ascertain the implementation 
entity was capable of delivering the output as planned, on time and on budget. Once the UMC 
had done its part, that is either approved a project, the selection of an implementation 
organization, or a report, then the OCEEI management team would do its part and confirm 
funding for the activity, sign a contract with the selected organization or proceed with making 
final payment. In essence, EMDU operated like a two-keys safety box as found in bank vaults: 
each party remained fully accountable for its role in the entire process and both had to concur 
about each decision. Argued differently, it operated according to consensus rules as it is practiced 
in OECD.  
 
IDRC eventually realized that, during the Soviet era, the military was the only client that 
effectively took care of transforming a new technology into practical usage and deriving know-
how. Highly trained scientists in Ukraine had acquired little experience in those fields, and the 
search for improved know-how and management became our most pressing task. 
 





The problem of disbursing untaxed funds for local research remained unresolved for 
some time. Faced with what can only be described as "predatory" fiscal systems, IDRC had no 
choice but to help the Ministry of Environment find a durable and practical solution for moving 
aid resources into the country. For that purpose, the International Dnipro Fund (IDF) was created 
based on a model initially operating in Poland. This Ukrainian NGO was empowered to collect 
fines and grants and spend them for the purpose of improving the Dnieper's environment. This 
became the conduit of IDRC's grants to local research institutions and remained its only 
mechanism until the EMDU ceased to exist. The Dnipro Fund has expanded its activities to 
promote environmental audits, and it now functions as a fund-raising organization and has 
established branches in Belarus and Russia.  
 
Critical elements for success 
 
We believe fully empowering our Ukrainian partners, was central to the project achieving its 
goals. The funds were perceived as a true, and very scarce, Ukrainian resource whose usage 
should be maximized at all times. As a consequence the UMC ensured that cumulative savings be 
put to best use, that projects be carried out without cost overruns, and reports and results be of the 
best quality possible. When outside experts were budgeted, it was then clear to everyone that no 
local and/or less costly alternative could be found. Feeling in charge, the UMC never lost sight 
that these resources were meant to improve the quality of water flowing in the River, thus, when 
appropriate, government policies were changed. 
 
We strived to introduce cooperative habits between formerly stove-piped institutions. We 
invested in bringing about confidence and trust where soviet practices had planted mistrust and 
fear. We gradually introduced modern management practices, such as budgeting and measuring 
unit costs, and reporting against budgets and against outputs. We introduced information-sharing 
practices and imbedded those ideas into water management systems. With the concept of 
information sharing came the related idea of sharing standards and measurements, and of 
involving the widest possible audience made up of individuals and groups (companies, 
associations, institutions).  
 
Section 3. Components of the EMDU program and immediate 
results 
 
The major components and major projects of the program were: 
 
Water Pollution Control  
 
In autumn 1994, the Baseline Water Quality Study was undertaken to provide reliable 
information about surface water pollution. Information about the state of the River was obtained 
and organized, and a network of scientists and managers has been providing data on-line for the 
management of the River ever since. 
 
Water Toxicology  
 
WaterTox project (phases 1 and 2) was aimed at demonstrating the validity of a battery of 
inexpensive and simple, yet effective, bioassays to test water. The Joint use of Biotests project 
allowed the recipients to compare the effectiveness of the WaterTox battery with that of another 




Problems. Ukraine is now participating in an international network for testing and calibrating 
water quality using bio-testing methods. 
 
Information systems development  
 
A substantial number of projects were aimed at informational support and creating 
computer-analytical databases that deal with the chemical composition and the quality of the 
Dnipro water. A National Atlas of Ukraine project led to the development of an Electronic Atlas 
version, which was widely distributed. 
 
Demonstration projects  
 
Environmental Audits and Environmental Entrepreneurship projects allowed the 
introduction of low-cost measures to make production more environmentally friendly at selected 
Ukrainian enterprises. Training of Environmental Entrepreneurs project was aimed at training a 
leadership group of entrepreneurs. A group of Ukrainian scientists has since formed a consortium 
to provide such audits nationally. 
 
The Demonstration Shoreline Project entailed putting in place a 2-3 kilometre managed 
shoreline that demonstrated protection measures applicable elsewhere along Dnipro reservoir 
shorelines. The Solid Waste and Landfill Remediation project involved designing and installing a 
leachate collection system to intercept contaminated ground and surface waters from the disposal 
site. A Drinking Water Technology project provided for the construction and installation of 
equipment for drinking water treatment. The Rising Groundwater Protection project allowed 
working out economically and ecologically efficient ways of rising groundwater protection. The 
Organomineral Fertilizer Production project introduced technologies for organomineral fertilizer 
production from sewage sludge and other kinds of waste.  
 
Public Outreach  
 
The Raising Public Awareness of Environmental Problems project disseminated 
information about the present environmental situation in the basin of the main Ukraine waterway. 
The Environmental Television Program and Videos project helped develop TV materials, and 
helped promote nature-preserving consciousness within the community. The Dnipro – the Artery 
of Life Book project published an illustrated full-colour book in Ukrainian and English. Civil 
society has increasingly become involved in the program through outreach activities such as 
numerous television programs for local stations and a web page. 
 
Direct Program Outcomes 
 
In 1997, a National Program for Rehabilitating the Dnieper and Improving Water Quality 
was drafted by the Ministry of Environment and approved by the Verhovna Rada. Many 
Ukrainian specialists perceive it as the most important outcome of the EMDU cooperation 
experience. 
 
To those immediate and direct results, we must add indirect outcomes related to securing 
other funds from various donors: 
• Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety has taken 




(GEF) to define a Strategic Action Plan (SAP) for the rehabilitation of the River 
Basin and ameliorating its effects on the Black Sea.  
• Significant improvements in the provision of public utility services in the city of 
Zaporizhzhia have led to the approval of a loan by EBRD (US$30 million) to 
upgrade water and sewer systems. In contrast, an adjacent city was refused a similar 
loan because it has not yet learned to provide utility services in a financially viable 
manner.  
• The Government of Denmark has provided funds (US$1.2 million) for environmental 
audits of industries in the city of Zaporizhzhia 
 
Section 4. Effects of the program on policy formulation  
 
The Evaluation Unit of IDRC hired Dr I. Lyzogub to carry out a review of EMDU’s 
influence on policy formulation in Ukraine. The case study is part of the study referred to in sub-
section 2.3. Under the direct supervision of the Evaluation Unit, Dr Lyzogub interviewed about 
50 participants and end-users of the EMDU program. Her judgement on the results attained by 
EMDU is divided according to five types of activities that are essential for connecting research to 
policy. These were based on the Evaluation Unit literature review. Her findings are summarized 
below. 
 
Sub section 4.1 Expanding policy capacities 
 
Almost all projects (as well as the EMDU program as a whole) were intended to have 
policy influence from the very beginning. Therefore, including the active participation and 
involvement of decision-makers was important. The Ukrainian Management Committee did that. 
The people who managed the program also had the power to use its results in the decision-making 
process. Furthermore, since UMC members occupied high-level positions in different government 
and research institutions, they were not in boss/subordinate relationships and were not afraid to 
openly express their views.  
 
• IDRC’s research on policy influence also revealed that “policy entrepreneurs” are 
often an essential feature of a successful process. Dr Shevchuk, who had been a 
chairperson of the program from its inception in 1994 until its last meeting in 
February 2001, was such a “policy entrepreneur.” Throughout the program 
implementation, Dr. Shevchuk occupied authoritative decision-making positions, 
yet he maintained his full commitment to this program until the program ended. 
• The IDRC approach helped expand policy capacity by relying on local partners 
and providing them with an opportunity to decide the course of research. 
Furthermore it fostered the most important ingredients in self-help: self-
confidence, trust, and friendship with other partners and between countries. 
• The Baseline Water Quality Study project allowed the early assessment of the 
crucial issue concerning radioactivity in the river waters. It helped ease the 
anxieties of the population and the drafting of sensible policies to deal with this 
emotionally charged problem. For example, in 1993 a Nationalist Party ran its 
electoral campaign on the idea of destroying all dams that were erected on the 
Dnipro during the Stalin era in order to return it to its natural rapid flow. The 
Baseline Study revealed that Chernobyl radioactive fallout had sunk in the 




isolating the riverbed and the direct contamination of its water. The best way to 
deal with the problem is therefore never to stir up the mud accumulated at the 
bottom. This would inevitably happen if artificial lakes were destroyed. 
• The EMDU program addressed the issue of secrecy by sharing openly all 
information pertinent to the management of the program. IDRC’s willingness to 
share information seemed “amazing” to Ukrainians. IDRC also facilitated data 
exchange and dissemination through various information-sharing systems using 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that appealed to technically minded 
experts. Perhaps the most successful project aimed at data dissemination was the 
National Atlas Project. The CD-ROM created within this project was widely 
disseminated among different organizations after the project ended. Finally, two 
scientific conferences allowed for the publication of all reports and research 
results.  
  
Maintaining scholarly standards and providing bases for education 
 
In many cases, IDRC provided support to good institutions that would not operate 
otherwise. Brain drain of highly trained scientists might have been the result. Along with 
acquiring a higher level of professionalism, researchers had an opportunity to educate others on 
the basis of the program results. The postgraduate student inflow to the scientific institutions was 
stimulated by the IDRC-sponsored projects. The program also resulted in publication of various 
textbooks, and most prominent project results were thus incorporated into the educational 
process. 
 
Supporting recipients to develop innovative ideas  
 
The project also resulted in working out the Program of Implementation of Organic 
Fertilizer Production and Its Use in Agriculture. The State Committee on Construction, 
Architecture, and Housing Policy, Zaporizhzhia Oblast Sanitary Epidemic Station, and 
Zaporizhzhia Ecological Department approved this program and lobbied in favour of its 
expansion in the country. The connection between research and policy was enhanced when 
decision-makers perceived scientists as providing solid and practical ideas. 
 
Broadening policy horizons 
 
Initially, Ukrainian research institutions did not always use internationally recognized 
research and methodological standards that could meet with peer review research criteria. As for 
the presentation of data, old USSR indicators were in use to the puzzlement of western scientists 
who did not know to what these indicators referred. At the beginning, Ukrainian scientists found 
it difficult to meet the requirements of IDRC. Furthermore, project proposals had to be approved 
by both committees. Researchers sometimes compiled two different documents that presented the 
same project using entirely different formats. This led to rethinking the usage of country-specific 
data presentation systems in favour of internationally recognized standards. 
 
Accessing international standards was an opportunity to enter the international scientific 
community. Scientists published their findings in Western scientific journals, made presentations 
at international conferences, and Western colleagues acknowledged their level of professionalism. 
Furthermore, it allowed collaboration with new Western partners, such as specialized consultant 
firms and joint ventures. It should be noted that empirical evidence suggests that joint venturing 
was the result of a lengthy and circuitous adjustment process and not, as it had been presumed in 





The program has been heralded by a number of scientists as “the window for Ukraine to 
see and experience Western technology and Western ideas.” It led to attitudinal changes, for 
example, concerning the delivery of municipal services, the relationship with clients and users, as 
well as the need for synergy among related institutions and multidisciplinary work. This was 
particularly valuable for a country that was closed and isolated for many decades.  
 
Stimulating dialogue between and among decision-makers and researchers 
 
IDRC dealt with this problem by the way EMDU was managed, by encouraging joint 
research, by stressing the importance of relevance and giving preference to applied versus 
empirical or theoretical research, and by trying to convince decision-makers to use research 
findings. 
  
As Caplan suggests, increasing the use of research in policymaking could not be achieved 
by merely increasing interactions between policymakers and researchers. It is important to 
achieve a “relevance” of research (see Neilson 2001, p. 4-7). Within the EMDU program, such 
relevance was achieved through “learning the applied side of a science.” 
 
Pilot projects can be seen as the way to convince policymakers of the value of research 
results. Early in 1995, IDRC was confronted with the strong views of the Minister of 
Environment who openly criticized IDRC’s approach toward Ecological Audits: “ give us less 
recommendations and advice and more equipment.” 
 
Reduction of pollution was viewed first as resulting from new equipment or new 
technology. Equipment was often purchased before a thorough evaluation had been conducted. 
IDF was charged with improving the Vatutino meat processing plant. Its experts were insisting on 
using high-energy plasma to treat waste. IDRC refused to fund expensive plasma-based 
equipment, since its own survey of what was known on this topic indicated that it would be 
impractical in the context. In the words of one member of the IDRC team, Dr Babcock, 
“scientists and managers alike tend to focus on technological fixes to problems, rather than 
adjusting management practices where practical.” The unwillingness of IDRC may serve as an 
example of research as argumentation. In the end IDRC was able to convince the IDF director 
that plasma technology was not efficient for use at the meat processing plant. Ecological audits 
however, may lead to better results. Soon the ecological audit projects demonstrated vividly the 
value of managerial and low-cost improvements leading to improved production and pollution 
reduction. 
 
Sub section 4.2 Program’s Impact  
 
On Legislation  
 
According to interviewees, the program’s major achievement was connected with 
developments in legislation. The following pieces of legislation arose from IDRC projects or 
were directly influenced by it: 
 
• National Program on Ecologic Rehabilitation of Dnipro Basin and Drinking Water 
Improvement (was considered at and adopted by Verhovna Rada of Ukraine on February 27, 
1997). 
• Drinking Water Law (was adopted on 10 January 2002). 




• Several norms and regulations were worked out within the IDRC-sponsored projects, in 
particular, the Methodology of Ecological Estimation of Surface Water Quality (1998), 
regulations concerning water tariffs, and others. 
• Law “On Environment Protection” defines ecologic audit development in Ukraine. The latter 
is also regulated by laws “On Auditing Activities,” “On Entrepreneurship Activities,” as well 
as by standards and regulations (Dnipro Ecological Rehabilitation 2001: p.185-191). At 
present, the law “On Auditing Activities” provides legislative bases for ecological audits. The 
draft law on ecological audit has been developed within the framework of the EMDU 
program and it is now under Verhovna Rada consideration. 
 
Changes in legislation were not always directly connected to ecology and water 
resources. The (infamous) law of 1937 concerning the secrecy of water systems was changed at 
the instigation of EMDU program participants. 
 
Public involvement and public outreach and learning processes 
 
From the outset, IDRC suggested greater involvement of Ukrainian civil society, 
increased public participation, and NGO involvement. These ideas ran counter to 70 years of 
socialism and were difficult to internalize. In the past, government officials flooded thousands of 
hectares of arable land and hundreds of villages, without consultations, to build a hydroelectric 
station on the Dnieper. With respect to NGOs, Ukrainian scientists granted them little credit, as 
they perceived NGOs as lacking professionalism and being driven by emotions and political 
considerations. They also questioned NGO accountability. Public participation was a highly 
sensitive issue, one that IDRC could hardly tackle directly or in a confrontational fashion. The 
following story sheds light on the issue and on the appropriate pedagogy.  
 
 For example, the project manager of the Riverbank Stabilization project began 
implementing the project “soviet style”: he brought machinery and diligently started to work. 
Local authorities and the local population were not informed nor consulted about the changes 
envisaged to their precious shoreline. Misinformed about the project intentions and on the alert, 
rumours started to spread within the local population: “Canadians are buying up our land here. 
Soon, they are going to be building high-rises, and we will never get to the river anymore” they 
were heard muttering. At some point they interrupted work using pitchforks. The only solution 
was opening a dialogue between the project manager and local authorities. Had IDRC insisted on 
a democratic consultative approach as practiced in Canada, it is most unlikely that this project 
would have led to a valuable learning experience. As a result of this project, Ukrainians (UMC) 
learned to include public participation and public awareness in project proposals. This was 
something they learned, not taught to do.  
 
Positive aspects of the IDRC program as perceived by recipients  
• There exists an atmosphere of trust, confidence, and real partnership between IDRC and 
Ukrainian recipients. IDRC's consultants and staff never force their views upon recipients 
but are open to discussing and exploring all avenues for solving problems.  
• All project managers are local Ukrainians and they feel they have a great deal of 
independence, hiring necessary specialists, choosing appropriate equipment, and 
approving trips within the project budget. Using IDRC's approach, more money is spent 
locally and more money reaches Ukrainian scientists and consultants. No other donor 




• Many of the projects carried out under EMDU were highly practical with outcomes that 
will last beyond the end of EMDU and funding from IDRC. Real tangible results can be 
seen going beyond the usual reports and publications whose utility to locals is 
questionable.  
• A large training component has allowed many Ukrainian specialists to upgrade their 
skills and qualifications in Canada and other countries.  
Negative aspects of the IDRC program as perceived by recipients 
• What IDRC understood as benign intrusion in practising due diligence and enquiring 
about administrative and technical issues was regarded as severe probing by recipient 
institutions. IDRC's approval was expected to be forthright and simple. Sometimes 
recipients had to revise a proposal four or five times before IDRC approved it. This has 
led to the senior scientific adviser of IDRC being referred to as "Dr. Niet" (sic).  
• Proposal approval, contract preparation, and transfers of funds took too much time. In the 
current poor economic conditions for many scientists in Ukraine, donor money is the only 
means of support and delays cause nervousness.  
• The list of reports that have to be prepared, along with the final project outputs, is quite 
long. Many recipients do not see any real purpose and value with the preparation of some 
of these reports. Moreover, the list tends to grow over time. For instance, Results-Based 
Management and time sheets for workers on the project were added, joining gender, 
training, and local contributions reports as a requirement” (Guilmette and Iskra, 2001, p. 
84-85). 
Demand-driven methodology and sequencing 
 
As IDRC compared notes with other western organizations active in the region, the 
importance of capacity-building methods and approaches became ever more apparent. It is useful 
to remind the reader that there are four critical aspects for large project delivery: 1) complete 
ownership by recipient countries; 2) best financial and operational management; 3) highest 
scientific and technical standards; and 4) collaboration with other partners. It is essential to ensure 
a good balance among these four complementary goals. However, experience has shown that, in 
practice, projects are often skewed in favour of one or the other of these goals. Generally, priority 
is given to ensuring that all procurement and accounting procedures will be meticulously adhered 
to, and pressure is put on foreign experts and consultants to obtain and demonstrate visible 
results. As a result:  
• There is an over-emphasis on immediate, tangible results such as reports.  
• Local ownership and capacity building suffers.  
• Long-term sustainability is left in doubt.  
In contrast, Ukrainian authorities are now heralding the demand-driven methodology of 
IDRC as a unique and effective model. Ukrainian partners have expressed a preference for the 
management methods employed in EMDU, bemoaning the fact that many other aid organizations 
do not operate in this manner, but rather rely on extensive use of expensive foreign consultants. A 
few years back, the Ministry of Environment demanded that two donor agencies use the same 
implementation mechanism that IDRC uses.  
 
In almost all processes designed by humans, sequencing is of the essence. It is true for 




Development problems as unique and new as the reforms undertaken in Ukraine presented a rare 
sequencing challenge. In part accidentally and in part intentionally, EMDU seems to have 
adopted the right sequence. 
 
In summary, the sequencing was follows. With empowerment came responsibility; with 
responsibility came frugality and strategic thinking. Strategic thinking led to building and 
searching for relevant new knowledge as well as for testing practical ideas. In order to do so, 
local resources were expanded often through local contributions requiring considerable 
cooperation and ingenuity. The various activities provided tangible results, results that were 
perceived pertinent to the specific context of Ukraine. In many instances, the lessons learned 
revealed new ways to leverage resources, people and to surmount passivity. Combined, these 
achievements led to self-confidence. The self-confidence and self-respect thus acquired 
eventually led to audacity; the UMC felt empowered to transform newly acquired knowledge into 
policy approved by Parliament. It also led to the UMC taking the lead and securing UNDP/GEF 
funds for the rehabilitation of the River Basin, involving thus Belarus and Russia. 
 
 
Section 5. Moving toward regional networks and management of 
the GEF Program 
 
As IDRC’s own networks’ evaluation has demonstrated (Bernard, p.xxxx), local 
networks often benefit from linking upward into regional and/or international networks. 
 
One obvious extension for cleaning up the main source of water for Ukraine called for 
involving the two upstream riparian countries of the Dnieper River Basin, Belarus and Russia. 
This was perceived by IDRC as another opportunity to expand its network management 
approaches into the region. It might have the complementary or supplementary effect of inducing 
mentality changes into Ukraine through feedback. Indeed, command and control methods can 
hardly coexist within an international network made up of sovereign countries. Local experience 
was limited to former soviet-style international bodies managed under strict Moscow control and 
resting on the communist party fraternity. The idea of introducing softer and less coercive 
methods made sense as a means to manage better the River Basin, but also as a means to expand 








Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) 2000-2004  
Strategic Action Program for the Dnipro River Basin 
                                                 Belarus, Russia, Ukraine  
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) program, budgeted at US$7 million, was designed to 
develop a suite of measures and their respective implementation mechanisms for the sustainable 
protection of Europe’s third largest river, the Dnieper, and fell under the GEF's International Waters 
Programme. The GEF Dnieper Programme was intended to contribute to the protection of regional 
and global international waters. The management capacity, both at the level of the individual riparian 
countries (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and at the transboundary level, is to be strengthened, while 
wider global benefits are to accrue to the Dnieper Basin countries, as well as to littoral countries of 
the Black Sea. The long-term objectives of the project were to remedy the serious environmental 
effects of pollution and habitat degradation, to ensure sustainable use of resources, and to protect 
biodiversity in the Dnieper River Basin.  
The Dnieper Program was part of the GEF Black Sea Basin Strategic Approach and was a 
partnership between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Canada’s 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), with full involvement of specialized UN and 
other multilateral and bilateral agencies. The partnership with IDRC facilitated continuity with 
ongoing projects in the region, brought with it a complementary project laying the groundwork for 
the GEF Dnieper Program, and provided for greater leverage of donor funds.  
Outline and objectives 
The long-term objectives of the project are to remedy the serious environmental effects of 
pollution and habitat degradation, to ensure sustainable use of resources, and to protect biodiversity 
in the Dnieper River Basin. The project included seven specific objectives:  
1. Create a transboundary management regime and coordinating body.  
2. Assist countries in the formulation, review, and endorsement process of a Strategic Action 
Programme (SAP).  
3. Improve financial, legal, and operational mechanisms for pollution reduction and sustainable 




4. Formulate National Action Plans by inter-ministerial committees.  
5. Improve conservation of biodiversity.  
6. Enhance communication among stakeholders and encourage public awareness and 
involvement in addressing the problems of the Dnieper Basin.  
7. Build capacity for SAP implementation. 
More information on this project can be found at the following address: 
http://www.dnipro-gef.net/   
 
 
Table 5 GEF/UNDP Strategic Action Plan for the Dnieper 
  
In the autumn of 1997, I became convinced that OECD offered a proven and tested 
method for negotiating policy among sovereign nations. This approach is very close to IDRC’s 
practices: it rests on the principle of self-help, peer pressure, and the design of new policy based 
on the scientific search for facts. The EMDU experiment could therefore be put to good use by 
expanding its newly tested methods and positive results into Belarus and Russia. 
 
The conviction that OECD could provide a useful model for regional cooperation was the 
result of the multi-donors’ evaluation of 20 years of cooperation within the OECD/Sahel Club 
that ended in 1997. The Sahel club was a real-size innovative experiment in international 
cooperation that was undertaken in 1975. The basis of its method rested on a strikingly different 
approach to international cooperation and to fund-raising. Its underpinning operative feature was 
that donors and recipients should work together to define what are the best ways for resolving big 
problems such as desertification or food deficit leading to famines. They work as a team to 
identify the key questions and do the research leading to an answer to each of these questions. In 
this manner, there is a simultaneous buy-in by both the countries and their donor partners for the 
agreed-upon policies. This breeds mutual confidence: - confidence in the plan, - confidence that 
money invested is wisely spent, - confidence that recipient governments are applying good 
development policies. This, in turn, ensures that critical activities essential for the rehabilitation 
of the region find donor support. In other words, it is an extremely efficient and powerful fund-
raising methodology based on ongoing dialogue and policy adjustments and planning. It creates 
what experts refer to as a “learning organization.” 
 
In October 1997, the validity of the Sahel Club experiment having been thoroughly 
assessed by OECD and by its partner countries from the region was viewed as positive. The Sahel 
region had received more money than the average for Africa, albeit the fact that it was geo-
politically of less importance than others during that period. Moreover, aid resources had been 
well used in general and it was believed that the aid activities selected through this process had 
led to significant improvements in the well being of the region. In other words, working together 
to assess the problems of the region was more effective than having a small group of experts 
write a plan and then trying to convince donors to sponsor the activities coming out of the plan of 
action through so-called “pledging sessions.” The plan of action stands a greater chance of being 
perceived as relevant by all parties. 
 
In my experience, the OECD rigorous negotiating process adds the elements necessary to 




creation of a management committee in Ukraine had empirically provided a critical element in the 
construction of a regional mechanism for negotiating common arrangements concerning the 
management of the River Basin. During the following winter, OCEEI transformed these disparate 
ideas into a single methodological package and made this a central element in its proposal to 
UNDP/GEF. 
 
It could be argued that FSU countries have little in common with Sahelian nations. 
Everything keeps them apart: the size and sophistication of their economies, their physical 
environments, their traditions, religions and culture, the level of technology and of education. 
However, the Sahel Club experiment provided a fully tested methodology for conducting 
dialogue and for reaching consensus among sovereign nations, involving rich countries such as 
France, Canada, or the United States, and poor countries such as Mali, Niger, or Gambia. It 
provided a rigorous way for designing policy through a unique blend of scientific research 
intermingled with dialogue among experts and decision-makers. It provided a useful experience 
on how to raise funds by involving donors and recipients in a sustained dialogue over difficult 
subjects such as “what to do to resolve a difficult environmental problem.” It provided a method 
for donors to accompany development as opposed to “do it upon others.” It provided a tested 
methodology to arrive at an agreed plan of action for an immense task, one that led to long-term 
commitments as opposed to ad hoc and piecemeal approaches. It helped alleviate the perennial 
problem related to chicanery and divergent development approaches between donors. Last but not 
least, it provided a method to breed confidence among seemingly unrelated partners, including 
partners that enjoy different development levels. 
 
In 1998, IDRC made a formal proposal to Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for managing a Global Environment Facility 
(GEF)-financed project aimed at preparing a joint Strategic Action Plan for the rehabilitation of 
the entire Dnieper River Basin. IDRC introduced for that purpose a model that departed in many 
ways from traditional technical assistance-driven models. The proposed model rested on four key 
and interlocking elements:  
1. Most of the research and analysis, as well as policy proposals, were to be conducted by local 
scientists, NGOs, and research institutions, and not by foreign consultants recruited following 
international tendering processes. 
2. All program priorities, related financial allocations, selection of executing agencies, appraisal 
of results, and final approval of ensuing policies were to be the first accountability of 
National Management Committees, using a two key formula as tested and developed during 
EMDU. UNDP would be holding in this instance the second key. For the purpose of 
administering the regional program, a joint riparian steering committee would be formed with 
the head of each national committee. This would become the final arbiter of trans-boundary 
decisions. 
3. Donors would be invited from the very beginning to accompany the planning process. They 
would be invited to discuss and comment “informally” with the Steering Committee. In 
addition to seeking their views on how to resolve the problems facing the region, their 
financial support for additional studies would be actively sought. 
4. OECD’s highly specific consensus-reaching methodology would be introduced gradually as 
the project evolved. 
 
Members of the Ukrainian Management Committee supported it, but other partners had 
mixed views about an approach they had never seen or heard about before. They were sceptical of 





It can be argued that the absence of any existing reference to OECD’s model did not help 
in this regard. In addition, representatives of other donor institutions were generally unaware that 
OECD’s management practices and conventions are strikingly different than the ones with which 
they are familiar. Because of this, their representatives found it hard to understand and appreciate 
its intrinsic merits. Nevertheless, some elements of IDRC’s proposal were introduced within the 
management structure of the project. Management committees created by IDRC are salient 
features of the governance for this project. In addition, very large portions of the project activities 
and studies have been tasked to local organizations, as opposed to being tendered among 
international consultants. However, the full range of governance mechanisms and the know-how 
that are essential to run such a network have yet to be introduced and fully tested in the region. 
 
In our view, it is necessary for donors to design new concepts of development 
cooperation and invent new instruments for the transfer of assistance so as to become relevant to 
and responsive to the needs that are now apparent in transition countries. Today, conditions in the 
NIS region are substantially different from previous situations in either post-war Europe or the 
developing countries. One would have assumed that an array of new instruments for cooperation 
and assistance would have been designed to respond to this dramatically new situation. In fact, 
except for the establishment of the EBRD, which involved little of an innovative quality, little 
innovation has been attempted to date. The conjunction between the need for new instruments for 
the transfer of appropriate types of assistance and support for a paradigm shift that must 
accompany effective reform remained by and large unrecognized among Western donor agencies.  
 
 This lacuna, and the imperative for innovation in the development of new and 
appropriate forms of assistance, seem likely to become increasingly salient issues in the policy 
dialogue between Western aid donors and the NIS. The challenge is to create a relevant new 
transfer mechanism with the purpose of bridging an important knowledge gap. We describe these 










It is not the intent of this paper to give a detailed account of how the OECD functions. 
Two works have been published in French, from which we have drawn heavily (Bonvin, 1998 
and Chavranski 1997). In addition, the OECD web site provides details on the organization’s 
structure. What we have tried to do here is to highlight the main characteristics that explain the 
fundamental nature of its functioning. As the subtitle of this chapter suggests, it is in effect an 
essay on the sociology of the organization’s institutional culture.  
 
Inevitably, it gives a stylized view of the organization. However, many variations of 
common practices coexist within the organization and in this way, OECD is rich in its diversity. 
Even peer reviews are conducted somewhat differently depending on the nature of the subject. 
Specialists such as, for example, economists and health specialists, have different scientific 
traditions as well as different means to reach their goals. Such differences eventually work their 
way into the manner by which this “network of networks” conducts its business. Appendix 1 fully 






The fundamental task of OECD is straightforward: to enable its member countries to 
consult and cooperate to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth, and to improve the 
economic and social well-being of their people. 
 
OECD offers advice and makes recommendations to its members to help them define their 
policies. On occasion it also arbitrates in multilateral agreements and establishes legal codes in 
certain areas of activity. 
 
The organization is a forum for objective, skilled, and independent dialogue, which permits 
a thorough understanding and true assessment of the problems posed in today's increasingly 
complex world. The great comparative advantages of OECD are its multidisciplinary approach - a 
capacity to cover all areas of government activity in a consistent way - and its system of consensus 
building through peer pressure. Within the different committees the peer pressure system 
encourages countries to be transparent, to provide explanations and justifications, and to be self-
critical where necessary, the practice of self-assessment being the most original characteristic of 
OECD. 
 
The current member countries are the following (date of accession except for original 
members): Australia (1971), Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic (2003), Denmark, Finland 
(1969), France, Germany, Hungary (2003), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan (1964), Korea (1996), 
Luxembourg, Mexico (1994), Netherlands, New Zealand (1973), Norway, Poland (1996), Portugal, 










Section 1  
Foundations of the OECD's Institutional Culture 
Subsection 1.1. - Historical Background 
 
At the end of the Second World War, European countries were physically and morally 
devastated. Two years later, in 1947, economic recovery had scarcely begun: farm output, for 
example, was still 25 percent below what it had been in 1939, and governments were still 
resorting to rationing. The generalized demoralization of Europe and the onset of the Cold War 
induced in most leaders the fear that “capitalism’s days were numbered” (Bonvin, 1998, p. 6). 
 
Major reforms were obviously called for (see Chapter 1). The protectionist measures that 
characterized the economic behaviour of all European states had led to drastic declines in trade 
and led to war. But how should the reform process be addressed? Mistrust was universal and no 
European government really believed that other states would implement any reforms that might 
be agreed, without cheating. In effect, governments were facing the “prisoner’s dilemma” (see 
table 9). 
 
The announcement of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 served as a veritable lifesaver: it 
provided an input that was rare at that time – hope (Bonvin, 1997, p.7). General Marshall's idea of 
providing financial assistance for European recovery came with some strings attached, however. 
In exchange for firm, multiyear commitments on the part of donors, participants were expected to 
cooperate with each other. The reforms were to be introduced over a period of several years, and 
they would be slow in making their impact felt. The continuity of this financial and technical 
assistance represented an essential commitment for reassuring the Europeans. 
 
It is important to remember that all the countries of Europe, from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, were invited to participate in this program. On June 27, 1947, however, at a meeting 
convened by France and the United Kingdom to discuss the American proposal, Stalin’s 
representative, Vyacheslav Molotov, refused on behalf of the USSR to take any part in a 
cooperative approach to the economic reconstruction of Europe. Instead, he presented a list of 
useful imports that might be purchased with the aid of American credits (Griffith, 1997, p.34). 
His refusal also meant that the states that were under Soviet influence would be left out as well 
(Bonvin, 1998, p.7) with the exception of Yugoslavia, which maintained an independent stance 
toward Moscow and cooperated with western institutions.  
 
What followed was a process of self-selection and taking sides. In the end, the states of 
Europe split into two opposing ideological camps. On one side were the future members of 
OECD, most of which shared to a greater or lesser extent the characteristics discussed in the 
preceding chapters: a democratic political system that respected human rights, and a developed 
industrial economy that recognized the primacy of the market (Bonvin, 1998, p.7). On the other 
side stood the Socialist states, whose allegiance to Moscow was unquestioned. From a 
sociological viewpoint, they constituted two separate groups that for the next 40 years would 
pursue diametrically opposed policies. 
 
The European countries participating in the Marshall Plan met under the aegis of the 
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation); the two donor countries, Canada and 
the United States, participated as observers. The steady influx of American aid amounts in 2003 




overcome shortages, and in this way to assuage political discontent. The much more modest 
contribution of Canada added a political dimension to this collective effort. 
 
The Marshall Plan has too often been viewed as simply a financial mechanism: in fact, it 
served first and foremost to instil hope among European leaders and to stabilize the political 
situation. In this way, it served as a conflict prevention mechanism by helping to establish the 
social peace that was essential to economic progress. 
 
With the money also came some good ideas. European states now were obliged to work 
together, to submit all their economic policies to critical review by their neighbours and to 
provide OEEC with all the information it needed (and not merely the data that they were 
interested in sharing - a subtle but extremely important distinction). They also undertook to 
liberalize their economies and to reduce barriers to trade (Bonvin   p.9). A great many ideas thus 
emerged from the informal debates within the OEEC. Older staff members of OECD recall that it 
was an American delegate who, at one of the organization's meetings, suggested to the Europeans 
that they start by working out an agreement on a specific problem: coal and steel. Everyone 
knows how this modest idea has since snowballed. 
 
Marshall Plan aid was provided with another important precondition: no country could 
receive assistance until all countries had reached a consensus on the distribution formula for 
sharing the American funds (Bonvin, 1998, p.13). Besides effectively resolving the perennial 
problem of aid allocation, this approach marked the first application of the consensus method. 
Thus the effort to reach consensus and the system of peer reviews were to become two of the 
pillars of the OECD approach. 
 
In 1959, after activities had ceased under the Marshall Plan, Europe was well on its way 
to economic recovery and the six-nation European Community was up and running. It was time, 
perhaps, to do away with OEEC. On the other hand, tensions were appearing within NATO, 
sparked in particular by France’s threat to withdraw its Mediterranean fleet from the NATO high 
command. Moscow chose this moment to launch an “economic offensive” in the developing 
countries. Suddenly, it seemed urgent to do something spectacular, not only to coordinate the 
efforts of Western countries on behalf of the developing countries, but also to deal with the many 
commercial disputes that were emerging between Europe and North America. 
 
The idea of transforming and expanding OEEC seemed attractive, but what was to be 
done with the many decisions by which the European states were by then bound? Would they 
apply to the new members? Some Europeans saw this as a splendid opportunity to revisit 
decisions that they found difficult to implement. After hot debate about whether the new 
organization, OECD, would adopt the commitments taken within OEEC, a compromise was 
found whereby all acts of OEEC were to be subject to a unanimous vote by members of OECD 
(Griffith, 1997, p.247). 
 
Thus it was that in 1961 the members of OEEC, plus Canada and the United States, 
undertook to prolong the efforts launched with the Marshall Plan, but this time in order to "lay the 
basis for economic relations between the new Europe and the two North American powers that 
had emerged unscathed from the war. It was crucial, in the end, to establish principles for 
cooperation and solidarity with the outside world…. Prosperity posed its own problems" 





It was only after a convoluted process that the legal personality, the conventions adopted 
within OEEC and the institutional culture of that organization, born in the aftermath of war, were 
transmitted to OECD and forged the organization that we know today. 
 
Reliance on peer pressure and consensus, and on a coherent set of operational 
characteristics, then, is explained by the historical and cultural context of the nations of Western 
Europe that set out to build this organization in association with their two North American 
partners. There is a degree of cultural homogeneity between these states, based on a shared 
historical past. 
 
Subsection 1.2. – OECD’s Basic Rules of Conduct or the Values of the 
Institution 
 
From the outset, it is important to emphasize the pragmatic character of the OECD 
negotiation process. The OECD approach to negotiations is designed to lead to an agreement 
upon policies or policy options and structures that may be implemented by all member countries, 
since they arise from a consensus-building process. In essence, the OECD process produces 
outcomes that are seen – by member countries - to be reasonable and acceptable. These policy 
outputs are generally considered relevant and timely, and can be readily adapted to the specific 
needs of the concerned member countries. The possibility of adapting policies adopted through 
consensus is the essence of the very subtle OECD process. If a country adapts a policy in a 
manner that seems contrary to the spirit of the common policy, the perceived misadaptation will 
give rise to discussions at the occasion of Peer Review. The process can only be described as 
intensively iterative; for some it sounds slow and tedious, but it should be argued that it results in 
resilient and sustainable agreements in the end. 
 
Over the years, OECD members have enlarged the subjects of their analyses. In many 
cases their concern for reducing trade barriers and creating a level playing field for business 
transactions has been expanded to include sharing knowledge about “promising or best practices” 
on matters that do not involve mutual competition. This is the case for studies on health or 
education, for example. In such cases the pursuit of consensus and the negotiation process is less 
critical; sharing “intelligence” on these matters becomes the real essence of their cooperation. 
 
The success of OECD rests on a “blueprint” for international and regional cooperation 
consisting of three elements: 
 
• Espousal of a supra-national policy regime based on respect for human rights, democratic 
government, and the market economy (see Chapter 2);  
• Respecting certain basic rules of conduct (discussed in this chapter); 
• Application of certain unique techniques and skills for making and negotiating collective 
choices (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 1). 
 
The rules for OECD meetings and procedures include agreement on an agenda for 
achieving practical and defined outcomes. It has a practical, operational mission, which is 
expected to lead to tangible objectives and to real, demonstrable progress. Its primary product is 
agreed policy options based on common analysis, but of course allowing for a variety of coherent 
and consistent responses based on differing national situations. In many instances these will 
evolve into agreed policies among its members, that will become national policies enforced 





From the beginning, it is probably the position of strength from which the major 
victorious powers (Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) started that explains the 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon character of the organization. If we observe the functioning of 
OECD, we find the traits of a juridical system based on jurisprudence or case law, one that 
evolves by comparison of precedents, by flexible interpretation rather than literal application of 
statutes and regulations. OECD is thus full of exceptions, gentlemen’s agreements, and unwritten 
conventions that are constantly evolving. In this respect, it follows in the tradition of English law. 
In its early days, the organization was nicknamed “Whitehall-sur-Seine”! Since then, this original 
dominant culture has undergone considerable evolution. The success of the organization rests on 
finding compromises and adaptations to local circumstances. This adaptive characteristic is 
reflected not only in its overall process, but also in its organizational arrangements and collective 
behaviour.  
 
We also find the use of recognized scientific methods, in particular the concern to base 
solutions on research and on objective analysis of the relevant facts. The peer review method 
comes close to the peer evaluation tradition that is commonly used in scientific research and 
publishing. 
 
The OECD approach is in fact the product of a mixture of political pragmatism and the 
search for empirically demonstrated solutions. Countries participating in the organization have 
gradually become accustomed to seeing their actions dissected by the Secretariat in the presence 
of their peers. They have gradually come to understand and to appreciate the need for 
harmonizing their national accounts, and for ensuring that all economic data and analyses are 
made public and therefore available not only to competing states but, more daring yet, to 
domestic critics and opposition parties. This has given rise to a degree of steadily expanded 
transparency across many sectors that were unusual even within democracies. Members have 
learned as well to appreciate the indirect influence that democratic practices such as peer review 
can have on improving individual as well as collective welfare. 
 
Using game theory to better understand 
 
Moving down the road mapped out by OECD required "the willing suspension of 
disbelief." The theory of games offers some especially useful metaphors for understanding the 
"OECD mystery." The "prisoner's dilemma" is a classic metaphor in literature of this kind. It 
helps us to understand the problems facing European states at the end of the war. The second 
metaphor, less well known, allows us to intellectualize the approach that was adopted for 
dismantling the trap from which the Europeans seemed unable to escape. The habits induced by 
the Marshall Plan ran counter to "received ideas" of the time -- because of this, it represented a 




THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
 
“A pair of transients, Al Fresco and Des Jardins, has been arrested for vagrancy. 
They are suspected of complicity in a robbery, but the evidence is inadequate to convict 
them. The district attorney interrogates them in separate cells and offers each the following 
deal. "If you confess and your friend does not, you will be released and your friend will 
have the book thrown at him. He will get 15 months in jail; and the other way around if he 
confesses and you do not. If you both confess, both will receive moderately long sentences 
of 8 months. If neither confesses, you will both be convicted of a minor vagrancy charge 







Des does not confess 
 
Al confesses 
Al serves 8 months 
Al is free 
 
Al does not confess 
Al serves 15 months 
Al serves 1 month 
 
 
What does rationality dictate that our players do? What is the logic of the situation 
represented in this table?  
 
If Al believes that Des is going to confess, then (reading down the first column) Al 
sees he has a choice between 8 months in jail (if he confesses) and 15 months in jail (if he 
does not confess). Confessing is clearly his best strategy. If Al believes Des will not 
confess, then (reading down the second column) Al sees that his choice is between going 
free (if he confesses) and 1 month in jail (if he does not confess); again, confessing is best 
for him. Regardless of what Des does, Al's best action is to confess. Now notice that Des is 
in exactly the same situation as Al, so Des reaches the same conclusion; Des also 
rationally confesses. Thus the equilibrium of this game, the outcome of simultaneously 
rational decisions by both of the players, has both confessing and serving 8 months in jail. 
 
This looks paradoxical. The collective good is better served if neither confess, 
which results in 1 month’s jail for both, a high-level equilibrium. There is a contradiction 
between what is individually rational and what is collectively rational. Each would be better 
off if the two could succeed in cooperation. But they cannot. The equilibrium of the 
prisoners’ dilemma game is not efficient. What the prisoner's dilemma shows, in the words 
of the mathematician Robert Aumann, is that "People who fail to cooperate for their own 
mutual benefit are not necessarily foolish or irrational; they may be acting perfectly 
rationally." 
 
Table 7 The Prisoner’s dilemma 
 
 
THE RATIONAL PIGS 
 
Two pigs, one dominant and the other subordinate, are put in a box. There is a 
lever at one end of the box which, when pressed, dispenses food at the other end. Thus 
the pig that presses the lever must run to the other end; by the time it gets there, the other 
pig has eaten most, but not all, of the food. The dominant pig is able to prevent the 
subordinate pig from getting any of the food when both are at the food. Assuming the pigs 
can reason like game theorists, which pig will press the lever? 
 
To solve this game, let us anthropomorphically endow the pigs with deductive 
capabilities. Consider first the subordinate pig's reasoning. "Suppose I predict that the big 
pig will press the lever. Then I get a little if I press and more if I don't. If, on the other hand, 
I predict it will not press, I get less than nothing if I press and none if I don't. Thus 
regardless of what it does, I am better off not pressing than pressing." Now imagine the 
dominant pig's thought process. To figure it out, the dominant pig must put itself in the 
shoes of the subordinate pig. Doing so, it sees, as we saw, that the subordinate pig's best 




it knows it should use its best response to its rival's not pressing: thus it is in its interest to 
press the lever. Rational behaviour, therefore, indicates a surprising conclusion: the 
dominant pig presses the lever, and the subordinate pig gets most of the food. Weakness, 
in this case, is strength. Animal behaviourists have actually conducted experiments of this 
sort. In most experimental trials, the dominant pig did actually push the lever. The pigs 
behaved like game theorists.  
 
In contrast to the prisoners' dilemma, the pig’s game generates no conflict between 
individual rationality and collective rationality. This metaphor is illustrative of much of 
OECD’s undertaking and may help some readers understand better the way it works and 
why it succeeds.  
 
(Summarized from McMillan,1992, p. 11-14) 
 
Table 8 The rational pigs 
 
The prisoners' dilemma is a representation for many diverse business and economic 
interactions. For example: Two nations trading with each other are driven by rational, national-
interest calculations to erect trade barriers when both would be better off if they were eliminated. 
The rational pig game or metaphor arises in less trivial circumstances. Consider, for example, 
how, in a sense, General Marshall pressed the lever in 1947 and allowed a flow of resources to 
“feed” the European economy. The intent was as generous and enlightened as it was selfish: in 




Subsection 1.3 - OECD Structure and Functions  
 
OECD’s mandate calls for the organization to promote and coordinate policies aimed at 
achieving the highest sustainable economic growth and employment for member countries and 
the world, as well as policies to stimulate the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-
discriminatory basis. The 30 member countries of OECD include all the advanced industrial 
countries. 
 
OECD functions through its governing body, the Council, chaired by the Secretary 
General, and its network of about 120 Committees and Working Groups, which are issue-related. 
One deals, for example, with maritime transport, another focuses on competition law and policy, 
while another was formed to deal with scientific and technological policy. The OECD Secretariat 
carries out work mandated by the Council and the Committees. The Council approves decisions 
and recommendations. Generally, decisions of Council require unanimity (consensus). An 
Executive Committee, chaired by one of the ambassadors to the OECD, provides day-to-day 
supervision of OECD activities. The Secretary General is responsible for managing the 
implementation of Council and Executive Committee decisions. Agreed policies are then 
implemented through the domestic policy apparatus of each individual member country. Overall 
compliance with these agreements is reviewed and discussed within each Committee. Peer 
pressure from other member governments provides powerful inducements for implementation of 
OECD recommendations leading to harmonization.  
 
Representatives from government departments of member countries responsible for the 
work area designated for the committee attend meetings and, along with specialists from the 
Secretariat, monitor developments, advance policy ideas, deal with specific problems shared by 




carrying out policy. They make recommendations for Council decisions and encourage member 
countries to harmonize their policies. 4  
 
As was noted previously, OECD is neither a funding agency nor a program delivery 
agency. The key to OECD’s role in promoting international economic cooperation lies in its 
continuous review of economic policies and trends in member countries. Draft reports on each 
member country's economic policies and performance are prepared by the Secretariat for vetting 
and discussion with its government before being addressed at the Economic Development and 
Review Committee (see below). At that level, the concerned country is expected to respond to 
questions prepared by the Secretariat and other members. These review procedures usually lead to 
frank and open exchanges, often resulting in recommendations for policy changes. OECD also 
conducts studies of its own intended to enhance the design and to improve the coordination of 
policies for the management of economic growth, trade expansion, and development cooperation.  
 
One of the principal working committees of OECD is its Economic and Development 
Review Committee, which examines and monitors economic trends and policies in individual 
member countries. The Committee thus plays a leading part in the process of multilateral 
surveillance of economic policies within OECD. Subsequent to each examination, the 
Committee's country survey and policy conclusions are published. In practice, the economic 
surveys (and the biannual reviews of the OECD grouping) also present economic forecasts for the 
year/eighteen months ahead.  
 
Another committee, the Economic Policy Committee, is responsible for the review and 
surveillance of macroeconomic and structural issues common to member countries, or arising 
from interactions of national economic trends and policies. Its members are senior officials from 
economics or finance ministries and/or central banks of member countries.  
 
The Secretariat, with about 1200 staff members, gathers statistical and policy information 
from member country governments. They process the data, do analyses, forecasts, manage policy 
reviews, organize meetings, provide translation services, prepare directories and other reference 
materials, monitor agreements reached by member countries, and publish much of the analyses, 
forecasts, and statistical information. Member country governments fund the work of the OECD 
Secretariat. National contributions to OECD's annual budget are determined by the size of each 
member's economy.  
 
OECD has established mechanisms to help address the challenges of enforcing its 
international policy regime in the absence of more formal institutionalized systems of global 
governance. These mechanisms function within the consensus arrangements of OECD, and are 
managed through OECD itself, mostly without permanent staffing or administrative systems of 
their own. For example, the mechanism put in place to deal with delinquent borrowers of official 
loans was the so-called "Paris Club," an ad-hoc arrangement of the OECD; this committee is now 
autonomous. Another mechanism for addressing unfair trade subsidies is the OECD "consensus 
arrangement"; here again the consensus is outside of OECD but is related to a committee dealing 
with export credits. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) deals with matters 
concerning aid policy and criteria. This approach to policy enforcement enables OECD to achieve 
a fair measure of coherence and consistency (if not participatory universality) in the making and 









The OECD regime and the US Federal Reserve decision on interest rates 
 
On September 29, 1998, the United States Federal Reserve decision to lower its key short-
term funds interest rate by 0.25% represented a deliberate and calculated response to a looming 
global financial crisis. In responding in this way, the American monetary policy authority sought to 
cushion the threat to US financial confidence and economic performance from the looming global 
contagion, whilst also helping international financial markets to regain their lost buoyancy. At this 
juncture, the timing and delicate balance being upheld by US monetary policy had far-reaching 
significance, not just for the stability of the American financial system and economic well-being, but 
for the prospects of economic recovery for the rest of the world. Given the parameters of this 
decision, the US Federal Reserve was acting in effect as central banker to the world. 
 
This monetary policy decision was an extremely delicate and difficult one. The US economy 
was still robust but global financial conditions were deteriorating dramatically. Capital was fleeing 
Asia, the Americas, and Russia to safe havens in US dollars. Pleas for corrective action called for a 
US interest rate cut to provide additional financial liquidity, to heighten overall investor confidence, 
and to restore capital flows to international markets. 
 
Although the policy-making process of the US Federal Reserve is notably opaque, the 
decision depended for its timeliness and effectiveness on the reliability and transparency of the 
economic and financial information upon which the policymakers based their judgments. The 
requirement for reliable and current information is best indicated by the magnitudes involved (slight 
changes in interest rates affecting hundreds of billions of dollars in capital flows), and by the delicate 
balance being maintained between domestic and external policy concerns: countering inflationary 
pressures, maintaining growth, and restoring capital flow to international markets. 
 
The sources of information used were, of course, American. However, it should be clear that 
availability of internationally comparable and consistent data on macroeconomic, financial, and trade 
performance was a tribute to the accomplishments of OECD. By virtue of the OECD's salient role in 
promoting the integrity, transparency, and standardization of economic information, the US Federal 
Reserve had access to reliable data on its important international linkages upon which to base its 
decision. 
 
Through the use of multilateral and peer review processes to achieve high standards and 
acceptable definitions of financial, monetary, and other economic and social data, OECD helped to 
create confidence in macroeconomic information among the public and even in the intra-
governmental community. Thus, in a complex system like that of the United States, where there 
exists separation of powers, the Federal Reserve can have confidence that the monetary and other 
economic information that it obtains transcends and is free from any institutional bias arising from the 
Administration, Congress, or any other stakeholder. It is the impeccability attached to economic 
information, reflecting the cooperation culture of OECD, which enabled the Federal Reserve to make 
highly sensitive monetary management decisions with equanimity. 
 
It is pertinent to call attention to the connectivities involved. The US Federal Reserve's 
capacity to manage monetary policy effectively is connected to the availability of reliable, transparent, 
standardized and timely information about the US and global economies. This, in turn, involved 
connectivity between the American systems for national accounting and the OECD, as a coordinator 
and reviewer of the information and policy mechanisms of other significant world economies. These 
connectivities between macro-economic management and the production of high-quality 
standardized economic information help create the enabling environment for international flows of 
capital and other resources that are hallmarks of OECD-supported economic cooperation. 
 
Martin Rudner 






Subsection 1.4 - Economics Department 
 
Some of the salient achievements of OECD are exemplified by the work of its Economics 
Department. The department addresses issues of both a macroeconomic and a structural character, 
and the interaction between structural and macroeconomic policies and developments. What is 
unique about its contribution to OECD is the overall economy-wide perspective it brings to every 
policy issue. Most of the Department's work is eventually published, but its first and primary use 
is by member governments as represented in a range of committees and working parties. Of 
particular significance is the Economics Department's input into the work of the Economic 
Development and Review Committee and the Economic Policy Committee, among others. Here, 
the department's analysis forms the basis for a process of multilateral monitoring and 
surveillance.  
 
The department's macroeconomic work is based on continual monitoring of events in 
member countries, including regular projections of short- and medium-term economic 
developments. Interactions among individual country policies and developments are of particular 
concern. The department's focus on structural issues has evolved over time. Currently, its 
analytical efforts are concentrated on policies affecting, inter alia, labour, regulatory reform, 
corporate governance, income distribution and poverty, and sustainable development and climate 
change, as well as policies dealing with ageing populations.  
 
In one way or another, the work of this department contributes to policy discussion in 
committees and working parties and, ultimately, in national capitals. Indeed, many of the 
participants in committee meetings come for the occasion from national capitals. Committee 
discussions deal with both the analysis of particular issues or policy areas between countries, and 
with the country-by-country review of a broad field of policy settings. In typical committee 
practice, issues are first discussed in a country-by-country setting, with the aim of setting general 
policy orientations. Then general orientations are considered in the context of individual 
countries, taking their particularities into account. Finally, once a number of countries have been 
analyzed and discussed, the lessons learned from country-specific analyses are pulled together 
and discussed in a multi-country setting. The results of this process can also have an impact on 
the overall agenda of OECD.  
 
The primary purpose of OECD committee discussions is to help individual governments 
arrive at decisions appropriate to their own and other countries’ conditions. These discussions 
therefore remain largely confidential. However, four series of publications are produced regularly 
to communicate conclusions of OECD to a wider audience: various annual reports, 22 journals 
and magazines, studies, and conference proceedings. OECD now offers over 3500 paperback and 
700 electronic publications.  
 
In a distinctively subtle but nevertheless meaningful way, OECD has been at the centre of 
an iterative and often far-reaching policy discourse. The activities of OECD and its efforts at 
fostering transparency have helped invigorate the domestic policy discourse on economic and 
social issues in member countries, contributing to the emergence of an active and articulate civil 
society. OECD plays a vital role in facilitating the sharing of knowledge and lessons learned and 
in the formulation of common standards. Furthermore, OECD has provided valuable mechanisms 
for ensuring overall governance transparency, for rigour in national accounts, for sharing 
experience in defining many basic governance policies, and for tracking both the implementation 




is itself at both the sending and receiving ends of this policy discourse. In essence, the OECD 
annual Peer Reviews in as many as fifteen major sectors, have made data, statistics, and analysis 
of each country’s performance progressively available to civil society, thus reinforcing the 
abilities of citizens and citizens’ groups to voice their views and to influence government 
policies. In turn, these citizen’s groups have demanded more information, analysis, and 
transparency from their government, thus inciting OECD to probe further into many issues and 
complex problems.   
 
By virtue of this information-sharing function, OECD has helped inspire increased 
confidence, connectivity, networks, and standards among its member countries. As a result, 
public sector initiatives and economic enterprises have become increasingly more efficient at 
doing what they do best. Moreover, international trade among OECD countries has expanded 
exponentially, generating employment and wealth among the countries, as well as inducing 
growth in many developing countries through massive transfers of technology and investments.  
 
As Joseph E. Stiglitz aptly demonstrated, classical economy rests on the premise that 
information essential to making good economic decisions is more or less equally shared by all 
actors, and therefore, the market is functioning well; and the “invisible hand” can play its role. 
But reality is different: In many cases, information is private and too costly to acquire, thus 
leading to “asymmetries of information” between economic actors. This gives rise to a variety of 
distortions, creating challenges for policymakers who rely only on classical paradigms to guide 
their action. 
 
Supply, or demand-side economics and many other fads born in classical economic 
schools, have marked the policies of OECD member’s governments over the last forty years. This 
pendulum-like discourse has also influenced all aid-giving institutions, be they bilateral or 
multilateral. They more or less echoed the prevalent policy of the day into their programs and 
most importantly into their “prescriptions” to aid recipients, generally referred to as 
“conditionality”; this elegant euphemism means that aid will be granted if the beneficiary agrees 
to do certain prescribed things. The beneficiary is, of course, free to refuse the aid thus extended.  
 
Close observation of what happened in reality in the field raised doubt about the wisdom 
of applying any of those prescriptions. Some development specialists, and I joined their ranks in 
the early 1980s, noticed that information essential to take good decisions is often so scarce, so 
distorted or so missing in the essential, that even good prescriptions have little chance of 
succeeding. For instance, in the early 1980s, at the instigation of World Bank analysts, some 
countries attempted to move away from state control currency valuation (always distorted, of 
course) by auctioning daily foreign currency. This seemed a fair and transparent way of handling 
the problem, however, it soon became obvious that this created bias in favour of rich, well-
informed business and weakened even more essential social activities. For instance, hospitals 
trying to import necessary drugs were seldom capable of winning any bids against commercial 
activities. “Bidding where there is known to be asymmetries of information will be markedly 
different from that where such asymmetry does not exist. Those who are uniformed will presume 
that they will win only if they bid too much …” (Wilson, p 511-518, in Stiglitz, p. 489).  
 
Another example of the way information accrual, policy formulation and economic 
growth occurs comes from some of the OECD’s Sahel Club research carried out when I headed 
the Club. From 1986 onward, the Club and its Sahelian partner, CILSS, produced ever 
increasingly precise yearly cereal crop estimates. This was deemed essential to help define food 
aid requirements. Gradually this new information flow revealed two important policy distortions. 




deficit, thus providing greater quantities of food aid. This lead to artificially deflated prices which 
acted as disincentive to local farmers, thus reducing local production. The contradiction between 
aid activities targeted at increasing food production and other aid programs providing food aid 
became obvious. Better information about crops incited Sahelian countries and Donors to sign an 
agreement governing food aid in 1991. Furthermore, this also led to significant policy changes in 
most Sahelian countries. A case in point was Mali. Laws had been passed earlier that made it a 
criminal offence to export cereals. Such a law made sense in time of drought and shortage, but it 
deprived farmers access to regional export markets. Faced with reality, those laws were changed, 
thus inducing economic growth. This is another tangible demonstration of the significant role that 
quality information provided by governments can play in economic growth.  
 
In the meantime, some smart Sahelian traders noticed opportunities along the extensive 
borders of the region years before governments changed import and export laws. Studies 
undertaken by the Sahel Club in 1988 through 1990 revealed a strong underground cereal trade 
that had emerged in the 1980s. The analysis soon made it obvious that West Africa operated as a 
vast free-trade zone whereby cereals (and presumably other goods) moved across borders in large 
quantities unimpaired by rules or regulations. Confronted with these facts, donor representatives, 
experts, and Sahelian officials pondered the significance of this new outcome. Some argued that 
an underground economy was just another way to attain economic efficiency (balancing supply 
and demand) when faced with ill-advised government controls and policies. Others argued that it 
led to human and capital underutilization. It induced a less efficient economy in general, and most 
importantly, it bred income disparities. Their argument rested in large part on the fact that those 
that had access to information were generally the same that had resources in the first place: they 
could bribe officials to access whatever meaningful statistics they could buy. Farmers for their 
part were seldom given a fair share of profit, as they did not know the real worth of their 
exportable surplus crop. By not recognizing that information of this nature is a “public good,” and 
by not acting decisively to correct this imbalance, governments further compounded “information 
asymmetry.” We soon noticed, for instance, that some crafty government officials increased their 
rent by retaining information longer, thus creating artificial scarcity. In one particular case, some 
regulations were passed with absolutely no other rationale but to sell the right to circumvent it… 
Rent seekers are quite smart indeed.  
 
In Stiglitz words, “The most challenging problems for growth lie in economic 
development. Typically market failures are more prevalent in less developed countries, and these 
market failures are often associated with information problems… Asymmetries of information 
give rise to a host of other market failures – such as missing markets, and especially capital 
markets imperfections, leading to firms that are risk averse and cash constrained.” (Stiglitz, 
2001, p 515, 516).  
 
The way the OECD works has impacted directly in the diversity, quantity, quality, and 
transparency of information collected and made available by its member governments. This not 
only created better national accounts, but also expanded the diversity, depth, and range of various 
census and statistics. It has also led to wider dissemination of the information not only within 
each nation but also universally. Following Stiglitz’ reasoning, by reducing significantly, albeit 
progressively, information asymmetries has lead into markets that function better as economic 
operators became increasingly more confident to invest, expand their operations and create 
employment. Furthermore, it is increasingly being recognized that the arrival of new market 
information allows a market to expand, not just to operate more efficiently. It is difficult to argue, 





As explained in Chapter 3, Section 4, the first thing the OECD Secretariat does when 
tasked with studying a problem is to collect data from each member, and, most importantly, to 
harmonize it in order to  analyze it. This has the obvious result of creating data, statistics, and 
knowledge that are universally readable. It also results in improving the quality and the 
transparency of information provided by less diligent members. Through annual Peer Reviews, all 
OECD members are made to perform at the highest possible level. In other words, a Danish hotel 
entrepreneur can access and  analyze tourist statistics in France with the same certainty his French 
or German competitor will. He can also benefit from the same analysis and forecast produced by 
OECD in order to measure his risks and profits. From 1949 onward, the OECD work has 
progressively reduced “information asymmetry” allowing economic operators to invest, expand, 
and create employment with greater confidence and boldness.  
 
Subsection 1.5 – OECD’s Basic Rules of Conduct 
 
The methodologies deployed by OECD are not well understood, and have rarely been 
discussed in the professional and scholarly literature.  
 
The success of OECD rests on a “blueprint” for international and regional cooperation 
consisting of three elements: (1) promulgation of a supra-national policy regime based on respect 
for human rights, democratic government, and the market economy; (2) enforcement of certain 
basic rules of inter-state conduct; and (3) application of certain unique techniques for making and 
negotiating collective choices among member countries.  
 
The rules for OECD meetings and procedures include agreement on an agenda leading to 
a practical and defined outcome. This has a practical operational mission that is expected to lead 
to tangible objectives and real, demonstrable progress. The basic principles of OECD procedures 
include: (1) respect for ethics; (2) confidence and trust in the other partners; (3) frankness, 
blended with courtesy; (4) a commitment to respect agreements as they are reached and not to 
reopen them to obtain advantage at later stages; and (5) a consensus based on objectivity and 
common standards (these will be described in more detail later).  
 
Taken together, these principles create a common normative framework for 
organizational behaviour, and reflect themselves in the style of discourse within OECD and 
among its members.  
 
In addition, OECD has developed its own know-how on reconciling diverse opinions and 
consensus building. This is achieved through (1) iterative peer review, (2) application of common 
standards, (3) well structured meetings, and (4) transparent processes.  
 
 
Subsection 1.6 - OECD’s “Etiquette” or Unwritten Behavioural Principles 
 
The unwritten rules of the game 
 
In the institutional culture of OECD the stress is on informality and on respect for some 
unwritten rules that, for want of a better term, we may call those of “decorum and etiquette.” 
These, in short, are the principal rules, for the most part unwritten, that govern the behaviour of 
players within the organization. Without this set of complementary rules, the search for consensus 





The primary commitments of states (to work together; to submit their economic policies 
to peer review; to provide all information needed by OECD) have produced what we might call 




• The dominant ethical code in the organization resembles somewhat that of an old style 
English “gentlemen’s club.” 
• All decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, or consensus. 
• In committing themselves to work together, member states have never sacrificed their 
sovereignty, as some did more recently upon joining the European Community. Even 
when they sign on a specific convention, such as the “Convention to Fight Bribery,” they 
do so under no obligation to a majority decision. Furthermore, as there exists no formal 
enforcement mechanism, one may argue that conduct remains voluntary in all respects. 
• The consensus rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions and accommodations in 
order to make it less constraining. 
• Formal decisions are rare: since 1961 there have been perhaps 50 at most (this does not 
include annual budget resolutions for the functioning of the Secretariat). For the most 
part, the results of OECD's work are reflected in a range of commitments that are 
progressively less formal and constraining. 
• As the process moves along, many partial agreements are reached: once such a decision 
is taken, the issue is considered closed and should not be reopened (Bonvin, 1998, p. 22). 
This is another rule specific to the OECD, and one that has allowed it to make steady 
progress over long periods of time. This firmly rooted and thoroughly respected rule 
allows issues to be ratcheted forward step by step. This method of proceeding is a central 
feature in the drafting of minutes of meetings. We shall return to the subject in Chapter 4 
• The OECD statutes engage every member to contribute a share of the organization's 
operating budget, calculated in accordance with a burden-sharing formula based on a 
country's wealth and size. In addition to the activities that involve the entire membership, 
members are free to make voluntary contributions to finance activities to which they 
attach an importance that may not be shared by other members. There are five "affiliated 
organs" of the OECD, including the International Energy Agency that have been created 
and entirely financed by subgroups of members. This is yet another way of getting 
around the rigid requirement of consensus. 
• Respect for consensus is enforced by peer pressure, i.e. a kind of moral and political 
constraint that can be highly effective but is quite different from that flowing from formal 
agreements (Bonvin, 1998, p. 50). 
• Working together consistently for four decades has transformed the organization from a 
negotiating mechanism to achieve “level playing fields” to rich “collective learning 
machinery,” where every member, including its Secretariat, learns from the other. The 
richness of new knowledge based on comparative analysis and on “promising practices” 
is central to allowing member country governments to surmount domestic obstacles, 





• It is important here to distinguish between peer pressure, which as noted above helps in 




4. It is important, however, to understand that in peer review, representatives of other 
member countries serve as a kind of “jury” to evaluate a country’s performance. 
• All member countries, without exception, are expected to submit their policies for 
evaluation and to respond to questions from their peers. 
• To forestall any ill feelings or vendettas between officials, various procedures have been 
adopted. For example, a period of 10 years is allowed to elapse before a country that has 
evaluated another member is in turn subjected to evaluation by that member (see also the 
box in Subsection 4.6 and Chapter 4). 
• Nothing would change if national administrations were not open and flexible. They must 
be in a sense “porous,” so as to absorb comments and modify their habits, their rules and 
procedures, and even their laws, to take account of OECD’s “informal” 
recommendations. The latter have no legal force and might indeed be regarded by some 
as nothing more then interesting declarations of principle. 
• This called for discipline and respect for political agreements on the part of the 
authorities of member states. Protecting the honour of one’s government (however quaint 
this may sound in a modern world which is seemingly governed by interests and 
geopolitical considerations) is most likely at the core of the behaviour of those 
bureaucrats who implement and enforce nationally these informal arrangements. Honour 
is essentially linked with the pursuit of order and stability as it may be achieved through 
traditions and stable institutions (Berger, p. 89-90). Coming out of the devastation of 
World War Two, Europeans were in search of order, national dignity, and sought 
institutional stability. This may explain the relative ease by which agreements reached 
within OECD (and previously within the OEEC) were adhered to: the honour of the 
nation was an important feature for the reconstruction of a stable and peaceful Europe. 
• Most decisions arrived at by country delegates, no matter what their rank is, seldom 
require ministerial approval; the OECD modus operandi rests on real delegated authority 
at lower levels of the administration. 
• The system will work only if member states, and in particular the principal members, are 
really willing to seek and eventually to implement a new common approach. 
• Respect for power relationships is still one of the unspoken rules within the community. 
Although all states are equal when it comes to consensus, some are more equal than 
others. The most important members, led by the United States, will always find it easier 
to impose their views on the others, and by the same token their opposition will constitute 
a virtually insurmountable obstacle to any new undertaking. These power relationships 
may nevertheless shift over time. It is clear, for example, that the predominance once 
enjoyed by the Americans is now shared with the major European countries (to the extent 
they can agree among themselves) and with Japan. It is being claimed by some 
representatives that Peer Reviews are often more direct and frank with smaller countries. 
 
Providing all the information needed by OECD 
 
• The approach to information gathering is highly precise and calculated. Data and studies 
are made public, and the entire system is reinforced by open publication policy (discussed 
in detail in Section 5.2). 
• On the other hand, the minutes of internal discussions within the Organization, 
characterized as these are by a great degree of frankness, are considered the property of 
the members themselves and are not always made public. In fact, “some debates are 
considered so “frank” and of such strategic importance that they are reserved to a 
restricted group of members. This is the case, for example, with Working Party No. 3 




are communicated to other OECD members only on a very restricted basis.” (Chavranski, 
1997, p. 63) 
• This obligation of frankness implies another rule of etiquette on the part of members: the 
confidentiality of debates is vigorously protected. No member would think of taking 
secrets learned during a debate and using them to its negotiating advantage in another 
forum. Confidence is a precious commodity that takes a long time to build and can be 
easily destroyed. Without this mutual trust, the entire structure of OECD would collapse 
like a house of cards. 
• OECD does not issue dogma even if a dominant thinking prevails. This explains the tone 
adopted in all of its work. It would be considered "poor taste" to make dogmatic 
pronouncements: these are left to national authors and researchers and to politicians. As a 
result, the Organization’s style of writing is so nuanced and subtle that uninitiated readers 
may mistake subtlety for vagueness and nuance for indulgence. We shall return to the 
subject in Chapters 3 and 4. 
• Since the Secretariat was expected to serve as a kind of arbitrator vis-à-vis national 
administrations, it was essential to endow the Secretary General with clear and sufficient 
powers when it comes to staff planning and appointments. (The subject is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 5.1.) 
 
Taken together, these principles create a common normative framework for 
organizational behaviour, and are reflected in the style of discourse within OECD and among 
its members. In the recent past, some NGOs have been included in a number of working 
groups. This raises an interesting and haunting question: will they accept to observe 
meticulously those rules created by and for bureaucrats? 
 
 
Section 2  
A Network Driven by Peer Pressure 
 
By now, it should be clear to the reader that OECD is not a typical international 
institution whose organizational rules can be analyzed according to traditional descriptive 
methods. Rather, OECD is clearly a network, or what Pierre Vinde, a former Deputy Secretary 
General, describes as “a permanent intergovernmental multi-sectoral conference.” This is 
confirmed by the fact that the OECD Secretariat’s annual budget is roughly equal to the estimated 
costs borne by its members to attend meetings in Paris and to keep permanent national 
delegations in place. It is a little-known fact that 40,000 delegates from capitals and national 
administrations attend various meetings dealing with the work of more than 140 committees and 
working parties, for a total of 2,829 meeting days (1997 data). Vinde (2002), who first attempted 
to evaluate these relative costs, has established that there is a ratio of 1 to 1 between members’ 
direct costs and the running of the Secretariat. Such a ratio makes this organization somewhat 
unique among international bodies. In a report released in December 2002, Vinde reviewed in 
some detail the relative costs for Sweden. It reveals an interesting pattern worth noting. The 
Government of Sweden spends around 85 million Kroners (7.75 Kronors = US$1, may-8-2004) 
per year for its participation in OECD. That figure accounts for a statutory contribution to Part 
one and two of 14 to 15 million Kroners to which it adds 10 million Kroners as voluntary 
contribution. This implies that Sweden’s own direct cost for participating in this network is about 
65 million Kroners, or twice as much as its contribution to the operation of the Secretariat. In 
other words, the ratio is greater than one to one and presumably Sweden gets “value for money” 
from the Secretariat, as it perceives it as the hub of a significant and important network. This may 




25% of the cost of running the Secretariat. In this case the ratio is probably less than one to one. 
This might partially explain why the US delegation has been arguing for significant cost 
reductions for the Secretariat, while smaller members, such as Sweden, have agreed to shore up 
for lost capacity on a voluntary basis. 
 
From an organizational point of view, a network such as OECD differs from an 
institution in that it is composed of entities that are free participant nations, which are never 
subject to the discipline and authority of a typical hierarchy. They may freely enter into binding 
agreements and contracts, but they cannot be forced to do so. They may not even be swayed by 
majority votes. For a concept, an idea or a policy to be agreed to and to be transformed into a 
general practice, each and every participant in the network must recognize and accept its intrinsic 
merit. At the very least, it should see it as in its interest to stay with the group or be swayed 
through other arguments. Occasionally, a majority may decide to proceed and leave a few 
laggards behind, thereby suspending the consensus rule in hopes that the holdouts will eventually 
join the consensus; such situations, however, are the exception and are not intended to last very 
long. The health of a network demands that the entire process be subject to closure. 
 
Subsection 2.1 - Peer pressure 
 
The central element in this methodology for collective choice, arguably, is the use of peer 
pressure. Peer pressure and its adjunct, peer review or appraisal, serves as an organizational 
engine to propel participants forward and to ensure progress in procedural terms. This concept 
will be more widely discussed in Chapter 4, but it is important to distinguish it from peer 
appraisal as it is known in the scientific world. These two concepts, however, are very close to 
each other. In a number of cases, the two methods function in tandem. 
 
There are three distinct periods in the negotiation process over collective choices when 
peer appraisal seems to be most effective: a) When the group concerned establishes a common 
agenda; b) When the group concerned formulates and adopts a policy choice or policy options; or 
c) When the group concerned monitors, evaluates, and enforces, again through peer appraisal, 
these newly adopted policy choices. 
 
Defining a common agenda: two contrasting examples 
 
In explaining this way of proceeding, it is useful to look at some examples. Following is 
a deconstruction of two examples of peer pressure, involving analysis of the subsidies that all 
member states give to their agricultural and industrial sectors. Since the early 1980s, many 
governments have recognized the need for structural adjustment. The methods - in particular 
targeted subsidies – that were used to stimulate output, and that did so much to relaunch the 
European economy, have had a perverse effect: they have engendered new forms of 
protectionism and this, of course, runs counter to the OECD spirit of cooperation. 
 
In the first example, OECD members managed to overcome their “visceral” objections, 
and since 1988 OECD has been publishing a detailed annual report (Agricultural Policies, 
Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook) on the comparative state of farm subsidies in each 
member country. By making “hidden” information available and allowing for objective 
comparison of country performances, this report has had a steadily growing impact on debate. 
 
By contrast, one major member or another has blocked repeated initiatives at a similar 








From its earliest days, the European Community has had in place a set of policies for 
encouraging agricultural output. The initial challenge was to overcome food shortages and restore 
production to its prewar levels. Leaders were determined that they should never again be 
dependent on distant sources of supply, in case the cold war should erupt into open hostilities. 
Fear of a naval blockade was felt nowhere more strongly than in Finland, where agriculture is 
protected and subsidized at a very high level. 
 
European farm support is based essentially on shoring up market prices through variable 
import levies and export subsidies. This is one of the principal mechanisms of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). As a result, prices remain high even if output rises. Predominantly 
industrial countries thus find themselves financing agricultural growth in EC countries that are 
better suited to farming. Europe is in this respect a protectionist stronghold. 
 
This situation is a constant source of irritation to American and Canadian farm lobbies, as 
well as those of Australia and New Zealand. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, these 
countries exerted constant pressure on European nations to abandon its agricultural policy. They 
saw it as costly and economically distorting, to the detriment of more efficient and competitive 
producers elsewhere in the world. The Europeans retorted that farm subsidies in the United States 
amounted to some US$60billion, a figure they considered astronomical and that, they charged, 
betrayed the real motive of North Americans, which was to increase their market share. 
 
This is an extraordinarily complicated technical issue, since it is difficult to compare the 
costs and effects of the measures taken by each country and (in the case of federations such as 
Canada) by every province or state. The Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario, for example, 
control milk prices through "supply management" schemes. These provinces assign each 
producer an output quota and impose stiff penalties if that quota is exceeded. This means, in turn, 
that imports must also be subject to quotas, otherwise the sacrifice demanded of local producers 
would be in vain. Is this merely an elegant euphemism for subsidizing domestic output, much as 
the EC does, or is it, as Canadian farmers believe, a remarkable mechanism intended solely to 
reduce the devastating hazards of laissez-faire? 
 
It is probable that the debate would still be dragging on were it not for renewed criticism 
of the CAP within the EC. Complaints were raised that it was costly for consumers and taxpayers 
alike. Even more important, it came to be seen as providing support to large, efficient producers 
while doing little to improve incomes for small farmers or to offer effective aid to disadvantaged 
rural areas (Chavranski, 1997, p. 92). 
 
In the end, under the impact of peer pressure, OECD members agreed that the Secretariat 
should shed some light on this discussion. The item was accordingly placed on the organization's 
agenda. The Secretariat was to play its role in accordance with the method and procedures 
discussed in Section 4. 
 
After repeated and fruitless attempts to compile comparable statistics, the OECD 
agriculture directorate had no choice but to innovate and to invent a new operational concept. 
Basing itself on "incontestable technical foundations"(Chavranski, 1997, p. 92) , the Secretariat 
developed a method for calculating "producer subsidy equivalents" (PSE) and "consumer subsidy 




farmers and livestock producers, as well as support measures that are the equivalents of subsidies. 
In 1988, the Secretariat published its first report on this subject. 
 
To nearly universal surprise, this report revealed the full measure of farm support 
provided by all OECD members. The total figure for farm support of various kinds in OECD 
countries in 1986 was set at US$302 billion, against total output of US$534 billion (based on 
farm gate prices), or 56.5% of output value. It represented more than 2.3% of total GDP. In some 
countries, notably Japan, the distortion is even higher (as much as 70%). The analysis showed 
that every farmer was being subsidized to the tune of US$10,000 in the European Union, 
US$16,000 in the United States, and US$8,000 in Canada. These practices were obviously 
causing significant economic distortions not only domestically but also in international trade. 
Another OECD body, the Club du Sahel, showed that these subsidies were having a depressing 
impact on developing country producers. Studies by the Club revealed that in the 1980s, Sahelian 
cattle herders lost their traditional meat market in Côte d’Ivoire in favour of subsidized meat 
exported from the EU. 
 
It was not OECD itself that undertook to negotiate the details of measures to reform these 
practices. The organization merely recommended to its members that they try their best to do so 
gradually. But “by highlighting the tremendous burden on taxpayers and consumers, as reflected 
in the PSE calculations, it had in hand a powerful lever for promoting agricultural policy reform” 
(Chavranski, 1997, p.95). The Secretariat’s annual monitoring report has become a key document 
for objectively assessing progress, while highlighting examples of backsliding and broken 
promises. 
 
This move had an impact on the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the late 1980s. At 
that time, the disagreements dividing the Europeans and the Americans were so deep and so 
serious (not to mention the suspicions surrounding Japanese protectionism), that GATT 
negotiations seemed doomed to failure. Indeed, the creation of the World Trade Organization in 
1991 may never have come about had it not been for this injection of transparency. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the OECD Secretariat, in inventing the PSE, was providing far 
more than a statistical indicator: it was in fact laying the basis for a common language among 
member countries. The PSE now serves as a kind of "Esperanto" for dealing with agricultural 
support policies. 
 
In short, we have here an example of the complexities and the importance of peer 
pressure for defining a common agenda and establishing rules for monitoring it. To overcome the 
impasse, European states that derive fewer advantages from CAP would have had to exert strong 
pressure on its net beneficiaries. Otherwise, any single member could have blocked progress for a 
long time on this issue. It is also an example of the central role that information and transparency 
can play in improving the economy, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Last but not least, it gives us an idea of how difficult it is to demonstrate the value of 
prevention efforts when those efforts are successful. There has been modest progress since that 
time, despite heavy pressure from farm lobbies. Subsidies in 2001 represented only 1.3% of GDP, 
and accounted for only 54% of the total value of agricultural output. These may be modest gains, 







On the other hand, things do not always turn out so well in a network. Consider the 
following history of failure, as recounted by Chavranski (p. 91): 
 
“In the early 1980s, a few countries, led by the United States, brought pressure within the 
organization to improve the transparency of industrial subsidies. The objective was, first, to 
develop an overall view of the importance of subsidies in each member country, with the 
underlying but not explicit idea that they might eventually be phased out. This was a key chapter 
in structural adjustment policies. At the time, France objected and the project remained bogged 
down until it was revised by a compromise in 1987. Since then, there has been considerable 
progress in the course of peer reviews aimed at drawing international comparisons. 
 
“Paradoxically, the current situation is diametrically opposed to that of the early 1980s. 
European countries are eager to pursue the project, while the United States and Canada, citing 
institutional differences between centralized and federal countries, have declared it impossible to 
provide information on subsidies provided at the state or provincial level - which, according to 
available data, are far from negligible. For these two countries, the initial results of the exercise 
were a surprise, and quite different from what they expected, and they are now seeking to rein in 
the project. In any case, significant methodological difficulties remain, relating in particular to the 
existence of indirect subsidies through the taxation system that are not easy to pin down. 
 
“Efforts are now confined to analyzing the economic effects of subsidies on the industrial 
sectors of countries for which adequate information is available. This represents a significant 
backtracking from the original goal of transparency. This example is fairly typical of the 
behaviour of certain member countries, and of their capacity to shift their stance when the results 
of an exercise they supported turn out to be different from what they expected.” 2
 
 Here is what game theory has to say on this subject:  
 
“Cooperation is not the only equilibrium of the repeated game. Suppose one of the firms 
doggedly charges a low price, regardless of what its rival does. Then the best the rival can do is 
charge that low price too. [In essence, that is what continues to happen concerning subsidies to 
industry among OECD member nations.] Game theory does not predict that cooperation occurs in 
a repeated game; it says only that the repetition makes cooperation possible. Many outcomes are 
consistent with all the players behaving rationally, and it is possible to be trapped in a low-level 
equilibrium. Cooperation is just one of the outcomes of a repeated game. The conclusion is 
therefore regrettably indeterminate.” To the related question, “Does it pay to be trustworthy?” the 
answer is “maybe”(McMillan, 1992,p.30). This is the reality in any network, including OECD. 
Therefore, the remarkable feature that should be highlighted is the fact that it has worked 
consistently for so many important occasions. The fact that at times it does not work should be 
taken as a natural variation. 
 
 
Section 3  Consensual Discipline and Dynamic Tension 
 
3.1 Maintaining balance 
 
                                                     
2 It should be noted that this particular issue is now under the responsibility of the World Trade 
Organization. Using a different approach may result in changing this particular practice, which in essence, 




Dynamic tension is what creates equilibrium and balance in a network. Forces must at all 
times be kept in balance, as one cannot count on hierarchy to compensate occasional or 
permanent loss in balance.  
 
One could argue that within each OECD country, government institutions are kept 
healthy by constantly being confronted with permanent tension created by conflicting interests 
and interest groups, as we have seen in the previous example. Agricultural policymakers, for 
example, are confronted with pressures from farmers, food processors and related industries, and 
consumer and other interest groups (including their own bureaucracy). This tension balances 
itself out more or less (sometimes less) over a long time period, so that legislation and adopted 
practice remain more or less fair to each segment of society. This tension is also reflected within 
OECD itself. Each country delegate is moved and prompted to adopt positions that, over time, are 
bound to reflect conflicting national interests.  
 
Changes in the equilibrium, however, are to be expected. They are often the result of 
strong political forces, and there is nothing anyone in the OECD Secretariat can or should do 
about this. For example, the Thatcher and Reagan eras, in conjunction with the end of the Cold 
War, brought about a shift away from many Welfare State creeds and ideas. This push by two 
conservative leaders opened a general quest for structural adjustments among most if not all 
OECD members in the 1980s and 1990s. One must recognize that the fulcrum has moved 
somewhat to the right. It is nevertheless the function of OECD to challenge political fads where it 
can, and try to illuminate the issues with evidence and nuance.  
 
 A long “rivalry” went on, for example, between those advocating a strict economic 
approach in the public sector, and those who sought a broader view, balancing policy 
effectiveness with budgetary efficiency. Classical economists, believing in the virtue of the 
“invisible hand,” and of the effectiveness of market competition to keep costs down, argued that 
the private sector was more efficient at delivering services than heavy bureaucracies. They 
persuaded OECD members to privatize many government-owned organizations and to seek ways 
to reduce further the overall cost of government. In some cases, governments even privatized 
natural monopolies, such as municipal water systems, for example, thus losing the leverage of 
competition to maintain discipline and keep prices down. In addition, as private corporations are 
bound to maximize profits and not redistribution, social problems could be expected to emerge 
following privatization. To continue on the same example, municipalities had traditionally found 
ways and means to give access to water even to impoverished citizens. Obviously, private 
companies could not be expected to do the same, but targeted fiscal transfers could compensate. 
However, opponents argued that targeting a segment of population is laden with problems and 
heavy costs, and therefore not always feasible. Secondly, many sectors in which the government 
was present were involving externalities (energy) or concerned public goods (water), in which 
case the government can be more efficient as it internalizes the externalities. Furthermore market 
imperfections and the results of market failures have a tendency to constantly affect the same 
segment of society more than the others. In other words, the single-minded pursuit of “budgetary 
efficiency” needed to be balanced by social, political, and other considerations.  
 
To rally a majority vote, it is necessary to convince only half of the participants plus one, 
and this in essence is less of a tedious task than convincing everyone, as required under the 
consensus rule. In addition, in a situation requiring consensus, any less-concerned participating 
country can wait until all the others have committed themselves and then demand an enormous 
“price” to cast its vote with them. If a game is played only once, then the consensus rule gives 
enormous power to the last one in. But this tactic is unlikely to work in a repeated game. “Once a 




order and, in fact, constitute the principal means to instil corporate discipline” (McMillan, 1992, 
p.29). 
 
Even this factor, however, becomes less and less important as time goes by and the same 
players regularly interact. After a number of iterations, a collective behaviour will have been 
developed and a shared language arrived at. An agreed and generally unwritten form of self-
imposed discipline arises. Obvious misbehaviour is simply chastised by the others and in the 
worst case the offending member may be ostracized. Eventually, when one player refuses to join 
a consensus, a clear message is being given to the group: it has no choice but to listen carefully to 
the arguments and build a consensus that takes them into consideration. “In the search for 
consensus, then, everyone is obliged to make concessions and a compromise will finally emerge, 
after all the essential concerns (to the extent they are mutually compatible) have been taken into 
consideration” (Chavranski, 1997, p.43). 
   
Subsection 3.2. - Mechanisms for Softening the Rigors of Consensus 
 
Occasions will arise when concessions and compromises will not suffice. The full 
consensus rule must then be bent. This is one of the ways by which a network moves ahead and 
refuses to be held hostage to the slowest, or to what is called the “rule of the lowest common 
denominator.” OECD has harboured a number of mechanisms to foster flexibility and to 
encourage its members to adopt in all circumstances a proactive attitude, to move as far as it can 
go to promote reforms and to seek, jointly and individually, the best means to arrive at it. There 
are four ways of softening the demands and the obstacles inherent in the consensus rule. 
 
Rule of exception to the consensus 
 
In all cases, the meeting chair will allow the discussion to continue (perhaps over several 
months) until there are no further formal objections. A member may then simply sit silent so as 
not to prevent a consensus from being reached. This approach is sometimes less binding than a 
formal vote. On the other hand, a member may formally abstain. In this case, the "decision" (or 
the "recommendation") will not apply to that member, a situation that differs from the rules of the 
European Union, where a majority vote (in certain fields) is equally binding on all members 
(Bonvin, 1998, p. 50).  
 
Downgrading the degree of formality of commitments  
 
OECD has the power to take “decisions” that, by virtue of the OECD Charter, are 
binding on all members. Although the Charter does not provide for any sanction mechanism, 
these decisions engage the political honour of states, and for this reason they are always taken 
seriously. States are expected to take all the steps necessary to ensure that obligations assumed in 
this way are effectively respected. Experience has shown that they do respect such commitments. 
As a result, every article of a "decision" will be examined and debated in the finest detail. 
Consensus in such cases is usually a long time in coming. It is therefore a fairly rare form of 
commitment. Bonvin counts at most 40 decisions since the founding of the organization. Two of 
the best known and most important concern the 1961 Codes of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements and of Current Invisible Operations. These codes have had a major impact on the 
development of economies, by supporting and reinforcing the process of economic opening, as 
Chavranski has so elegantly and persuasively shown. 
 
OECD is more likely to produce recommendations, which are easier to negotiate and are, 




adopts them, and they are not dependent on any time-consuming and obstacle-strewn ratification 
process. They are applied in a flexible manner that allows member states to apply them gradually. 
Peer reviews exert sustained pressure to ensure that this happens. 
 
The Council may also issue declarations, the legal import of which is poorly defined but 
which, as with everything OECD does, will in the end have considerable moral force. In 1997, 
130 declarations were in force. This reflects the fact that the Council can take supplementary 
decisions on the application of the declarations and can decide later how they are to be applied. 
Each new stage therefore serves to refine and reinforce the initial consensus. 
 
Finally, OECD members may agree on arrangements or what are more generally known 
as “actes innommés/gentlemen’s agreements.” These do not carry signatures but are “officialized” 
by the Council, which takes note of them and records them in its minutes (Bonvin, 1998, p. 53 
and Chavranski, 1997, 1997, p. 57). There will even be occasions where the Council decides not 
to take note of an acte innommé, if it involves a particularly delicate political issue. In this way, 
discussions within the "arrangement" may gradually lead to a consensus that is more precise and 
operational. The "arrangement" with which aid specialists are most familiar is that regarding the 
use of export credits. In fact it eventually came to be known as the "Consensus." Its aim was to 
prevent governments from using tied bilateral aid as a disguised subsidy for their exports, 
contrary to the spirit and rules of agreements concluded among OECD members (see Section 3.3, 
Chapter 1). 
 
This simple terminology reveals the flexibility and the subtlety that guide the actions of 
the organization and that allow it to progress step-by-step as far as possible. 
 
Nomenclature of the committees 
 
The Council is the supreme authority of the organization. Every country has a 
representative on the Council, with the rank and status of Ambassador, who heads the country's 
delegation to the organization. It is the Council that takes every important decision, that creates 
the committees, and that adopts the annual budget. 
 
In most cases, every national delegation will have a number of counsellors with 
specialized functions, whose mandate is to follow the work of the committees (subsidiary bodies 
created by the Council) and to prepare reports that will be routed to each of the ministries 
concerned. In total, national delegations had nearly 600 such diplomats in 1997. In the 
committees, delegates not only discuss new ideas but also examine progress in certain fields such 
as economic policy, international trade, science and technology, development assistance, or 
financial markets. 
 
The structure of committees and working parties is another indicator of the organization's 
great flexibility. A number of working parties have been established, following the course of 
events. A consensus had to be struck every time, because every committee requires the 
mobilization of the Secretariat capacity, and in many cases it implies the creation of a new unit 
within the Secretariat and consequent costs for member country delegations. 
 
In addition to the Committees, the following entities coexist within the Organization, as 





• Working party - a subsidiary body of a committee. Some working parties operate by 
electronic communications, without actual meetings, and are referred to as electronic 
working parties. 
• Working group (or possibly, a subgroup) - subsidiary body of a working party. 
• Task force - an open-ended subsidiary body set up by a Committee or a Working party with 
a specific and time-bound mandate. 
• Workshop - a meeting convened by a subsidiary body for a one-time discussion of a 
particular topic. Occasionally the terms seminars, ad hoc meeting, special session are 
used for the same purpose. 
• Conference - identical to a workshop but with broader participation and usually at a higher 
level. 
• Forum - a subsidiary body meeting on a regular basis linked to an OECD Committee with 
participation of non-member countries, other international organizations, and the private 
sector, particularly, but not exclusively, in connection with the outreach program. 
• Expert group - a group with limited participation set up by a Committee or a Working party 
to study a specific issue, and composed of participants chosen for their particular 
expertise. 
• Steering group - in certain cases there is the need to create a subsidiary body with limited 
participation to supervise and guide certain activities/projects on behalf of a Committee, a 
Working party, or a Working group. 
• In addition to all these groups, every year sees an “OECD Ministerial”: it is, in essence, a 
Council meeting held at the ministerial level rather than at the Ambassador level. It 
brings together ministers of finance and of foreign affairs and trade from all member 
countries. This ministerial conference discusses the major issues affecting the economies 
of member states and of the world in general. When deemed necessary, any Committee 
may be held at the ministerial level.  
 
Initiatives financed on a voluntary basis 
 
The annual operating budget of the organization is based on the planned activities and 
work of the committees (as well as the other subsidiary working groups identified above). Every 
participating country is expected to pay a quota that is determined by a complex burden-sharing 
formula The Organization's expenses are shared among its members in accordance with a formula 
based on gross domestic product during the most recently available three-year period. This 
principle is subject to three modifications: the smallest countries (Iceland and Luxembourg) may 
not pay less than 0.10% of the total budget each, while the largest country, the United States, will 
never pay more than 25%. The size of every other member's contribution is thus calculated from 
the remainder (74.8% of the total) (Chavranski, 1997, p. 69). This common budget is discussed 
and approved by the Council, and it is known as "Part One" of the OECD budget. 
 
Over the years, OECD has expanded its field of action and has agreed to play host to a 
number of entities that are financed by a limited number of members. As some see it, this 
plethora of agencies sows disorder and fosters the impression that OECD is a bloated 
bureaucracy. They argue that the organization would do better to focus on what they see as its 
principal mandate. Here again, the organization regularly makes efforts to simplify its 
administration and reduce its costs. It is not our purpose to defend one view or another 
concerning the existence of the committees or agencies, including those known as “Part Two.” It 





The first and most obvious advantage is to accommodate the desires of some members 
without requiring the search for an undoubtedly elusive consensus. The entities created in this 
way with the support of certain member countries are covered under “Part Two,” as opposed to 
“Part One,” i.e. the part of the Secretariat’s operating budget to which all members contribute. 
This is the case, for example, with the International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA was created 
in the early 1970s, in the wake of the first oil shock. OECD member countries felt the need for a 
watching post to analyze changes in oil supply and demand as an aid to refining their energy 
policies. France preferred to go it alone. Thus, what would otherwise have become a Committee 
of the Organization, financed annually under “Part One” of the budget, became one of the entities 
under Part Two of the organization's budget. It should be noted that eventually France saw to its 
advantage to join the IEA as a full member. 
 
Second, the great diversity of these activities serves to involve members ever more 
deeply in common undertakings by allowing them to support the collective effort voluntarily, just 
as volunteer associations involve citizens in their community. They may provide financial support 
or “in-kind” contributions toward those specific goals they believe to be critical. In the recent 
past, many countries have chosen to increase their voluntary contributions. It is reflected in the 
fact that following a series of personnel reductions, OECD still employs as many people as it did 
before downsizing, due to increased voluntary contributions. 
 
Third, we may note that these 
activities allow the organization to 
expand the scope of its moral 
authority into new communities, 
which in turn will benefit from the 
rigour, the methodology, and the 
reputation of OECD. For example, the 
library of documents published by the 
Club du Sahel includes many African 
authors who otherwise could scarcely 
have hoped to see their work 
distributed in European and North 
American capitals. 
 
A large measure of flexibility 
blended with rigour becomes the true 
asset of this modern construct. 
Possibly as a result of reduced outside 
political pressures, combined with 
relative economic affluence, the 
consensus-based decision-making 
process has become increasingly 
unwieldy. OECD has been searching 
for an alternative for some years with 
no consensus. In the meantime, 
pragmatic ways are found to work 
around each specific obstacle. 
Table 10 The OECD family. 
 To help understand what otherwise appears to be an extremely complex operation, 




activities of OECD financed by “Part One.” In this core, we find all the main Committees and 
Working Parties.  
 
 There is then a second circle of activities that are closely linked to the core and generally 
complement it. This second circle is financed in “Part Two” of the budget. Part-two entities also 
contribute to meeting the general overhead expenses of the organization.  
 
A third circle is constituted by international organizations or intergovernmental activities 
that for reasons of convenience have chosen to use OECD administrative rules and services, but 
which have an autonomous status. IMHE is recorded in “Part two” activities, other independent 
entities do not appear in the OECD budget documents. 
 
Many participants, and a fair number of observers, find this architecture needlessly 
complex. It has been the subject of many internal studies and discussions in order to simplify its 
application and to reduce its costs. Yet rationalization implies abandoning activities that will be 
dear to one delegation or another, and consensus will always be elusive. Whatever the arguments 
pro and con a specific program feature may be, one might suggest that this plethora of 
arrangements and accommodations reflects, in a sense, the very nature of the organization, and as 
such is essential to its success. 
 
In fact, these various forms of committees and entities as well as the various forms of 
commitments, act as a series of “little tools,” the differences among which are subtle and often 
difficult to perceive. Their use, however, in the hands of skilled negotiators make it possible to 
continue flushing out small points of consensus that would otherwise have remained hidden. The 
sum total of all these efforts and all these partial successes helps to instil harmony and peace 
within the group. In a universe that is constantly changing, this array of tools would seem to be an 
essential factor for adaptation. Yet we must recognize that the nomenclature of entities subsidiary 
to the Council is rather obscure and seems at times to lack consistency. It should be emphasized 
however, that member countries can always do things that matter to them somewhere within 
OECD, something they often can’t do elsewhere. 
 
 
Section 4  
Policy Process, Blending Negotiations and Research 
 
The OECD policy process is itself designed to be progressive, iterative, and empirical: it 
follows the progress of its members, at times leading, pushing, pulling, or tugging, always 
moving from common knowledge to new facts, and eventually to new policies. It also makes use 
of state-of-the-art synthesis of knowledge on a contentious topic. It sponsors in-house or hands-
off research to shed new light on a growing topic, and moves the agenda progressively in a 
seesaw fashion using various techniques.  
 
The entire process can be broken down into six distinct steps or elements: 
 
1. Agreement on a common problem to be assessed and eventually resolved. 
2. Establishment of an information base for making comparisons. 
3. Analysis of findings and the drawing up of conclusions. 
4. Forecasts and scenarios. 
5. The preparation and adoption of recommendations. 





Not all activities of the Organization comprise all those six elements. Many activities 
considered very useful by country members include only some of those. For example, between 
1961 and 2001, the Secretariat only collected and compared data concerning health. Furthermore, 
in recent years an increased proportion of the work focuses on exchanging information and 
sharing experience with the view of identifying “promising practices” or what many still refer to 
as “best practices.” 
 
Each Committee is composed of member states and chaired by the representative of one 
of them; it is responsible for overseeing the entire process. However, it is clearly understood that 
the work of a technical and scientific kind (phases 2, 3, 4 and the drafting of recommendations) is 
primarily the responsibility of the Secretariat. The Committee will take the lead, however, in 
defining the agenda, adopting recommendations, and reviewing the performance of other 
members. 
 
The entire process remains at all times rigorous, subtle and, in keeping with tradition, 
eminently flexible.  
 
Subsection 4.1 - Defining a common agenda through “preliminary inquiry” 
 
The process begins with a preliminary inquiry designed to ensure that the dialogue 
among partners is actually feasible and viable, and that it can reach the intended goals. In essence, 
it is deemed feasible if all partners agree to put it on the agenda, and it is not feasible if a 
consensus cannot be reached. This may sound like somewhat circular logic, but it works.  
 
Defining the question remains a most difficult task, one that may require much iteration, 
and may raise many questions. What is to be emphasized? What is excluded from the field of 
research? Are we working from the basis of a broad question with many related sub-issues, 
possibly concerning many fields and departments? Should we start with a very limited and 
operational question, and elaborate it as we move along? Is it a field that is already well studied 
by other international organizations? Will further research on the question then be redundant or 
complementary? How strong and how well entrenched are national vested interest groups?  
 
All these questions are obviously linked to national interests and to specific lobby groups, 
which, at least in some cases, are likely to win or lose depending on the definition adopted by 
OECD. 
 
Once the parties have agreed on the topic, applying the “OECD process” then involves 
the four steps of a more scientific nature, which fall clearly under the responsibility of the 
Secretariat: a) establishing a database, b) analyzing findings, c) forecasts and scenarios, and d) 
preparing recommendations (Bonvin, 1998, p. 56). This typology is typical of scientific research -
- but as it applies to the resolution of national and international political problems, the research 
approach taken may differ from the methods of the academic world. Its focus is often broader and 
multidisciplinary. In OECD parlance, this is referred to as “horizontal.” 
 
The Secretariat reports to the committee upon completing each of these steps. The 
ensuing discussions will allow member countries to commit themselves progressively and more 
deeply to the path of reform. 
 





Once members have identified a common problem, the Secretariat is charged with 
constructing a reliable database of statistics on the subject. The Secretariat must not only compile 
the data supplied by member states, but must also "make these data mutually compatible in order 
to facilitate international comparisons over a long period. To do this, it must develop standards 
and classifications" (Chavranski, 1997, p. 19). 
 
This groundwork can itself produce results that are sometimes surprising. They may 
bring to light facts of which governments were previously unaware. They may also reveal 
discrepancies when the variables stray particularly far from the mean. The publication of reliable 
and transparent statistical data helps national and international investors as well as economic 
operators in general to take decisions. This means that capital will move more freely and 
effectively, thanks to the confidence and certainty generated. For example, reliable statistics on 
tourist movements are needed for investments in new hotels to materialize (this is fully discussed 
in Chapter 2). 
 
Finally, these studies may give rise to new concepts and new ways of understanding and 
describing reality: a sort of Esperanto for governance. As described earlier, (see example 
Agricultural Subsidies) the Secretariat had to invent new indicators, the PSE and the CSE, in 
order to compare different forms of farm subsidies. A second example of innovation can be seen 
in the development of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP, see Table 11), which has become an 





What are Price Purchasing Parities? 
 
“The first major study of PPPs was undertaken under the auspices of the OEEC in the 
early 1950s when Milton Gilbert and Irving B. Kravis produced their pioneering report on An 
International Comparison of National Products and the Purchasing Power of Currencies, 
(OEEC, 1954). In the 1960s and 1970s the main focus of this work shifted to the Statistical 
Offices of the United Nations and the European Communities. However, in 1982 OECD 
became convinced of the need to calculate a new benchmark set of PPPs for its member 
countries, partly because of the large movements in the exchange rates between the 
currencies of some of its Member countries in the 1980s. Exchange rates are liable to change 
much more rapidly, and in greater amounts, than purchasing power parities whose movements 
tend to be gradual and small. Nominal figures based on exchange rates do not provide the 
information that many users seek to obtain concerning real differences in productivity or living 
standards” (Hill,1989, p. 2-3). 
 
In their simplest form, PPPs are relative prices that show the ratio of prices in national 
currencies for the same good or service in different countries. A well-known example of a one-
product comparison is The Economist’s Big Mac Currency index, presented by that newspaper 
as ‘burgernomics,’ whereby ‘the Big Mac PPP’ is the exchange rate that would mean 
hamburgers cost the same in America as abroad. The OECD-Eurostat PPPs, however, are 
calculated not only for individual products but also for product groups and for each of the 
various levels of aggregation up to and including GDP. The purpose is similar - to obtain 
currency conversion rates that eliminate the differences in price levels between countries, and 
to permit volume comparisons. 
 
A great challenge with such comparisons is that volumes or prices have to be 
compared across economies that may be very different. Goods and services that are 




has to be found to make meaningful comparisons. Regular benchmark surveys help keep 
product lists up to date so as to maximize comparability. 
 
Deviations between PPPs and income based on exchange rates can be considerable, 
as can be seen in Table 1 below. For example, Russia's income per capita is only 6% of the 
OECD average when calculated by the exchange rate method, but it rises to 26% using the 
PPP method. The conventional exchange rate method generally tends to overstate living 
standards in rich countries and to understate them in poor countries" (Chavranski,1997, p. 21). 
 
The calculations of PPPs are described the OECD publication “Purchasing Power 
Parities and Real Expenditures” 
 




PPP and International Comparisons of GDP 
 
Selected countries Per capita GDP,  
OECD members’ average = 
100 
 Indices 
based on PPPs 
Indices 
based on exchange 
rates 
Canada (G-7) 117 94 
France (G-7) 102 106 




Italy (G-7) 106 91 

















Ukraine 16 3 
Source OECD, 2002 







Subsection 4.3. - Analyzing the Data 
 
Based on the data it has collected, the Secretariat conducts the necessary studies. There 
are many kinds of studies that may be appropriate to specific circumstances, ranging from the 
preparation of synthetic summaries, through inter-country comparisons, to original research. 
These studies are similar to academic research -- after all, OECD analysts generally have the 
same academic training as university researchers, but they must first and foremost answer all the 
questions posed by the decision-makers. The scope of their analysis may therefore go beyond the 
normal bounds of a scientific research project. 
 
The conclusions and recommendations will then have to be fed into the process specific 
to the OECD committee, which remains the final client for all this work. The organization may 
also use the analysis "to criticize national policies, in particular on the basis of comparisons with 
the policies and outcomes of other member countries…" (Chavranski, 1997, p. 21). This approach 
in fact constitutes an unprecedented social innovation. 
 
Subsection 4.5 - Forecasting 
 
As an aid to decision-making and policy formulation, the Secretariat is often expected to 
extend its analysis over time in order to show member states the foreseeable consequences of 
current policies or of modifications to them. This is common practice for economic assessments.  
 
This forecasting work has become the hallmark of the organization. It makes it possible 
indirectly “to test the quality of studies and analysis on the basis of which these forecasts are 
made. Their credibility depends on the discrepancies between the figures forecast in the past and 
the figures actually observed”(Bonvin, 1998, p. 60). Thus, before discussing the 
recommendations or debating changes in habits and laws, countries must first become familiar 
with the comparative data so that they can understand and discuss the analysis and ultimately 
assess the impact of the various scenarios.  
 
Subsection 4.6. - Recommendations 
 
Unlike the previous steps, preparing recommendations is in reality more of an art than a 
science. It involves applying know-how to the results of a “sober” analysis of the observed facts, 
while constantly avoiding dogmatic approaches and putting forward proposals that will lead to 
real improvements, with due regard to the existing political situation and the absorptive capacity 
of each state. These recommendations are discussed in detail by member countries, although they 
may give only cursory attention to the preceding documents. Primarily, this reflects the fact that 
monitoring will be based on the recommendation, and so it is important for countries to make 
commitments that they can respect, since their evaluation will depend on it. 
 
Throughout the process, then, there is a subtle play between the pressure that countries 
exert on each other to move the issue forward and reach consensus, and the prospect of peer 
review, the final stage of the entire process, since it is that review that will determine whether 
each member has respected the consensus. 
 





Peer review is the keystone for this architecture, which is at once fragile and robust. It is 
a highly structured process, and its rules are never left to chance, given the delicate nature of its 
task, which is to enlist commitment from the governments of sovereign states. 
 
It is worth recalling that this procedure was imposed on states that were just emerging 
from a long period of unceasing warfare. We must appreciate how much tact and diplomacy was 
needed to bring about such a change in values and behaviour. At the same time, we need to grasp 
the scope of the challenges that had to be overcome and that must never be underestimated, 
although they are today taken for granted, as is economic prosperity. On this point, analysts who 
have looked closely at OECD are unanimous in recognizing that the experience of more than four 
decades shows “by all accounts that the pressure exerted by one or several states is the principal 
driving force behind the organization’s thinking and action, despite the fact that there is no 
mechanism, even in the case of decisions, for penalizing violations of solemn obligations” 
(Chavranski, 1997, p. 32). All of these intersecting methods serve to reinforce the idea that 
indirect but sustained effort is worth more than a single spectacular act. 
 
Peer review has been taken farthest in the all-important economic committee, which 
remains the point of reference on this subject. The method can also be applied for evaluating 
social, health, or environmental policies. Regardless of the subject, the basic rules remain the 
same. The process of peer review will be examined in detail in Appendix 1, but the first process 
of peer review in OECD is well described by Bonvin and Morrisson (INSERT DATE) and is 
reproduced below.  
 
 
 The first example of peer review: the examination of economic situations 
 
“The Committee for the Examination of Economic Situations and Development Problems 
was created in 1961, to examine annually the economic situation of each country, based on the 
principle that every member is required to keep the organization informed of any significant 
change in its economic policy. 
 
“The working method of this committee and of the Secretariat servicing it is worthy of 
attention, because it reflects what makes OECD’s work special. 
 
“A draft report is prepared by the Secretariat on the basis of missions to the country 
concerned. Information (statistics, trends) is compiled using detailed questionnaires. OECD 
experts also hold meetings with senior economic policy officials. For several years, a structural 
dimension (pension system, labour markets) has been added to the studies and the national 
officials responsible for these questions are also asked to contribute. The draft report is then sent 
to the national authorities, several weeks before the committee meeting. 
 
“The committee session lasts a full day (Chavranski and other participants have 
expressed the opinion that this is clearly too short to discuss fully such complex and rich reports) 
and the delegation of the country under examination consists of senior officials of the 
departments and agencies concerned. It presents its viewpoint and notes the aspects on which it 
may disagree with the draft report. For any examination, two countries will be named as 
examiners and will pose a series of questions. The representatives of other countries may then 
intervene. The examination is divided into different chapters. The committee chair plays an 
important role, which is to draw out a consensus, in particular on the conclusions. This process 




country faces pressure from other countries to ensure that the direction of its national policies 
will converge with those of its own. An examining country, which may be tempted to take radical 
positions, must never forget that it too will be examined one day. Moreover, the regular schedule 
of examinations helps keep countries to their commitments: if the country has undertaken before 
the committee to move in a certain direction, it will be held accountable at the time of the next 
examination. 
 
“A definitive report is then prepared between the Secretariat and the country examined, 
and is sent to the committee for written approval. It will be published in English and French, and 
often in the language of the country if it is different. This publication generally receives wide 
media coverage, because it represents an x-ray of the country’s economic situation that is as 
objective as possible” (Bonvin, 1998, pp. 77-78). 
 
Finally, as noted by Thygesen (2002), the OECD peer review process has a number of 
distinct advantages over the review process of institutions such as the IMF:  
• “First, there is more interaction with relevant national policy on the basis of the 
Secretariat’s draft report;  
• “Then there is a useful element of having, in a number of cases, such as with the 
EDRC, two examining countries (which is the closest thing to pure peer pressure 
that exists in the international system);  
• “Furthermore, the subsequent process of revising and approving the report gives 
some ownership by the country to the final report (though this redrafting does 
consume a lot of time);  
• “The organisation has also a manageable size (for example, IMF 133, OECD 30) 
and a limited diversity of membership (which is particularly beneficial in that it is 
difficult to keep up to date in technical areas);  
• “Lastly, there is the continuity (which is typically 3 years for the EDRC) and the 
experience of the national officials that countries send as representatives (and 
examiners); 
• “On the other hand, the OECD Secretariat has fewer resources to produce country 
surveys at regular intervals than other institutions using the same process, and this 
is important, for the determinant of the standing of the institution is the quality of 
the staff work.” 
 
“Beyond their intrinsic interest, the economic analyses produced by the OEEC played a 
more enduring role. In effect, they accustomed national authorities to providing honest and 
comparable information on their economies, based on questionnaires prepared by the Secretariat, 
and then studying and comparing the collected data jointly. This exercise gave them a further 
occasion to think about their policies and their respective forecasts, and in the end it led to a 
degree of coordination, as it became increasingly difficult to maintain sharp discrepancies once 
they were brought to light. The unanimity required for approving the economic reports, although 
it made the task more difficult, also worked in this direction. This gradually gave rise to habits 





List of Country Peer Reviews in the OECD 
 





List of Country Peer Reviews in the OECD 
 
Subject Frequency Review Team Review Committee 
Macroeconomic 
& Structural issues 
12-18 
months 
Secretariat EDRC (2 examiner 
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and 3 country 
examiners 
Working Party on 
Environment Performance 
Aid Policy 3 years Secretariat 
with 2 country 
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The information in this table is extracted from Vinde (1998) 
Table 13 List of Country Peer Reviews in the OECD 
 






Gravitational forces and counter weights 
at play in a gothic cathedral
 
Peer Review, a keystone of the OECD architecture 
 
Architects of the Gothic age used the flying buttress to reinforce the walls of cathedrals. 
This ingenious mechanism made it possible to increase the height of walls, which otherwise 
would have pulled away and collapsed under the enormous weight of the roof vaulting. If the 
walls begin to separate, this cancels the pressure holding the vault stones together and 
preventing collapse. The keystone will no longer be able to play its role. This offers a good 
analogy for the way the OECD works: Peer Pressure acts in a sense like the stones of the 
vaulting, each supporting the other. Held together by the stone at the apex of the arch (the peer 
review), a set of partners can jointly resist the pull of gravity. The pillars, which give shape to this 
organization, represent the fundamental values of the institution. Finally, the foundations 
represent the supranational regime based on respect for human rights, democracy, and the 
market economy. Policies concerning Secretariat personnel and publications constitute the flying 
buttress in this metaphor. 
 
Table 14 Peer Review, a keystone of the OECD architecture 
 
Subsection 5.1 - Personnel Policy 
 
A key factor in the OECD negotiation process is its technique for managing the 
Secretariat personnel. From the outset there was an agreed convention among OECD members 
that its secretariat would be sheltered from national interventions. Endowed with “wise directors,” 
the OECD Secretariat staff was therefore able to play a significant role as intermediaries in 
negotiations among members, and at times served as respected referees or as brokers of 
knowledge and of evaluations of national policies.  
 
The Secretariat's operating rules in this complex network are thus an essential instrument 





The intellectual and moral independence of the Secretariat serves as counterweights to 
interest-driven pressures from member countries. In order to play its "honest broker" role, and to 
provide advice that is as "scientific" as possible, the Secretary General and staff must be recruited 
on the basis of their recognized knowledge, moral integrity, and impartiality. They must be 
protected against recriminations and possible reprisals from member states. Objectivity, 
professionalism, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest must form the set of values inspiring 
the rights and duties of the Secretariat. When filling top positions, the Secretary General is 
generally bound to consult the Council members. In so doing, he must make judgment calls as 
delegations often argue in favour of candidates from their own country, or from their region. With 
respect to ongoing personnel activities, such as promotion, and contract renewals, as it is the case 
for program activities, the organization generally works well and objectively. 
 
The personnel makeup of member country administrations is constantly changing. This 
poses a significant stumbling block to the proper functioning of the network. New arrivals are 
generally not aware of how the machine functions: they are likely to assume that it works like 
other bureaucracies with which they are familiar, and they may be unaware of its most 
fundamental rules. They can hardly count on older members to give them the induction they need, 
and this role must fall to the organization's staff. Thus, the stability of Secretariat staff is another 
essential ingredient for keeping things in balance. 
 
Subsection 5.1.2 – Role of a “Wise Director” 
 
Professionally, the Secretariat is recognized for its highly qualified staff. Its personnel, in 
turn, have taken care to uphold standards of excellence in their work and to safeguard the overall 
professional integrity of the organization. The insulation of the OECD Secretariat from the cross-
current of national and international politics gives it a unique professional status and role, 
analogous in its own context to that of the German Bundesbank in that country’s economy. In the 
1980s, the OECD Secretariat issued a “Proposed Economic Survey” of the UK that was highly 
critical of its policies, which infuriated the British Prime Minister. She demanded the Director of 
the Economic Division, a British citizen at the time, be removed from office. Of course, the 
Secretary General refused. In the end, some moderate language was found to placate the prime 
minister’s anger, and the Director kept his position.  
 
What role does the Secretariat play in this regard? Each specialized division of the OECD 
Secretariat in Paris is charged with the task of moving the agenda forward in its own domain. 
Divisions have developed through trial and error specific traditions and skills that are passed on 
from director to director and from team to team. In a metaphorical manner, we will then refer to 
the behaviour of the “wise director.” 
  
Building a common language is a major task for the secretariat of such a network. 
Implicit in most of the technical work is the concern for establishing common definitions. This is 
what is achieved when building a data bank. Disparities in data collection are reduced through the 
persistent work of OECD analysts. Each concept is scrutinized and eventually harmonized before 
a meaningful dialogue can take place on how to improve any specific policy. As we pointed out 
when dealing with the example of subsidies to agriculture, the creation of the PSE was equivalent 
to the definition of a new Esperanto word, one that everybody could use with the certainty of 
being understood. 
 
But this does not suffice: culture, history, values, habits, and old conventions colour most 




example in the box below will reveal, even words as standard as “preparing detail construction 




Design and supervision: 
Same words, different traditions 
 
 
In North America, architects and engineers are generally called upon to design a 
building and ensure the supervision of the construction company. It is an accepted convention 
that the architect or, depending on the case, the engineer will remain accountable for every bit 
of calculation and design. The specifications used to tender all construction tasks are precise 
and detailed, leaving virtually no place for interpretation. The bidding contractors must comply 
with the specifications; the engineer must guarantee such compliance to his client. Thus, 
supervision is thorough and tedious. A representative from the engineering firm will be on site at 
all times, checking that the quality of the concrete complies with specifications and that it is 
poured according to norms. If a bridge were to fall, for example, the inquest would first look into 
the soundness of the design and the thoroughness of supervision. Therefore, engineering costs 
tend to add up to about 10% of total costs in North America, a higher proportion than in certain 
countries with different traditions. 
 
In the case of France, for example, the system is based on an entirely different process 
and state institutions such as Veritas are responsible for the design quality of all public works. 
The architect or the engineer is mainly in charge of drafting the overall design and putting it to 
tender. Prospective contractors are expected to do all necessary calculations before they bid. 
However, the state control firm must also do these calculations and to this end they maintain a 
large staff of drafters, architects, and engineers. Contractors often simply wait for this work to be 
done and use the calculations from the state supervisory organization in order to prepare their 
bid. However, in case of accidents, the inquiry will first look at the work performed by the 
contractor. Thus, during construction, the architect or the engineer will show up often enough 
but no more than is necessary to assure him that his design is being properly followed. 
 
It follows that a Canadian engineering firm bidding on an African Development Bank 
(AfDB) project to supervise the construction of a road in former French West Africa will prepare 
a budget that is significantly different than that of his competing colleague from France, with the 
predictable result that it will be evaluated as overly expensive. Canadian firms who had seen 
their bids rejected over the years in favour of French firms started to lobby Canada’s Foreign 
Ministry against the AfDB, which they wrongly suspected of foul play. 
 
Table 15 Design and supervision: Same words, different traditions 
 
The universe of public administrations reveals countless differences not only in language 
but also in the whole basis on which things are done (or not done). Each country functions 
between formal and informal arrangements. In some cases, bureaucrats are allowed to “tinker 
with the law,” to adapt it to specific circumstances, while in other countries such things “are just 
not done.” This compounds the existing linguistic differences and breeds misunderstandings and 
suspicions. 
 
To render things even more complicated, bureaucrats in national administrations move 
around regularly. Often, some key senior figures will change just when a consensus is about to 
emerge. As those cultural differences generate obstacles to collaboration between national 




national representatives so they will know how to influence each other and unblock protracted 
negotiations. The director’s role as a discreet mediator is critical, and second only to authoritative 
expertise. 
 
In essence, wise directors know they can count on persistent conflicts and contradictions to 
keep things in balance, and that they can then tip that balance in favour of the most sustainable policy 
option and enforce consensus on it. In some cases those tensions are such that they can only wait for a 
new equilibrium to take its effect. 
 
However, there are shifts that may be the product of simple changes in personnel within 
member countries. A wise director strives constantly to rebuild the equilibrium in order to avoid 
policy imbalances, which are the result of corporate memory losses rather than substantial 
movements of the fulcrum. Many techniques are used. 
 
It should be stressed that the success of a Committee rests as well on solid work 
performed by the Committee’s president, who must provide overall leadership, determination, and 
tact. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Subsection - 5.3 - Publication policy 
 
Another little known fact about OECD is that, for the past 40 years, it has been one of the 
largest scientific publishers in Europe. OECD’s steadfast policy of publishing the research results 
used for policymaking has contributed to enforcing those ideas and making a meaningful 
statement about transparency and accountability.  
 
As a unique forum to discuss, develop, and adjust economic and social policies, the 
accessibility to OECD work is crucial. The publications and statistics of OECD cover economics 
as well as social issues, macroeconomics, trade, education, development, science, and innovation. 
OECD aims at providing easy access to its research reports, conventions, working papers, country 
surveys, and statistics. There are over 4,000 publications in print, more than 25 statistical 
databases on CD-ROM and almost all can be accessed on-line. 
 
The OECD on-line library, Source OECD, is also of great value. In 2001, approximately 
2,000 institutions had subscribed to this library, which includes OECD books covering 20 
subjects, from Agriculture and Food to Transport, and the 24 OECD periodicals. In 2001, the 
American Library Association recognized this library as a “Notable Government Document” and 
“an invaluable resource for academic and research libraries.” In addition, OECD statistics, which 
are collected by in-house analysts, committees, and working parties, and by national statistical 
agencies, are mostly available to the public through electronic and paper publications and through 
the Statistics Portal.  
 
By publishing its findings, including data and statistics, OECD helps government 
decision-makers to adopt new measures. According to Chavranski (1997), with its diverse 
publications and analyses, OECD has a comparative advantage over such institutions as the 
World Bank and the IMF. Experts, media, and even public opinion make use of these research 
results thus granting to OECD a real weight in national debate (comments offered by Chavranski 
in his letter dated September 16, 2002). 
 
In fact, the best-known work of the OECD may be its regular reports on the economies of 
its member countries. Each of the annual reviews includes an analysis of developments in the 




for governments but also for businesses, academics, and NGOs that can use these reviews in their 
dialogue with the government. In addition, OECD harmonizes, validates, and presents its 
statistics in a comparative form. Ministries and policymakers in member country governments 
utilize OECD statistics; academics, researchers and planners, but also journalists, NGOs, business 
associations and trade unions, use them and in this way they generate effective collective debate.  
 
Through its diverse publications, OECD provides the results of numerous debates and 
negotiations. Some argue that the negotiation phase and the discussions leading to the 
achievement of an agreement should be made available to the public. On the contrary, we have 
argued that the debate itself should be kept private; some confidentiality has to remain. As we 
have mentioned in section 1.2, part of the etiquette of OECD is that the confidentiality of debates 
is vigorously protected in order to build mutual trust. Finally some may find the language used in 
most OECD work a bit too toned down. This may be true in some cases, but the major issues are 
still identified and discussed and can lead to stimulating debates in the public sphere. 
 
 





• Books (including 1,000 e-books) 
• 24 periodicals 
• 25 statistical databases on CD-ROM 
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Number of key OECD documents available (selection): 









(including Economic Surveys) 
573 
Guidelines 192 
Policy Briefs 151 
Source: OECD 2002 
Table 16 Key OECD publications 
 
Section – 6  
Adapting the OECD methodology to a new cultural environment 
 
From a very small group of countries, OECD has now expanded to 33 members. Other 
countries are “graduating” into the select group of successful industrial economies, and may wish 
to join this elite club eventually. This raises a challenging question: Can OECD retains its edge 
and continue using the methodology that has made it successful with a much larger group? 
Already, some delegates and members of the Secretariat are expressing concern about OECD’s 
absorptive capacity that they feel is stretched to its limits. The temptation is great for larger 
countries to create a restricted sub-group within the OECD membership. As we have just seen, 
the OECD method rests heavily on human relations, on bureaucrats learning together, 
understanding each other, and gradually learning to trust each other. This process is costly and 
labour intensive and the difficulties related to creating a homogeneous institutional culture are 
diminished if the group starts with a shared past and a common cultural background.  
 
Should OECD members encourage the creation of regional regrouping that might be 
inspired by its methods? Can it be exported elsewhere? Those are challenging questions for 
OECD members to address.  
 
In any case, so little has been written about the organization that very few specialists have 
thus far reflected on these matters, especially the complexity of transferring this unique method to 
another set of countries. We offer a few thoughts about the inherent difficulties related to such a 
challenge. 
 
To begin with, the OEEC example clearly demonstrated the need for some intellectual 
and moral bases that have to be established in order to define the work to be done. It should be 
stressed that perhaps the best way to start is to define a broad set of rules, implicit and explicit, 
through which members’ governments should function effectively on a continental or regional 
basis. It is impossible to conceive of a peer review process that is not grounded in the governance 
approach in a given region, or at the very least in those countries that wish to be active in the Peer 
Review process. 
 
It is critical before proceeding with a transfer of techniques to take into consideration two 
important caveats. In order to achieve a successful adaptation, numerous elements have to be 
taken into account, including the internal coherence characteristic of any management system as 
well as the inherent difficulties related to the introduction of new values. The first considers the 




and, the second reminds us that it is practically impossible to simultaneously introduce several 
new values in the behaviour of societies. 
 
Respect for essential linkages 
 
Any management system, such as, for example, Peer Review, the manufacturing of cars 
“just in time,” or even management by objectives, includes aspects that are essential to the 
functioning of such a system and which we cannot ignore without endangering the operations of 
the whole. This is what Berger (1973) calls intrinsic linkages. But for each of these systems, there 
also exist parts that are not essential to the operations and that can be modified or abandoned 
without creating problems. These constitute extrinsic linkages. It is vital to distinguish clearly the 
intrinsic linkages from the extrinsic linkages when there is a transfer of technology, or when one 
is trying to introduce a management system conceived in a different culture (Berger, 1973, p.27). 
Berger introduces the concept of componentiality, i.e. “a strategic element in the cognitive style 
[...or, said otherwise]. The apprehension of reality in terms of components is essential to the 
reproductibility of the production process...From this follows the interdependence of components 
and their sequences.” Reproducing a given process (technological or bureaucratic) and reaching 
same or similar results is possible because the components are “continuously interdependent in a 
rational, controllable and predictable way”. Therefore, to successfully transfer a package of 
interdependent components such as Peer Review requires careful analysis of the components and 
their interdependence. If this was technological, it is doubtful that it could be transferred without 
much preliminary research, testing, and adaptation. However, Berger later argues that 
bureaucratic systems have “a greater degree of variability than is possible in the technological 
production. ... In political bureaucracy there is less pressure from the logic of technology and 
therefore more of a chance for the peculiar “genius” of bureaucracy to unfold”. (Berger, 1973, p. 
42) This is possibly the challenge that confronts any new importers of this method. 
 
For example, if we want to operate an airline, not only must the pilots learn to fly but we 
must also ensure that they manage time in a very precise manner. An airplane is neither a truck 
nor a horse that we can stop whenever we feel like it. If the pilots do not calculate the flight time 
correctly, taking into account winds and the weight of the cargo, airplanes may crash. One must 
also ensure that preventive maintenance of all the airplanes is performed. It would be out of the 
question to just take off, saying to ourselves: “If it breaks, we’ll stop by the side of the road until 
the tow-truck comes to get us.” We can therefore say that time management and preventive 
maintenance constitute intrinsic linkages. These practices form a coherent whole and are 
absolutely essential to the operation of an airline. 
 
Conversely, the presence of flight attendants on airplanes is not an essential linkage for 
the proper operations of an airline. We could replace them with stewards or supervisors or, worse 
case scenario, we could even ask the more experienced passengers to help the novices. This is 
therefore an extrinsic linkage that could be adapted, modified, or even ignored. 
 
Too often, unfortunately, those who attempt to transplant new ideas into a different 
environment are unaware or even forget to highlight these important distinctions. The new users, 
poorly informed, change things willy-nilly and often without realizing that some of them are 
essential. The OECD Basic Rules of Conduct as they are defined in section 1.3 are composed of a 
set of rules, which, for the most part, are clearly essential linkages that must be taken into account 
when introducing Peer Review into a new political, economic, and social context. A few rules, 
however, could be simply modified. One would assume, for example, that the “Part Two” 






Introduction of new values 
 
Experience has shown, in a very convincing manner, that values are still the hardest thing 
to import and to modify. We can learn new techniques or acquire new knowledge, but it is 
notoriously difficult to adopt a behaviour that is based on values that are foreign to one’s society. 
Societies’ fundamental values evolve gradually, and the introduction of new values is always 
faced by traditional reflexive reactions. The problem of modernization is not to get people to 
work (there is widespread evidence that people in just about every area of the world have the 
capacity to work systematically and well, to be trained in modern methods of work and to acquire 
high degrees of technological skills), but to get them to work in a particular way. This involves 
the imposition not only of external patterns of activity but, equally important, of specific 
structures of consciousness. Until identification with the latter has taken place in the 
consciousness of the individual, the external patterns are perceived as alien and essentially 
meaningless. As long as the new patterns are not internalized (that is, integrated within the 
individual’s subjective structure of consciousness), they “sit on” the individual in a loose and 
superficial manner. Adherence in one context can only imperfectly be transferred to another 
context (Berger, 1973, p.124-125). 
  
Those who are going to use methods specific to Western cultures must, therefore, 
demonstrate both insight and ingenuity. In fact, to properly adapt a management system, which, 
as we have seen, is always imprinted with cultural perspectives, we must generally find some 
means that can support these new behaviours with the “importing” society’s own values. Indeed, 
we must understand our own traditions thoroughly to be able to integrate their related values with 
those coming from abroad. It is also often necessary to tinker a bit to find bridges that will make 
it possible to undertake such transitions. Thus, it is out of the question for a foreigner to adapt the 
structures from his society to a society whose operating rules the foreigner only partly and 
superficially understands. Such a task would, therefore, fall onto the shoulders of the managers of 
those who are, in a sense, importers of technology. It is the importer who must define the 
essential adaptations. 
 
OECD’s institutional culture corresponds to a value system that, as we have explained, is 
linked to the Anglo-Saxon mentality. It is a flexible architecture within which decisions and 
informal relationships end up carrying a lot of weight and, even sometimes, more weight than 
formal declarations. There are many conventions that are unspoken, but that does not mean that 
they are not followed to the letter. To the three founding values - respect for democracy, human 
rights, and the benefits of the market economy - are naturally grafted the other values that already 
existed within Western societies. The following examples seem particularly relevant. 
 
• The Western tradition of so-called “decentralization of power” is not new, but 
corresponds to old traditions so firmly anchored in custom that we no longer 
think about it. Therefore, it was completely normal for those who designed 
OECD’s operating rules to insist that mid-level management were, in fact, the 
clientele targeted by the institution. It is the latter that, within Western public 
administrations, design, initiate, administer, and write amendments to policies. 
During my readings, I found this interesting observation made by an Arabic 
commentator during the Crusades. It is quoted and commented on by Amin 
Maalouf in his book “The Crusades Through Arab Eyes” (Malouf, 2002, 
p.301):“Among Westerners, the power of monarchies was governed, at the time 
of the Crusades, by principles that were difficult to transgress. Usamah [Ibn 




knights render a sentence, it cannot be changed nor annulled by the king”.... 
Their society [that of the Franks, of the Crusaders] has the benefit of being a 
“distributor of rights.” The notion of the citizen does not exist yet, of course, but 
the feudal “infidels” the knights, the clergy, the universities, the common people 
and even the peasants all have established rights. In the Arab East, the procedure 
for tribunals is more rational, but there is no limit to the arbitrary power of the 
prince.”  
 
• We could say as much regarding the respect we, in the West, give to the linkage 
between science and government. The Renaissance 3 saw the rise of the notion of 
the separation between scientific knowledge on one hand, and spirituality and the 
Revelation, on the other, and then between the religious powers and the civil 
ones. Afterwards, all these notions became interwoven and gave birth to the idea 
that the art of governing could be studied “scientifically” like any other subject. 
This conviction, firmly anchored in custom, inspired the founders of OECD, who 
designed a model based on the notion that governments can examine themselves 
“objectively.” In addition, they can help each other to do so with a professionally 
neutral and objective secretariat that would not hesitate to criticize their 
behaviour, with no risk of reprisals or censure. 
• Finally, the peer review system presupposes that the members are what some 
sociologists define as “tolerant of conflict” in order to accept having their 
behaviour criticized and, in turn, to be able to criticize that of other members. 
Here, the terms “conflict” and “conflict tolerant” refer to divergences of opinion, 
to conflicts between interest groups and, more generally, the acceptance of open 
and equal debates where each person can express his or her views without 
concern about power differentials or hierarchical differentials. Violent conflicts 
are the unfortunate result of poorly managed conflicts. Violent conflicts 
characterize “conflict avoiders” as much as they do those who are “conflict 
tolerant.”  
 
If it were not for this deep capacity to accept conflict and to engage in debating in an 
egalitarian manner, this method could easily be adulterated. In fact, we should be concerned that 
individuals start avoiding saying the slightest disagreeable thing for fear of starting a debate, 
bothering or injuring someone who, some day, could do the same to them. The result is then a 
weakened and essentially useless evaluation system. It is evident that no society could survive for 
very long without the possibility of criticism at all levels, because it is criticism that triggers the 
search for innovation and the pursuit of new behaviour and new values. Cross-cultural studies 
reveal that there exist, in most cases, traditional mechanisms that play this role while still 
respecting the solidly imbedded taste for etiquette and courtesy. These could be the inspiration for 
the method used to adapt Peer Review to a new environment and to different reflexes.  
 
 
                                                     
3 Out of concern for history, we must remember that these great ideas often found their origins in 
the great Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle and Plato. After passing through Arab philosophers, 
these ideas returned to Western Europe in the fifteenth century and started what was then called the 
Renaissance. At the political level, Machiavelli was the first witness to the new thinking regarding “good 
governance” while he was writing The Prince, which is still considered as the first treatise on Power. But 
historians will put forth the argument that it is really during the Reformation that the concept of the 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
“What good is melody? 
What good is music? 
It don’t mean a thing 
If it ain’t got that swing” 
Music by Duke Ellington,  
lyrics by Irving Mills, 1932 
 
In short, the peer review system should not be considered in isolation, nor should it be viewed 
as a universal panacea that will guarantee good economic and political governance for countries that 
are badly managed. It requires a very strong national motivation, inspired most likely by the general 
recognition that without reform the country's future is at risk. We may say that it is a strong remedy 
that requires firm commitments both on the part of those who want to reform their management and 
those who want to help them. This symmetry of commitments between partners is analogous to what 
we find between patient and doctor: without mutual trust, without stability, it is vain to expect much 
from this method. It represents a long-term effort and a gradual and collective learning process. The 
financial effort, the discipline, and the political steadfastness required of each member state to sustain 
this approach are considerable. 
 
With time, and especially with the sustained economic growth of its members, OECD has 
grown and has come to make use of all the powers granted it by its charter, which today makes it a 
costly, complex, and multifaceted model, possibly too big and too complex, some representatives may 
argue. But, in any case, it did not start out this way. Europeans, with the help of their “American 
cousins," began with only the bare bones of an organization. They devoted all their attention to solving 
a few very concrete problems, such as lowering tariff barriers, something that seemed to them, a priori, 
both important and possible. This initial success bolstered their confidence and emboldened them to 
tackle increasingly complex and difficult tasks. This is surely a reasonable path that could be imitated 
by other countries. 
 
The essential features to bear in mind are the following. First, everyone must start with a 
strong motivation on which a commitment can be built. This commitment breaks down into three 
aspects that are interrelated and must always be present: a commitment to work together, a 
commitment to submit economic policies to peer review, and a commitment to provide all the 
information that the organization needs. It is important to understand thoroughly and, when necessary, 
to adapt all the complementary mechanisms supporting the delicate architecture of peer review, which 
we have lumped under the heading "the rules of the game." This method will not be appropriate in all 
circumstances, and it will be important to assess its feasibility in great detail before proceeding. 
 
Chavranski, for example, considers that “the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), 
which only recently made its appearance and is now growing in power, has been presented (or 
conceived) as a possible alternative to the OECD, and perhaps even as a way of isolating a Europe that 
is running out of steam. The great economic, social, and political disparities of APEC members, and 
the persistent tensions between China and the United States, make this a highly unlikely scenario” 
(Chavranski, 1997, p. 14). Furthermore, careful consideration should be given by any other group of 
countries wishing to make use of the peer review method to adapt the OECD methodology to local 
cultures and traditions, as well as to specific conditions and governance systems. 
 
We believe, however, that many of the techniques essential to the functioning of OECD could 




review could be introduced. In short, before we place the keystone at the top of the arch, we must first 
build solid walls on which each of the stones in that arch will rest. And we must also have good 





Chapter 4  : OECD techniques for managing the iterative policy 




Management systems, such as at OECD, or in the automobile industry, function well not 
only because they rest on solid foundations and structures, but equally because they are supported 
by trusted techniques, tools, and skills. These components are essential to maintain the integrity 
of the system. This chapter provides practical and concrete examples and techniques related to 
managing an iterative process, making use of a combination of meetings, research, and other 
essential elements for policy development. This chapter follows a simple logic. First, the un-
stated goal of OECD is to foster common and harmonized policy changes among its members. 
The word policy is well used within government circles but seldom defined. We will first define 
this concept. Second, arriving at agreed-upon policies must be achieved among significantly 
different cultures: we discuss how this additional complexity can be understood and surmounted. 
Third, the OECD process rests on a series of techniques that include roles, especially that of the 
chair, a precise syntax for documents, and how to manage meetings. 
 
 
Section 1  
The Policy Process 
 
Subsection 1.1: What is a “policy”? 
 
The most common use of the word policy refers to a course of action or intended course 
of action conceived as deliberately adopted, after a review of possible alternatives, and pursued, 
or intended to be pursued. This definition, however, does not explain the process through which a 
course of action will be conceived. In a modern democracy, the process has become as important 
as the goal, or to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, “the process is the policy.” The definition above 
applies equally to a course of action defined under dictatorship, or under any democratically 
elected government that generally has to go through intricate and open public consultations 
before committing the state to a course of action. In this sense, the so-called most common usage 
does not have the merit of universality. 
 
Furthermore, the word “policy” does not translate in many languages, including French 
and Russian. It may be translated as “politics” or “politiques,” which often leads to serious 
confusion.  
 
For our purposes, public policy is defined as: “A decision, a direction or a position to be 
preferred in the pursuit of one or more public objectives of the government. To arrive at such a 
preferred course of action almost always implies a set of processes involving the participation of 
a great number of concerned actors. These could include other governments, international 
organizations, and other government levels, representatives of civil society including citizens, 
users, clients, and stakeholders, scientists, and legislators who will discuss the various 
alternatives and input into the choice to be made”. 
 
In my view, this better reflects the way policy drafting is understood today in 




the way things were done. The process has evolved over the years. In the early days of democracy 
prior to the Second World War, the executive defined policy (in the case of Britain and Canada, 
by Cabinet). It was eventually submitted to legislature if and when it was necessary to adopt or 
amend a law to implement the preferred course of action. This was often more or less a form of 
rubber-stamping, especially when the governing party had an absolute majority and applied strict 
party discipline. It was the golden age of mandarin-dominated policymaking, where a few senior 
politicians and civil servants decided on most national policies. This was the case at the 
foundation of OECD.  
 
In the 1950s, and in some cases late into the 1960s, most OECD governments evolved 
toward increasingly involved citizen participation. Parliamentarians, including so-called 
backbenchers, have been involved in policy debates through various forms of specialized 
committees, where they heard and discussed arguments raised by interest and lobby groups, 
experts and researchers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Recently we have seen the 
birth of “policy communities” or groupings of various interest groups coming together under a 
broad single interest. The media may become part of such “policy communities” and might 
express support for one viewpoint or another. Governments have learned that passing a law does 
not suffice to deal with an issue, but an instrument must be created to implement a policy and to 
adapt its enforcement over time and changing circumstances. In Canada, for example, the CRTC 
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission) is an independent agency 
responsible for regulating Canada's broadcasting and telecommunications systems. Since 1932, 
the Government of Canada has been regulating and controlling broadcasting through such an 
instrument; over time its mandate was regularly updated to take into account technological 
progress. Another Canadian example can be found in Canada’s Banking Law that becomes null 
and void at the end of each decade, thus creating an obligation to review regularly every aspect of 
this most important train of law, and to adapt it to changing circumstances.  
 
It has now become general practice for governments to take polls on a regular basis and 
modify its stand depending on the results. Because of this, large and important events may exert 
significant influence on the adoption (or not) of any given policy. For example, the dramatic 
death of Diana, Princess of Wales, had a significant impact on pushing forward a cause she 
supported, the limitation of land mines. On the other hand, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 have caused many shifts in policy, often in contradictory directions, in the United States and 
in many other OECD countries.  
 
It should become clear how much any significant policy is widely debated and goes 
through an intricate set of processes before it becomes a preferred course of action.  
 
Subsection 1.2: - OECD Influence in National Policy Drafting 
 
In the circumstances discussed above, public servants continue to play a key role in 
drafting policy. They prepare briefings for elected officials, thus having an opportunity to make 
use of information generated in international organizations such as OECD. While conducting 
research for this text, I consulted Barry Carin about this. Mr Carin had been Assistant Deputy 
Minister responsible for Policy in the predecessor to HRDC - the Canada Employment and 
Immigration Commission in the Federal Government before retiring. He vividly recalled that at 
one time he and his team of specialists needed to find persuasive arguments in favour of a new 
policy they were submitting to Cabinet. In order to sustain his argumentation, he used his 
discretionary research funds to sponsor a “best practice” survey by OECD, thus generating 





Every year, 40,000 senior officials from national administrations attend 3,000 meetings, 
covering close to 200 subjects, at OECD headquarters in Paris. Senior officials are regularly 
called upon to appear at parliamentary committees to testify about such things as best practices, 
scientific evidence, legal and practical constraints and, most importantly, about existing 
commitments and international covenants, such as those reached within OECD. This would 
include Peer Reviews, whereby a country’s performance in a given field is assessed and 
commented upon by the other members of OECD. Undoubtedly this practice has a direct 
influence on domestic policy formulation. Senior public servants are also involved in preparing 
documentation and summarizing argumentation for Cabinet decisions. In this manner, OECD 
findings, international agreements and covenants, formal or informal, are generally taken into 
consideration before any decision is made. It exerts a strong influence on any national policy 
choice. In addition, those experts who appear at parliamentary committees often cite research 
results published by OECD; research results may even be quoted (with or without attribution) by 
the media. Academics, who have studied the way policy is drafted, tend to rely on published 
sources and data. Because governments rarely explain the way in which they use OECD findings, 
it remains a mystery. It should therefore come as no surprise that an important section of the 
policy drafting “iceberg” remains hidden and underestimated. 
 
OECD has developed over the years a long-term iterative process that blends discussions 
and analysis. This methodology has been used with a real measure of success, and is at the root of 
the economic and social progress experienced by member countries over the last 40 years. It is 
action oriented, not research driven. It blends research with negotiations, and moves the agenda 
forward incrementally in a ratchet fashion. The policy development process follows various steps 














































1. A dialogue begins a continuous 
process. It first identifies a question or a 
problem. It may lead to the creation of an “ad 
hoc discussion group,” for example. 
 
2. A thorough analysis is based on the 
most up-to-date information and state-of-the-art 
technology and methods. The Secretariat will 
proceed to a) gather data from members, b) 
harmonize it, c) analyze it, and d) prepare a 
state-of-the-art synthesis. Based on this, it 
prepares “recommendations.”  This analysis 
leads into the next round of discussions. 
3. A consensus emerges on some 
issues...once agreed upon, this consensus will 
not  change. 
 
4. Areas of contention also emerge, 
however, usually based on beliefs and 
ideologies. These often conceal commercial or 
even bureaucrats’ vested interests. 
 
 
5. A search for new and relevant facts 
ensues, shedding new light on those 

















9. The process continues, inducing 
regular changes in norms, behaviour, and 
policies. 
  
1. A problem is identified 
2. The problem is discussed, 
based on state of the art analysis 
3. A partial 
consensus 
Ares of contention remain 
based on beliefs and ideologies 
6. The dialogue starts anew 
5. Research on facts sheds light 
on disputed ideas 
7. A new 
consensus 
9. The cycle 
continues
8. New questions emerge
Table 17 OECD Iterative Process 
 
 
This process is iterative and often protracted, irregular, and erratic, and almost always 




or to generalize about questions such as: Who will exercise the greatest influence in the final 
decision? Will a policy be decided upon based on scientific evidence, demagogic bias, or 
commercial or partisan interests? Can a policy sail through discreetly or even secretly, or will it 
raise intense public interest? Will OECD discussions be fully taken into consideration?  
 
 
The Case of Former Soviet Union Countries 
 
Very little has been published on this topic. In the case of Eastern Europe, the notion 
of drafting public policies through multilayered consultations with civil society and NGOs 
was not common practice during Soviet times and has yet to be introduced. The few 
authors who have written about the way things are done now have focused on emerging 
think tanks. The evaluation is terse: “Ivan Krastev remarks that there are several factors 
explaining the so-called "influence" of think tanks on policy: it was not the strength of the 
independent research but the weakness of the other players in the realm of post-
communist policymaking that made think tanks influential players. The lack of confidence 
between the reform governments and the administration that they inherited, the weak 
policy capacities of the political parties, the unwillingness of the universities and academies 
of science to commit themselves to policy research, and the underdeveloped business 
community are the main factors explaining the 'Heritage moment' [or the direct influence on 
the governmental agenda] of the post-communist think tanks.”  
 
The EMDU project has recently been assessed for the purpose of assessing if 
research led to policy changes. Under the leadership of IDRC’s Evaluation Unit, Dr. Irina 
Lyzogub carried out the various interviews with principals, analyzed the findings, and 
drafted an overall assessment. The following preliminary conclusions are based on her 
unpublished report. 
 
“Western understanding of the policy process as the one that implies involving the 
participation of a great number of concerned actors is not always applicable to Ukrainian 
reality. For many decades, Ukraine was organized as a hierarchical system. "There was 
little experience of democracy and political rights, which … were limited to ritual 
participation in elections…" (Maravall, 1997, p. 207) The leaders made the policy, and 
everybody else implemented it. 
 
“The opinions of the interviewees, key participants of the EMDU program, differed. 
However, the current situation in Ukraine in relation to the development of civil society was 
frequently characterized in the following way: The state policy depends either on the 
president, or on different regional, clan, and oligarchic groups; The political system is 
characterized as a Presidential Republic (though the interviewees are aware of the fact that 
it is declared to be Presidential-Parliamentary); People are not ready to acknowledge that 
their opinion should matter; and public officials and oligarchic groups have little concern for 
the public good or for what people think. They compete for the spoils of office. Usually, 
policymakers do not consider public outreach in their undertakings.  
 
“As interviews reveal, changes can be made. These changes require an 
understanding of their necessity as well as courageous people ready to lobby for these 
changes ("to fight for their ideas"). These changes require bright personalities, not groups 
or public organizations. At the same time, interviewees agree with the necessity of wide 
participation as well as the necessity of informing people.” 
 





Arriving at Policy Consensus Within a Cross-Cultural 
Environment 
 
Cultural and political differences are never to be taken lightly in an international network 
such as OECD (see also Chapter 4, Section 6). Increasing economic integration within the EU, as 
well as globalization, have given rise in the 1990s to a body of literature concerning management 
and cultural diversity. Obviously, managers are becoming more curious about the problems 
arising from mismanaging this important feature of human relations; this is a welcome change 
from the times when managers and negotiators were complacently satisfied in knowing how to do 
things at home. Country representatives attending international meetings are most often blind to 
the way other representatives think and build up their line of argumentation. A “savvy president” 
and a “wise director” act proactively to bridge the knowledge gap between nations. The following 
notes are not intended to substitute for a course on cross-cultural management, but merely to 
provide examples of tools used by the Secretariat and by those delegates with long experience in 
the art of international negotiations. We have suggested additional readings for anyone keen to 
learn more about this subject. When dealing with “cultures” there is always the implicit danger of 
oversimplification. Country representatives cannot be reduced to a few simple observations, 
trends, or anecdotes. To paraphrase an old idiom, “even in Rome, some Romans do not act like 
Romans.” The following text is intended to open one’s mind and certainly never to close it. 
 
Subsection 2.1 - Development and culture 
 
Culture is understood differently depending on the perspective of the observer. As this 
text is action oriented, we suggest using a definition by Boyd and Richerson (1987) (in Homer-
Dixon, 2001, p. 205 from Boyd and Richerson, p.67). 
 
“Culture is information – skills, attitudes, beliefs, values – capable of effecting 
individuals’ behaviour, which they acquire from others by teaching, imitation, and other forms of 
social learning.”  
 
Understanding, or showing true empathy for the cultures and for the historical 
perspective of various participants, is an essential element for grasping “the logic of the situation. 
We understand people’s actions if we see how those actions are objectively appropriate to the 
situation, and how the observed actions are consistent with rational behaviour” (McMillan, 1992, 
p.8). Lacking a clear historical perspective of where the country is coming from has often been a 
failure of the classical economist. Fernand Braudel’s historical perspective about the functioning 
of market economy is a good reminder of the essentially empirical character of the market 
economy and therefore of the intimate relationship between today’s practices and their origins. 4 
Both the president of the committee and the “wise director” play a key role in helping various 
participants understand the logic of the situation that prevails in the various member countries. 
They help bridge the gap of suspicion that marks relationships between competing nations.  
 
Another important issue is the link between development and culture. Development is 
governed by ambiguity. It must deal simultaneously with transformation and conservation. No 
transformation can take place without the destruction of the initial form. For example, a sculptor 
                                                     
4 . See “Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism” a translation of his famous 1976 
conference at John Hopkins University titled in French: “La dynamique du capitalisme” edited by 




destroys the stone or the tree to create a new image out of the material. The child must die for an 
adolescent to take his place and eventually he must in turn die for the adult to take over. 
However, while this happens, the personality of the individual retains its main characteristics. 
Some characteristics are acquired genetically while many others are acquired through early 
socialization and through learning and education. In addition, some characteristics can be 
changed easily through learning, while reflexes and character remain fairly stable and are most 
difficult to modify. All these elements give birth to the personality of each individual. 
 
The search for change and stability is ancient and was discussed as early as the 6th 
Century by Greek philosophers such as Heraclitus. Humans always seek for something that 
remains the same while it changes. This is also true in the area of development, where some 
specialists often emphasize the virtue of modernization, of "changes in mentality," while others 
expound the importance of retaining tradition and the evil of "deculturation" (i.e. the loss of one's 
culture).  
 
Irrevocably, development will always be immersed in ambiguity. Ambiguity implies 
dynamism; it is entropy. Searching for a world without ambiguity leads to a world governed by 
rigidities and staleness; it is filling forms rather than thinking things through; it is abiding to 
rituals rather than making rational use of tested routines. 
 
Thus the art is balancing change while respecting the personality of a culture. This, to a 
large extent, has been OECD’s unspoken challenge for the past 40 years. The OECD’s ability to 
breed policy changes while empirically adapting such transformations to the specific 
circumstances and culture of each OECD member, has defined its strength and methodology. 
 
In the following discussion, we propose some tools that the reader may find useful to 
conduct successful international meetings.  
 
Subsection 2.2 - The balance of social systems: weights, drifts and 
counterweights 
 
Every society has values that it holds dear. These values can be viewed as weights, biases 
or characteristics. The effect of these values acting over time is to create a drift, forms of 
deviation, or a tendency within society. In most cases, this drift ultimately leads to a dysfunction 
of this society, and ultimately potentially to its destruction. A society that has survived over time 
will have developed culturally specific counterweights. These culturally specific counterweights 
or values, often linked to legal or quasi-legal requirement, counteract the effect of this drift and 
provide a mechanism whereby a society maintains its integrity and functionality in a dynamic 
equilibrium between the drift and the countervailing forces. In other words, each culture breeds 
its own deviations, and has means to surmount their ill effects. 
 
Social systems survive only if they remain in balance over time. The need for such 
balance is generally recognized within each society. Just as the American system of “checks and 
balances” prevents the excessive domination of one of the three branches of the American 
political system (legislative, executive, and judicial powers); the mixing of these components 
assures that the balance remains by preventing one to overtake the system.  
 
By examining social systems of different cultures, this search for balance can be 






Most often, management models are created in the US, and occasionally in Europe or 
Japan. These models are generally very difficult to transfer to other cultures because indigenous 
values are entrenched and generally "hidden." Culture is stubborn, and can only change 
incrementally over time. International organizations dealing with policies are bound to meet with 
examples of such intractable indigenous traditions. 
 
The US “honest contract” 
 
American models of organization rest on an old premise: contracts between parties, 
whoever they may be, are contracts between "equals" and between "free" entities (people, firms, 
or institutions). 
 
This "ideal" leads to the establishment of relationships between clients and suppliers as 
well as between boss and employee. “Clients are free to establish demands from their suppliers 
and the boss is free to impose objectives to his employees. […] However, it is deemed "unfair" to 
change your mind once a contract has been agreed upon. As well, the boss is bound by the 
objectives he has fixed for his employees” (D’Iribarne, 1993, p.55). 
 
This in turn leads to a cybernetics approach to social and business organizations. 
Cybernetics is the science of communication and control of machines and computers. Its rigid 
logic helps define clear links of accountability between all parties. Hence the use of boxes, lines 
of authority, and precise organization charts where accountability is divided among discrete and 
precise units. Conflicts are arbitrated following these defined lines of authority and predefined 
communication paths.  
 
This contractual ideal is twinned with a great suspicion of all things "arbitrary," and leads 
to defining performance indicators that are objective and measurable sometimes to great excess in 
details and procrastination. This form of legalistic procrastination may lead eventually to a 
company’s paralysis, hence a characteristic “drift.”  
 
Americans are at all times "risk tolerant." They thus allow market rules to govern a harsh 
and intractable system of deselecting the weakest or the unfit. This can act as a counterweight to 
legalistic procrastination and what would otherwise become most destructive behaviour. Firms 
and governments that get tangled up in details and procrastination are eventually destroyed by 
competition and/or by other parties. 
 
The French “logic of honour” 
 
The French labour force derives its traditions from very old "guilds," or the "ethic of the 
profession," also referred to as "the mission."  
 
Individuals are thus bound to rights and duties specific to their professional code of 
conduct. This allows one to recognize what is a job well done, a solid product, and a good way 
for doing things. 
 
Such traditions are not sacrificed in the quest to attain solid profits. The pursuit at all cost 
of the bottom line may clash with the honour of the professional group. It is not therefore 
considered honourable to be serf of a boss, a client, or a company (D’Iribarne, 1993, p. 57). 
However, it is honourable to be devoted to a cause, or to bend the rule to reach a higher goal 





A boss is therefore not supposed to oversee work in all its details, as is often the rule in 
American companies where you might hear: "delegation is good, but control is better." As a 
result, responsibilities are stratified vertically and horizontally (between different professional 
groups within the same company). 
 
Faced with a problem, improvising a solution is the “honourable” thing to do. This 
behaviour can be described by the French words “bricoller,” “se débrouiller,” which have no 
exact translation in English. In essence, it refers to untangling a messy situation through 
improvisation, inventiveness, often at the price of bending the rules a bit. Getting by or muddling 
through captures only partially the requirement for inventiveness and responsibility that comes 
with it. 
 
However, baronies and quarrels between departments staffed with different professional 
groups may lead to a company’s demise or to a government’s inefficiency, hence a drift typical of 
the French management system. 
 
French people have a high tolerance for individualistic behaviour; their own professional 
duty is a strong motivating factor. In combination with conscientiousness and respect for 
professional ethics, they find ways and means to surmount dysfunctionalities. 
 
The Japanese paternal loyalty 
 
When Americans search for depersonalizing relationships, Japanese search for long-term 
associations based on many intangible and unwritten rules, a key one being "loyalty in the context 
of highly unequal human structures” (D’Iribarne, 1993, p.58). 
 
The strong are bound by honour to provide a "certain respect" for the weak, but they 
reign high in the hierarchy of the company or of the government. In return, they must show 
paternal loyalty to all the employees of the firm, at all costs. Employees are in for the long run, 
and in case of difficulty, they will gather together and discuss a solution that fits with the 
organization's goals, values, and needs. 
 
Faced with changing economic circumstances, firms find it hard to reduce costs and 
changes are difficult to come by in light of such tradition of mutual loyalty. When change comes, 
it is often led by outside pressure, as was the case for the Meiji Restoration that, arguably, was 
prompted by outside events and pressure by Britain and the US. 
 
However, traditions are very strong, and individual responsibility of the "Samurai" still 
very strong. Faced with the consequence of poor judgment, he will fall on his sword, ...leaving 
the place empty for a successor who may be more progressive. 
 
The African business logic puzzle 
 
The search for consensus is central to many West African social models; as a 
consequence they tend to avoid direct and open confrontation and conflicts.  
 
Respect for social rules, for social order is entrenched and often leads to lack of 
individualistic behaviour. Employees in the organization hesitate to move ahead of their 





“Intentions represent an overwhelming measure of action, much more than the result 
(intended or accidental)” (D’Iribarne, 1993, p. 59). Africans generally tend not to separate 
personalities and work the way Americans like to do. Confidence rests on a social model 
organized around an ideal system of "friendship" and "kinship" where attitudes are governed by 
apparent benevolence. Any abnormal situation raises suspicion and creates reactions often 
difficult to control. 
 
Thus Western organizational systems and models, be they public or private, are generally 
unfit to function well within the prevalent values and behaviour. Foreign experts’ regular 
demands for "changes in mentality" always meet with the "stubbornness of culture". Management 
methods that put emphasis on "results" rather than on "good will," or that rest on the obligation to 
quarrel, such as "establishing priorities," are bound to threaten and/or destroy organizations. 
 
On the one hand, in the African tradition, loyalty to "kin" and "family" remains stronger 
than loyalty to abstract constructions such as a firm or a ministry. Faced with a problem the group 
follows tradition and hierarchy. On the other hand, goods are traditionally tradable and anything 
considered tradable is allowed to follow market logic. Goods are negotiable and the price will 
generally abide by the law of supply and demand; in this effect, some analogies can be made with 
the American open market mentality. In conjunction, these two forces generally allow for 
catastrophe to be averted. 
 
Subsection 2.3 - Bonthous’ four key dimensions for gathering intelligence 
 
Another example of how to take into consideration cultural factors can be found in 
Bonthous’ (1991, p. 275-310) analysis of intelligence systems, either for military and strategic 
purposes or for business organizations. He has compared the way Germany, France, Sweden, 
Japan, and the United States collect and manage intelligence systems. He looked at the 
significance of intelligence gathering along four dimensions; he then compared each nation’s 
preference in the use of intelligence, and the process by which it leads to strategic decisions. In 
other words, how is the cognitive system for each of these five nations structured? How is 
information used and what sort of information is generally considered essential or unimportant 
for a decision to be made in each of these five countries? For the wise director and savvy 
president this is rather important because OECD will need to gather and present information that 
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Five ways of looking at intelligence
 
Table 19 Bounthous key dimensions 
* 5  
 
Dimension 1 is characterized by meaning and purpose, humanistic and interpersonal 
skills, the search for qualitative and collaborative behaviour within the group and lastly by 
facilitating the gathering of information and for teaching its usage among the concerned 
community.  
 
Bonthous notes that “in the United States, the traditional association of intelligence with 
the military and secrecy has prevented the people from perceiving it as an opportunity that 
benefits everyone: intelligence is perceived instead as part of an underground world, rather 
manipulative, and bordering on the unethical. In Sweden and Japan by contrast, the benefit of 
intelligence to society is understood by the majority of people, from farmers to small business 
owners and big corporations. People, business, and government produce intelligence hand-in-
hand.” 
 
Dimension 2 dominant intelligence organizations seek to push their limits further. It is 
characterized by the search for holistic and integrative information, by supporting creative and 
imaginative behaviour, allowing for visionary and strategic thinking to take place, and by putting 
emphasis on synthesis as opposed to listing data and details and synergy within the organization 
rather than stove-piping divisions and directorates. 
 
Again, Bonthous notes that “Japan and Sweden have greatly developed this 
understanding: intelligence is an integral part of the ongoing process of strategizing on the 
national level and in corporations. Intelligence is not pursued in spurts, or mainly when crises 
strike…. Intelligence is in every piece of information and not limited to the confidential”. 
 
                                                     




Dimension 3 is about logical and analytical thinking. It deals primarily with quantitative 
and numerical data; it is critical and factual, structural and technical.  
 
“The U.S. intelligence reigns supreme in Dimension 3:as a master of logic and reason. 
Better than anyone, it handles rigorous quantitative assessments and factual or numerical 
analysis. Problems are solved logically: the complex is reduced to the simple, the unclear to the 
clear. Sophisticated tools are used to develop generalizations from the specific. Logic and reason 
rule the U.S. intelligence process. Intuition and “soft approaches” are discounted: they are 
perceived as debatable, hard to prove, unreliable. Intelligence processes are formal and 
quantified.  
 
“The search for knowledge is project-based and problem-oriented, with measurable 
goals at each step. When the project is over, the thrust of intelligence is reduced. Intelligence 
professionals have an affinity and capability for undertaking massive projects and tackling tough 
problems. They function within limited time horizons and seek short-term, measurable results. 
Projects are completed on time and within budget. Clockwork efficiency prevails. Facts and proof 
are needed at each step of the way. Performance is measured according to well-quantified 
criteria. Meeting the bottom line attains satisfaction.  
 
“Creativity is not considered essential: the way to increase performance is to optimize 
proven analytical models. There is a reluctance to undertake assignments when the output and 
the return on investment cannot be measured or when there are some elements of vagueness 
involved. Function and value are precisely quantified and monitored. Concerns for human 
processes are secondary. The reality is factual, the process mechanistic, and the interaction 
hierarchical. Authority is preferred to diversity… If this dimension is a master of efficiency, it 
lags in effectiveness: analytical tools have limited effect on organizational development.” 
 
Dimension 4 reflects the way things are done within the organization: it likes to plan, 
execute, and implement. Administrative routines and detailed procedures are carried out 
systematically; it is organizational and implementative, procedural and thorough, traditional and 
conservative. 
 
“Collecting data, following meticulously defined procedures, combing through data, 
evaluating, inventorying, and filing data are handled with great rigor. Ambiguity is rejected; 
intuition and emotions are distrusted. The orientation is mechanical: sequence, procedure and 
order are favoured… Dimension 4 supports Dimension 3 in its analytical efforts…Dimension 4 
professionals have extraordinary capabilities for bringing order out of chaos…[but] 
unfortunately tends to overlook the big picture.” 
 
These four dimensions are complementary. “Dimension 1, reaching into a person’s 
emotional depths, is essential for laying the foundation of a culture of intelligence, for it is based 
on people rather than on tools and techniques. Dimension 2 allows intelligence reality to grow, 
and break new ground. Dimension 3 structures this growth, and modelizes it. Dimension 4 brings 




Two types of intelligence according to Bonthous:  








•it handles rigorous quantitative assessments & 
factual or numerical analysis
•Facts and proof are needed at each step 
•Concern for human processes are secondary
•reality is factual, the process mechanistic, and 
the interaction hierarchical
•Clockwork efficiency prevails 
Dimensions 3 & 4
Very developped




U.S. intelligence reigns supreme in 





All 4 dimensions 
are equally 
developed 
•integral part of ongoing process of 
strategizing on the national level and in 
corporations
•not pursued in spurts, or mainly when 
crisis strike….Intelligence is in every 





Table 20 Two types of intelligence according to Bonthous: 
 
Subsection 2.4: - Defining a Story Line 
 
The national approaches to intelligence as described by Bonthous define national 
“personality traits” that come into play when delegations from various countries assess 
documentation associated with a policy issue. When delegates gather around the table to discuss a 
critical issue, each will scrutinize the proposed documentation according to the variables or 
dimensions that attract them. The American delegate is bound to look first into the facts and 
figures and will then check if the analysis is logical and if the paper uses state-of-the-art scientific 
methodology. The Swedish or Japanese delegates will look into those facts and figures, but they 
will search for other types of information meaningful for them and for their ministry: for them, a 
document that deals entirely with facts and figures but overlooks human and qualitative aspects is 
bound to remain incomplete. The same applies to the French or German delegate. 
 
I vividly recollect an afternoon when we had tabled for discussion a document prepared 
by a French expert. The document began with a sizable essay on development values; it was 
eventually followed by inevitable figures describing the performance of every donor to the Sahel 
region. The American delegate was upset with this presentation, and staring hard into my eyes, he 
literally tore off the first 50 pages of the report: for him, this was verbiage. Interestingly, French, 
Canadian, and Dutch delegates were rather eager to spend most of the morning session dealing 
with the philosophical preamble; of course, all this time, my American delegate was fuming. 
When his turn to speak arrived, he proceeded to criticize the methodology and the relevance of 
the whole document. Not all American delegates are that tempestuous, but faced with a document 
short on facts and abundant on “qualitative analysis,” they are bound to request a serious revisit 
of the document and will argue that this does not provide them with a “story line” they can use in 
their constituency. 
 
The notion of story line is relevant to the issue of policy adoption. For a new policy to be 
adopted in any OECD member country, a series of arguments must be presented to various levels 




delegates; no matter how senior they are, country representatives are merely a link in a long chain 
of command, and of influence. Having been persuaded about a particular change in policy, they 
must then go back home and persuade others, and for this they absolutely need to be equipped 
with the kind of arguments that are acceptable in their culture. For that purpose, I found 
Bonthous’ analysis useful. I kept reminding myself that the work of the Secretariat needed to 
reflect all intelligence needs of the various delegates, including Sahelian representatives. It also 
meant that more discussion time was necessary to allow delegates to introduce arguments in their 
own familiar manner. It is also essential to build redundancies; for example, dividing workload in 
such a manner as to warrant the hiring of two consultants, one from France and one from the 
United States, in order to build adequately for each country, the required “story line.” Ignoring 
this reality almost always led to stale discussions and lock-up positions.  
 
Little is known of these preferences for Eastern Europe and for Africa. This information 
deficit makes it very difficult for foreign agencies to make a persuasive and relevant case when 




Section 3  
Managing the Negotiation Process 
 
OECD is a network whose members retain their sovereignty at all times. The 
organization is governed by consensus, so persuading members to act in a certain way requires 
specific skills, a high level of tact, and strategy. Because it has no formal coercive powers, it must 
reach “active consensus” as the outcome of any discussion or negotiation. This implies that all 
participants not only agree with a recommendation or a decision by the group, but their behaviour 
has been changed in the process; it is expected that participants will return to their office and 
“behave” in a manner different than the way they behaved prior to the meeting, a behaviour that 
corresponds to the new standards or norms that have been agreed upon. In that sense, the 
discussion/negotiation process is closer to a pedagogical one at times, and at other times it is 
closer to brainstorming and the seeking of new ideas. In a manner analogous to good pedagogy, 
attention must be given to listening to others; one might further argue that it is equally important 
to be perceived as listening. It has been observed that most delegates do not mind divergent 
views, provided they know they have been heard. 
 
Thus, the management of the negotiation and discussion process leaves nothing to 
chance. The process must be managed in meticulous fashion to surmount the added complexity of 
ensuring the buy-in by all members. In my opinion, three features are central to this high-quality 
method:  
 
1. First, participants must understand the way they are meant to play their role for each 
meeting and within each committee to achieve maximum results. Some of the 
participants are called upon to play central roles, in particular the chair of each committee 
or each meeting. In Chapter 3 we addressed the specific role played by the “wise 
director.” In this section we will provide a few suggestions as to the best way a “savvy 
president” can best help a committee reach its objectives. We will also discuss how 
participants can lobby each other to maintain and maximize the use of peer pressure. 
Finally, we will discuss the use of experts and consultants. 
2. Second, as in theatre, a good play must rest on a solid script and so does a good meeting. 




will discuss the drafting and provide the salient feature for the syntax specific to the 
annotated agenda, summary records, peer review, and communiqué. 
3. Third, the logistical arrangements of the meeting, the management of time and 
sequencing of events, will facilitate or hinder the reaching of a consensus depending on 
the manner in which these elements are structured. 
 
Subsection 3.1 - Roles ascribed to various actors 
 
For greater effectiveness, all participants must know in advance what is expected of them 
and what role they are expected to play. It is also expected that national delegates will prepare 
their specific national response to the agenda items. They might also choose to contact each other 
to lobby for their preferred option. This is generally done in Paris between delegations, but may 
occasionally happen elsewhere. 
 
The role of the “savvy president”  
 
A representative from the member countries chairs most committees, subcommittees, and 
workshops, thus ensuring at all times that the network nature of the organization is fully reflected 
in its work. A permanent president chairs only two committees: the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) and the Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC). Otherwise, 
each group selects its chair in its own way in accordance with unwritten rules, precedents, and 
habits. As is typical of OECD, these rules may vary depending on the theme or sector. In sum, the 
selection of a president is considered to be of significant importance by all members, as the 
president plays a key role in moving the agenda for each of these committees. At the beginning of 
a task, when things are still informal and uncertain, countries often confer informally outside the 
meeting, and decide on who will provide the first president.  
 
Because OECD is “content driven,” members often fix their choice on one of them who 
seems to rally a consensus based on the person’s savvy, knowledge of the subject, leadership, and 
interest. Being so chosen is considered an honour for the country, and this is even truer for key 
committees, such as finance; generally the responsible department will facilitate things for the 
selected president. In some cases, it implies the individual will be left at the post for as long as the 
person chairs the committee.  
 
Each president develops skills as the committee work progresses. Some start with great 
intuition, others learn the hard way through trial and error. The following suggestions may help 
provide general direction. They have no claim to be based on hard scientific evidence, nor are 
they documented in the published literature. The ideas derive mostly from interviews that were 
carried out with present and past members of OECD staff. At best, these are lessons learned by 
those who were close to the action for a number of years. 
 
A “savvy president” remains calm and composed throughout a meeting, moving the 
agenda by interjecting probing questions or making statements, demonstrating at all times a clear 
reasoning and a broad understanding of the issues. The chair must focus on questions that are 
fundamental to constructing a solution, and spot a fuzzy question, one of those that divert energy 
into subsidiary issues. The chair ensures that real problems not be obscured by astute 
smokescreens, and does not let the meeting deteriorate into “forms, formalities, and rituals,” but 
keeps the group focussed on the substance of the issue. At the same time, the chair remains alert 
to susceptibilities and helps his most trusted partner, the “wise director” in finding true and 
acceptable language to define a situation or a problem. Every opportunity is used, in the meeting 




leadership comforts and reassures the group. A solid and timely sense of humour is a recognized 
asset. 
 
Two archetypes: the “persistent diplomat” and the “maverick” 
 
The “persistent diplomat” has chaired many committees with a large measure of success. 
The person is characterized by a capacity to listen for hours to every delegate, letting them speak 
late into the night, but won’t let go of the objectives of a specific meeting. The Chair literally 
wears them down by listening patiently and bringing them back to the task at hand.  
 
The “maverick” is encountered less often, but under certain circumstances, this 
personality may be the character best suited for the occasion. The maverick must possess a high 
independence of view, even be financially independent; he rides a group very hard, at times 
cutting a discussion short to refocus the participants on the real agenda. The maverick “has an 
attitude” but also intellectual leadership, and coupled with recognized ethics the maverick is 
acceptable to trained bureaucrats. The maverick has little chance of success alone, but with a 
partner and accomplice within the group who can be relied upon to provide timely support, 
chances of survival are relatively good. This archetype may best be used when the agenda is 
protracted and requires risk-taking to overcome embedded resistance. 
 
The “passive diplomat” epitomizes a less efficient type, characterized by not getting 
involved in the debate, and generally remaining on the fence. This person is content to manage 
the traffic and ensure that participants speak in turn and respect protocol. If a group is highly 
proactive, with many committed participants, to which we must add a strong and highly respected 
“wise director,” then a committee may wither this person’s lack of positive energy. A committee 
may otherwise lose its dynamism, and eventually a way will be found to secure another president. 
 
Chairing efficiency and effectiveness 
 
Defining effectiveness and efficiency remains elusive in the OECD context. The 
difference between the two is subtle but never vague. Each Chair must decide what to strive for 
and what to sacrifice in the heat of the action at least once per meeting. The difference between 
reaching the overall goals and bringing a meeting to a close often contradict each other. An 
efficiently run meeting might leave some participants secretly unsatisfied. Very often, for 
example, the preoccupations of more important countries overshadow the concerns of smaller 
states, and in the long run consensus may remain elusive. Small states have means to make 
themselves essential when the time comes. They either become “policy delinquents” or 
geopolitical considerations make them essential and give them occasional leverage. In sum, the 
“savvy president” never loses sight of the fact that the fundamental goal of the organization is to 
foster “cooperation” among its members. The role of the “savvy president” is to help bring 
inclusiveness where the world tends to be fractious. 
 
Searching for consensus should not overshadow other important objectives of the 
organization: 
 
1. It is a learning organization and what participants learn about themselves, about their 
neighbours, and about the best way to do things remains an essential and useful outcome 
of a good meeting. Some even argue that OECD has a “duty of care” compelling it to 
understand how each system works, its peculiar dynamics, understanding and 
demonstrating the relation between the various systems. In sum, for many, learning 




2. It is also a laboratory for new ideas to be tested and implemented: many of its forums act 
as quasi-brainstorming sessions between states to develop new products and new ways to 
govern, and to provide services to citizens.  
3. A third dimension of the process is the need to set the scene for future Peer Review. The 
“savvy president” never forgets that in the end all actions by members will have to be 
assessed and judged by the other members. Driving an agreement too fast might mean 
that its implementation will be difficult and member’s adherence sluggish. The Peer 
Review process is a unique function within OECD, and still remains a unique challenge. 
It is the litmus test of well-negotiated policy, and to a large measure, a performance 
indicator of the savvy of the chairpersons who conducted the discussions in the preceding 
stages. 
 
It is often better to call a difficult meeting to a close, short of a consensus, rather than 
press participants beyond what they are prepared to accept as a group. The “savvy president” 





OECD is a complex network, made up of a great number of families. For example, trade 
representatives from various member countries form a loosely bonded family; likewise for 
representatives of the ministry of finance or from any other ministry. They also meet in other 
forums where they are called to discuss issues and ideas that are debated in some OECD 
committee. They come to know each other well as they meet regularly in scientific seminars, 
bilateral meetings, and other international organizations (World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, World Trade Organization). The world of OECD is a highly connected world. The “savvy 
president” is also a member of the same circles, and the wise one knows how and when to push 
the agenda forward outside of the strict boundaries of the committee. OECD members often 
confer with each other in large forums and may call upon the Chair to preside over an informal 
gathering preceding the final session. This may provide an opportunity to move one particular 
item forward. The next session of the committee may confirm what was agreed to one evening in 
a hotel lobby. Seen from this angle, one may appreciate better the power of OECD’s informality.  
 
OECD has often been used to discuss, to prepare, and harmonize positions in other 
forums. For example, OECD members used the Exchange Committee to prepare General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations in the years preceding the formation of the World 
Trade Organization. The Development Assistance Committee was used in preparation for the Rio, 
Beijing, and other large international events that were attended by Third World countries. The 
most secretive Working Party Number Three was used to prepare G-10 meetings in the 1970s, as 
well as the IMF meeting. It should therefore come as no surprise that some measure of 
harmonization came to guide members’ policies and behaviour. 
 
Equilibrium Constantly Changes 
 
The high level of connectivity between OECD activities and those of its members means 
that the work within each committee must adapt to an ever-changing equilibrium. This is both a 
constraint and a resource for the “savvy president.” This is one key argument in favour of long-
lasting stable presidents as opposed to short-term revolving individuals. Over time, a good Chair 
personifies and embodies a committee. Combined with flexibility, good judgement, and 
commitment, the work of the Chair can often result in significant changes in the behaviour of 




Swiss lawyer, Dr Pieth. In Chapter 6 the unique achievements of this “ad hoc Committee” will 




One essential function of the Chair is to manage time -- the long time, which can be a 
period of years needed for a new policy to become accepted practice, and the short time, which is 
the time of each session and the time in between. This requires an acute sense of timing both at 
the global level and at the very specific moment within a meeting. As we have explained above, 
the connected world of OECD changes constantly. The “savvy president” must adapt to changes 
in politics, which sometimes facilitate his work, but more often they hinder and slow down 
progress. At a micro level, the Chair is called to judge when a group is stalled because of fatigue, 
when a new item should replace the previous one, and when to take charge and flush out a 
problem.  
 
In many instances, the time allotted to discuss a particular item is too short. For example, 
the annual review of the economic performance of each member lasts one day each. This may 
suffice to discuss the performance of Iceland, for example, but is perceived as too short to fully 
discuss the complexities of the US economy. 
 
Tricks of the Trade 
 
Faced with a difficult session, the Chair may choose to conclude with carefully 
considered words rather than belabour a seemingly intractable issue. It can be brought up again at 
a more promising opportunity. He then may insist on: 
 
• Determining how much was learned through sharing each other’s experience. 
• Praising the group for tackling a most difficult problem. 
• Encouraging participants to come back next time with means to attack the problem. 
• Focussing on methodological obstacles that were surmounted and which can be 
further used to pursue a difficult dialogue. 
 
Such words carry significant weight when used by someone who is recognized for 
incisive judgment and for being an expert in the field. Furthermore, for a creative mind, a difficult 
meeting is often the opportunity to create, to innovate, to spin the group into new areas of 
thinking, or to invent new tools or search for entirely different approaches to solutions. 
 
The “savvy president” does not fear the void of silence. He gives time to tthink. Faced 
with what is often perceived as heavy silence after the usual introduction, the Chair will choose to 
wait them out rather than jump into the void by repeating the introduction or voicing personal 
opinions. This results in de-responsibilizing the group. It is a network of peers and every 
participant is an owner of the process. One of them will eventually launch discussion. The Chair 
will not stymie participation, but will make sure everyone has had a chance to speak to an issue 
before offering a summary that is intended to close a discussion. 
 
Faced with a discussion that is deadlocked, and participants who don’t react, the 
competent Chair will use various tactics: 
 
• Restate his opinions to draw out participation. 




• Offer a temporary view: “the sense of the meeting appears to be….” 
• Decide to move to the next item on the agenda. 
 
To build the collective memory, the Chair will: 
 
• Offer regular, but short, summaries of what has been accomplished. 
• Put forward validation questions such as: “Do you mean that…?,“Does the 
group feel that…?”or, I sense a consensus building towards… .  
 
Section 4  
Syntax for Key Documents 
 
Subsection 4.1 - The annotated agenda 
 
The negotiation process often proceeds on the basis of an annotated agenda, which the 
OECD has developed into an art form. This agenda mechanism serves as a key instrument for 
guiding the negotiation into a sustained, goal-oriented dialogue. Not every meeting makes use of 
this technique. Generally, meetings are part of an ongoing process and thus, their management is 
considered straightforward. A simple listing of topics to be discussed is enough. But, when a 
meeting is more delicate, either because the subject matter is new and complex or when partners 
don’t know each other well enough, then a special effort must be made to increase the probability 
that a meeting will achieve its intended goals. 
 
The OECD method functions like a Matrioshka doll: it’s a continuum within a 
continuum, always moving from the basis of agreed facts toward consensus on common policy. 
Going back to the six distinct steps of its policy process (see Chapter 3, Section 4), the first step is 
to agree on a subject. This is the task of the members themselves. Once they have agreed, then the 
Secretariat takes over the crucial next phases, and applies a rigorous scientific method to move 
the agenda forward. It always begins with establishing the facts, collecting data, and creating a 
comparative information base. Analysis and drawing conclusions then follows. Lastly, forecasts 
and recommendations bring closure to the discussions before peer review can be performed.  
 
Discussions between members on a particular subject take place throughout the entire 
process, as committee meetings may take place once or even twice a year. For greater 
effectiveness, meetings should follow OECD’s traditional and proven recipe for reaching policy 
consensus: first moving from agreed upon facts and harmonized data to analysis before 
proceeding with the more difficult discussions concerning recommendations and decisions. 
 
If a meeting takes place at the very early stage, when little is known about a subject, then 
the meeting agenda is likely to focus first on what is known, what is the available data, and allow 
the group to evaluate if the data are of sufficient quality to move ahead. If it is problematic, more 
effort must be made toward securing a better basis upon which to make a comparative analysis. In 
essence, the method ensures that a problem is clearly identified before a solution can be 
discussed. Otherwise, the lack of consensus about the nature of the problem will always slow 
down or even block the search for a common policy. In sum, each meeting is structured in a 
manner less conducive to conflicts, and in this way, it maximizes the search for truth and 
objective knowledge based on facts, rigorous analysis, and contrary discussions, leading to the 





A second feature of an effective agenda is to guide the group through the meeting in a 
most efficient manner. It serves the role of a well-planned and easy-to-follow road map; this 
maximizes use of time, a scarce resource. Considering the costs of holding international meetings, 
anything less would be irresponsible.  
 
The following example of what could be seen as a model annotated agenda comes from 
the General Secretariat, Liaison and Cooperation Unit, and concerns a workshop organized in 
October 1995 to discuss “Public sector finances and the evolution of saving and investment 
balances” (OECD document no SG/DNME”ECO”GEN/A(95)1, 21 September 1995). The stated 
objective of the meeting was to examine how experience across countries in saving and 
investment rates relates to the level and structure of public finances and to public policy more 
generally. In addition to general reports that reflect state-of-the-art knowledge on a given topic, 
for example, a paper on “Ageing populations, pension system and government budgets: How do 
they affect savings”and a number of national case studies were tabled for discussion. As this 
particular workshop was intended for OECD members and so-called dynamic non-members, the 
case studies dealt with Latin America in general and more specifically Argentina and Brazil, 
Asia, including Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Chinese Taipei, and finally, the USA. 
Three topics were scheduled for discussion: First, the role of public policies in the evolution of 
savings and investments, or more precisely, the role of pension system reforms and the role of 
other public policies. Then the group addressed “prospect for public finances, saving and 
investments, more specifically in Latin American and Asian DNMEs.” Readers will notice the 
subtle shift from reviewing cross-country experience, i.e. a factual discussion, to assessing cross-
country prospects for fiscal policies. Lastly, the discussion dealt with policy implications.  
 
Annotated Agenda, example and comments 
The Agenda for each session 
follows the same format.  
First, the aim of the session 
is explained in succinct terms. 
 A listing of all the 
documents that have been produced 
expressly for that workshop.  




In three short paragraphs, the 
general issue at stake and the 
purpose of the workshop are clearly 
and succinctly explained.  
 
Notice the moderate and 









The second paragraph is 
Opening Remarks 
Recent and prospective developments in national 
savings and investment, and their determinants, are an 
important policy concern for both DNM and OECD 
economies. There are concerns that private investment is 
being held back in OECD countries by low domestic saving 
and high real interest rates, and that investment in many non-
OECD countries is also too low. Also, the ageing of the 
population in many OECD countries may imply that a higher 
level of savings is desirable. These considerations point, 
among others, to the role of the public sector and perhaps to 
the desirability of lower fiscal deficits and debt in many 
countries, in order to release resources to the private sector. 
 
In general, dynamic non-member economies in Asia 
have high growth, low inflation and balanced budgets, and 




essentially based on fact, dealing 
with elements that have previously 
been recognized as truthful. 
 
Differences in performance, 
in both OECD and non-OECD 
member countries are at once put on 






many Latin American countries have low savings rates and 
erratic capital inflows, as foreign lenders have been 
discouraged by macroeconomic instability. As a result, 
average per capita growth rates have been low in the past 10-
15 years. Many OECD countries are in an intermediate 
position. In many cases, fiscal positions have deteriorated, 
and national savings rates have fallen, as have growth rates 
since the 1970s. 
 
Given these differences in performance, and the 
concerns outlined above, the objective of the workshop is to 
examine how experience across countries on saving and 
investment rates relates to the level and structure of public 
finances and, in some cases, to public policy more generally. 
Case studies will be used to address specific issues -- like the 
role of pension systems. Also consideration will be given to 
prospects for public finance, their impact on saving and 
investment, and the policies required to increase savings in 
the future. 
The session is intended to 
allow the participant to “review 
cross-country experience”. This is 
building the consensus about the 
factual basis. 
 
The use of questions to 
induce participants to enter into 
discussion has a number of subtle 
advantages. 
It invites immediate 
participation. Faced with a statement, 
a participant may chose to agree 
passively. But a question avoids that 
trap. 
It is less threatening as it 
leaves space for thinking and 
phrasing one’s own mind.  
Short statements always 
sound dogmatic as they lose all the 
nuances that come with a long text. 
A question avoids that other trap. 
It permits one to attack the 
subject from various angles, even 
allows for subtle quasi-redundancies 
and sub-questions. These appeal to 
different characters, thus involving 
more participation.  
Observe also how the 
various operative verbs stimulate 
different areas of the brain: critical 
(i), analytical (ii and iv), or creative 
Session one, The role of Public Policies in the 
evolution of Saving and Investments. 
… The aim is to review the cross-country 
experience… 
Suggested issues for discussion: 
i) Are there reasons to believe that pension systems 
that are privately funded, or fully funded by the state, are 
associated with higher levels of national savings? 
ii) Is pension system reform by itself likely to result 
in higher national savings, or must other measures be taken 
as well? 
iii) Do other specific public policies exist, which 
durably affect private sector saving behaviour, and how 
certain can one be of their effects? 
iv) To what extent can different saving rates as 
between countries be explained by purely economic and 








The group is then 
progressively moved toward making 
its own analysis of the body of 
evidence that comes from the various 
case studies and drawing agreed 
conclusions.  
 
Here again, questions 
prompt discussions in a direct but not 
threatening fashion.  
Notice the use of “To what 
extent…” In effect, this question is 
very direct. It suggests a conclusion: 
Current or planned policy will have 
an impact for saving, but …”to what 
extent…? The reader may consider 
the various alternatives that would 
try to move the agenda using 
assertions rather than two line 
questions.  
Session two: Prospects for Public Finances, Saving 
and Investment 
The aim of this session is to assess cross-country 
prospects for fiscal policy, and the behaviour of saving and 
investment. Against the background of their possible 
evolution across countries, 
Suggested issues for discussion: 
i) Case studies on prospects for individual countries: 
-- How will Chinese Taipei’s fiscal deficit be 
consolidated? 
-- Prospects for national saving/investment balances 
in Thailand. 
-- What are the prospects for a sustained increase in 
saving in Argentina? 
-- To what extent might current or planned policy 
reforms affect medium-term prospects for national saving 
and investment balances in OECD countries? 
ii) General points: 
-- To what extent do participants feel that it is 
reasonable and prudent to rely on international capital flows 
to equilibrate prospective national saving and investment 
balances in individual countries? 
-- How urgent is fiscal consolidation in OECD 
countries? In Latin America? Is it likely that pressure for 
greater social expenditure (e.g. on health and education) will 
build up in Asian DNMEs as their income levels increase? 
The last session finally 
brings things together leading to 
conclusions.  
 
Notice for example, that an 
alternative would have been to deal 
with each subject in sequence and 
draw conclusions early on, subject 
by subject.  
 
This way of doing things, 
however, invests early in building 
the overall self-confidence and trust 
of the group; it empowers it at the 
end to move in a dynamic fashion 
toward making recommendations 
based “…on agreed upon evidence.” 
 
The group is moved toward 
generalizations and the sharing of 
best practices. 
 
 The last question is 
Third session: Policy Implications 
This session will confront the evidence and lessons 
from the two first sessions with medium-term fiscal and 
structural reform programs, in order to draw policy 
conclusions. 
Suggested issues for discussion: 
i) Do participants agree that, given the theoretical 
and empirical evidence, the only sure way for governments 
to affect saving/investment balances is to act directly on 
public sector balances? 
ii) Is Chile’s experience in raising its national saving 
rate exportable to other countries in the region? 
iii) Even if pension reform were to have no net 
impact on national savings balances, is it desirable on other 
grounds? 
iv) More generally, what does the experience of 
countries over time, or across countries, suggest about a) the 
interaction between spending on welfare programs (as a 
proportion of GDP) and national saving rates. Is there a 
negative correlation here?; and b) the effect of a sustained 
change in welfare spending on national savings balances? 
v) Are the policy measures envisaged by OECD 




haunting, leaving much space for 
doubt and for future discussions. It 
reflects an old penchant within the 
OECD for progress achieved 
incrementally over the long term 
rather than through one-shot 
spectacular operations. 
 
Notice that the very last 
question allows for criticism of the 
OECD members, the hosts; this may 
be seen as courteous, giving the last 
word to outside guests. 
the desired effect? 
Table 21 Annotated Agenda, example and comments 
 
It should be noted that other forms of agenda are also in use within the organization. The 
annotated agenda is used for more delicate meetings, those where new actors gather or when a 
subject is particularly difficult. Otherwise, the committee chair may prefer simple and direct 
agenda that list the subjects and define what type of action is expected from the meeting. Once 
again, it should be stressed that this text develops a model structure, and is not a meticulous 
description of all different practices. 
 
Subsection 4.2 The syntax for summary record 
 
The summary record complements the agenda in the OECD negotiation process, which 
has likewise been refined into an art form. The summary record is intended to focus the attention 
of the various member delegations on the common agenda and shared goals, even after they 
return to their home country. The availability of a summary record of OECD negotiations tends to 
militate against a tendency on the part of returning delegations to toy with narrow nationalist 
views at the expense of the wider-ranging, supra-national values and goals reflected in OECD. 
 
As in golf, follow-through is critical to ensure the success of the meeting. In many cases, 
the most salient output of a meeting is the analytical summary record of the meeting or seminar. 
That is not to say that the meeting itself is not important: the mere fact of gathering competent 
individuals, selected for the pertinence of their knowledge and for their key position in 
government, generally is sufficient to justify the cost of most meetings. However, one could 
argue that the conclusions reached by such a group, once organized in an intelligible fashion, 
based on a well structured agenda, should become part of common knowledge and be accepted as 
authoritative. 
 
The summary records must first and foremost reflect fully and in an analytical manner the 
conclusions reached and the substance of any preceding discussion. Whatever consensus is 
reached, partial or otherwise, must be immediately identified and added to the knowledge base.  
 
If the meeting is part of a longstanding workshop, then we would accept an “interpreted 
consensus”: it is the role of the Chair to interpret (generally with the assistance of the Secretariat) 
what constitutes a legitimate agreement by participants. It is only when a final document 
implying contractual arrangements have been reached that it may become necessary to define 





Consensus is seldom reached on every agenda item: issues that remain controversial, 
including their supporting arguments, are as such a valid product that will find usage at a 
subsequent meeting. It is therefore critical to take note of disagreements, and the summary should 
endeavour to give back to participants the full richness of their divergences and of the 
argumentation.  
 
Obviously, it is of no use to simply account literally for everything: the discursive nature 
of debates makes them often unintelligible. 
 
The speed with which the secretariat provides such a summary is key to ensuring the 
success of a meeting: it is an underestimated and unsuspected asset. A first draft should be 
provided at least orally, but preferably in writing, before the end of the meeting. A final summary 
record should reach participants not later than seven working days after the meeting. Beyond 
these dates, participants will have formed their own individual perception and these will have 
“gelled” in their mind. Once participants know that the Secretariat will provide these records with 
diligence, they generally wait for it before writing their own report and communicating its 
conclusions to colleagues and senior managers. Experience has shown that summary records 
prepared by each delegation tend to overemphasize the point of view of the delegation and 
understate or oversimplify the views of other delegations. As a result, these “national summary 
records” tend to be somewhat sectarian, and if not balanced by a more even point of view, they 




A good summary record fully reflects the richness of a meeting. In particular: 
 
$ It avoids repetitions and redundancies as much as possible. 
$ It structures the discussions in a manner that allows a reader to fully 
understand what was said; for that purpose, interventions may be 
repositioned where they make more sense. 
$ It underscores agreements and consensus. 
$ It does not gloss over dissensions but raises problematic issues frankly 
and respectfully. 
$ It lists and provides intelligence to contentious subjects, to questions and 
new problems that arose during the meeting. 
$ It clearly highlights commitments and pledges when appropriate. 
$ It always captures the clear and agreed upon actions to be taken, 
identifies who is responsible to carry them out, and will often capture 
those subtle actions and commitments that were implicit. 
 
One must assume all participants to a meeting have something essential they wanted to 
say and convey. No intervention must be excluded a priori from the record as being irrelevant, 
trivial, or devoid of meaning. Especially when dealing with national delegates, it must be 
assumed that each intervention, no matter how obscure, was intended and most likely was 
discussed in advance by the delegation. The summary record must therefore account for all key 
points raised by participants.  
 
Second, speakers may deliver their key message outside of the agenda items planned for 
and agreed at the outset. There are many reasons for not following the agenda. It often happens 
that a delegate will relate everything he has come to say in one stroke, for a variety of reasons. 




sure the record remains intelligible. For that purpose, the summary record must reposition all 
interventions in their proper context. 
 
This having been said, redundancies must be avoided as they clog the text and render it 
difficult to read and understand. Care must be taken when summarizing to make use of the words 
of various speakers, and not always use the words from the same one. 
 
The summary record must scrupulously avoid creating tensions, especially by polarizing 
groups unintentionally. Any forms of “us-them” language is barred at all times. Often without our 
noticing, we tend to group things in a binary fashion: “On the one hand, some argued this... , 
while, on the other hand, others argued the contrary...” In an insidious way, this method breeds 
tension and may pit one group against another through “subliminal summarizing” so to speak. It 
is generally better to recognize subtle nuances and reflect non-binary regrouping. For example: 
“The group considered various aspects of the question. Some argued that... others considered 
this... while another group viewed it as key to the resolution of the problem.” Regrouping into 
three or more categories of argumentation will generally reflect the nature of the discussion while 
ensuring that an accidental cleavage does not compound dissension. 
 
All statements eventually belong to the group once expressed and discussed. In most 
instances, it is therefore unnecessary and even counterproductive to ascribe positions, opinions, or 
even factual statements to any particular member. It is better to say: “The group considered 
various points of view: for some...” When two or more members suggested divergent facts or 
statistics, one could write: “the discussion revealed divergent views with regard to statistical 
evidence: for some the growth rate was closer to (say) 5% while others argued that 8% better 
reflected reality...” It is preferable to raise a problem and often underscore the capacity of the 
group to properly deal with issues and contradictions. 
 
There are very few meetings where nothing was achieved in terms of partial consensus. 
Whatever was achieved and agreed upon must be fully recorded, and the manner of reporting 
these partial agreements must convey finality and bring closure to that portion of the ongoing 
discussion. In so doing, the summary record must be open to future discussions and, in effect, it 
generally clarifies the next agenda. It must, as much as possible, highlight the task required to 
reach the next stage and identify responsibility centres. 
 
By definition, networks such as OECD exist because there are conflicts and divergences 
of views; these instruments have been expressly created to deal with resolving conflicts evolving 
from differences in policies, habits, behaviour, ideologies, and beliefs among its participants. The 
fundamental principle is therefore to differentiate clearly what is shared from what brings about 
conflicts. One has to think as positively as possible to find all and every little or significant 
agreement and consensus. This having been done, the remaining divergences must be clearly 
stated so the group can deal with them at the first opportunity.  
 
The tendency to be politically correct, to gloss over conflicts, to use euphemisms to 
disguise a difference and turn it into a pseudo-agreement, to replace subtleties with vagueness, are 
all efficient ways to entrench conflicts and ensure they remain protracted and increasingly more 
difficult to resolve. Modern psychology recognizes that naming your demons is an essential step 
in recovery. Denial, or double-talk, moves the group one step away from empowering itself to 
resolve these conflicts. The summary record plays a key role in that process.  
 
A litmus test for a good summary record is found in the satisfaction of participants. As 




often made with timidity or uncertainty have taken on a real value once set into the full context of 
the meeting. They will often discover how much sense their own intervention made once it is 
reset correctly into the full discussion context. This is where the intellectual agility and profound 
knowledge of the subject by those who write summary records become essential components of 
the process. In Canada, the US, and many other OECD countries, it has often become fashion to 
ask professional writers to draft these documents. In effect, what is gained in writing ability is 
offset by the lack of technical knowledge; this knowledge deficit means that very subtle 
compromises, implicit or even explicit to the discussion, are not perceived and brought to the 
attention of the group. Here again the ability to foster progress and reduce tension finds its 
outcome. These abilities are made of a real combination of intelligence, knowledge, and a true 
measure of humility. The records are meant to underscore the capacity of the participants to 
resolve problems among themselves. 
 
This brings about a paradox and a quandary. Successful directors make everything sound 
natural, and in this way, the group generally believes it is solely responsible for achievements. 
This may lead the group to underestimate its own Secretariat, its role, and its true 
accomplishment. In a world that is increasingly dominated by media, and which rests on 
worshipping individual heroes, the “non-flashy servants” of the group may become the victim of 
their own true success. 
 
Following is an example of a good summary. It is an extract of the record of proceedings 





One of the issues being debated at the N’djamena meeting concerned cereal production 
policies. This was central to survival strategies of farmers in the Sahel region: “Should local 
cereal producers benefit from protectionist measures? If so, should aid donors assume directly or 
indirectly, the financial support for such measures.” From 1976 to 1988, this subject had given 
rise to lengthy and passionate debates and many expert reports.  
 
All nine ministers of finance and ministers of rural development representing Sahelian 
countries, and from high-level delegates from Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, The 
Netherlands, United States, World Bank, IMF, EU, and the OECD Secretariat attended the 
N’djamena meeting.  
 
It can be objectively argued that this issue had divided decision-makers and experts into 
two broad camps. There were those who believed that protectionist measures were the best way to 
ensure a good level of domestic production -- the so-called Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
as practised within the EU was generally exemplified to justify this stance. The second group 
included those who argued in favour of an open market that, in their view, would eventually 
provide the right mix of opportunities and incentives for both Sahelian producers and consumers.  
 
Rice, a staple commodity of the Sahelian diet, was increasingly being imported at below 
farm-gate price from Thailand and other exporting nations. Various subsidies (ironically 
including subsidies paid by the Government of the United States) had contributed to deflating 
world price of many cereals, especially rice. Local rice farmers were facing harsh competition 
indeed. Senegal had imposed a tax on imported rice; however, Thailand rice came through the 
Gambian port of Banjul and found its way into the hands of consumers in Dakar through porous 




adjustments programs, this issue was topical indeed. Nobody wanted to antagonize France or the 
US, since both were firmly entrenched in opposite camps.  
 
Diplomats would characterize the discussion as frank, a euphemism meaning that parties 
had expressed divergent views in a forceful and direct manner. I was tasked to summarize 
discussions. Mrs Anne de Lattre, who was then director of the Club, however, rejected my 
summary. She proceeded to rewrite it in a manner more in line with OECD’s traditions and 
subtlety. In the following days, I analyzed meticulously the differences between my version and 
hers. The lessons I learned that day are discussed below. 
 
 Summary Record, Example and Comments 
 
In a few strokes, the sense of 
topic and the speakers are introduced. 
The meeting discussed a document entitled "A Protected 
Regional Cereals Market, An Initial Exploration of a New Idea". The 
discussion was introduced by the Mali Minister of Planning and by 
Mr. Louis Caudron (France). The document focuses on rice 
production and demonstrates that cereal imports to the Sahel have 
increased significantly over the past ten years, which is a worrisome 
trend from a number of standpoints. 
No matter how small and 
fugitive, whatever consensus emerged is 
dutifully recorded. 
 
The key contentious issues are at 




Key contradictions, as stated by 
participants are immediately revealed, 
thus marking out the limitations of the 
current debate. 
Participants agreed that agricultural development is a 
crucial factor for economic progress in the Sahelian countries, and 
that it is impossible to encourage farmers to increase the quantity and 
quality of production without providing incentives. However, the 
participants expressed differing viewpoints on the role that 
protectionism could play in the rapid development of Sahelian food 
crop production, and certain representatives of Sahelian countries 
wondered how it would be possible to reconcile protectionist and 
liberalization policies, which are recommended simultaneously. 







Argumentation is stated in the 
form of rhetorical questions, a more 
neutral, less aggressive way of reflecting 
diverging positions while providing the 
Certain participants considered that a protectionist 
policy would not favour an increase in Sahelian food crop 
production. Even if it was possible to define the geographic area 
and the products to be protected, protection might distort the 
distribution of scarce resources and discourage the commercial 
competition that would increase producers' incomes and reduce 
consumer prices. If rice was protected, would there be any 
attempt to develop production of more profitable crops in 
irrigated areas? Would there be any attempt to reduce production 
costs, which is one of the key factors in increased cereals production 
in the Sahel? Would there not be a tendency to reject other measures, 
which would be just as effective as protection, such as the 




gist of the argumentation. 
This is a compromise position. 
Notice it is set in between the two 
arguments, thus underscoring the 
impression that there exists a spectrum of 
solutions as opposed to black and white 
opposite views to be followed by some 
mushy “grey” compromise. 
 
Possible solutions are 
immediately highlighted, which turn this 
intermediary position into something 
where work can commence as soon as 
possible. 
Other participants adopted a more reserved stance. 
They recognized that the trade policies of Sahelian countries would 
have a major impact on certain large-scale investments that have 
already been made, but considered it overly ambitious to talk of a 
protected regional market at the present time. These participants felt 
that emphasis should rather be placed on harmonizing cereals 
policies in CILSS Member Countries. An initial phase of the 
harmonization process could involve identifying and analyzing 
the measures taken in each country, and in particular measures 
aimed at introducing protection or creating incentives, in Mali 
(PRMC, Office du Niger), Senegal, Burkina Faso, etc. Results of this 
analysis could be disseminated and comparisons made to see 
whether the measures that have been taken are complementary. 
There is also a need to examine the prices of imports - which are 
generally highly subsidized - to ascertain whether these prices are set 
at levels that will not discourage local production and that will not 
promote informal border trade. Several participants considered that it 
was impossible to justify a protectionist policy by focusing on rice 
production alone, since rice accounts for only one-tenth of total 
cereals production in the Sahel. The scope of the studies must be 
widened to cover Sahelian cereals production as a whole, and the 
studies must investigate the consequences that protection would have 
on producers, on different groups of consumers and on public-sector 
finances. The boundaries of the area to be protected must be defined. 

















Notice how we are referring to a 
group of participants, not a faction, nor a 
group outside of the Group, but a 
legitimate part of the overall 
A third group of participants considered that, although 
protection is only one of a number of ways to promote the 
development of cereals production in the Sahel, it must not be 
overlooked. First, agriculture will certainly continue to be the basis 
of the economies of Sahelian countries over the coming decades. 
Those economies must be modernized, and it is unlikely that 
modernization can be achieved if the Sahelian agricultural economy 
is not protected from the major upheavals of world markets and from 
the influx of agricultural produce subsidized by industrial countries. 
Second, modernization of water supply and irrigation infrastructures 
might turn out to be impossible without protectionist measures, even 
if the selling prices of products grown by irrigated agriculture in 
Sahelian countries are higher than those of equivalent products from 
industrial countries or from countries with more modern agricultural 
sectors. Finally, this group of participants stressed the 
importance of safeguarding producers' incomes in order to allow 
them to purchase equipment. Over and above these considerations, it 
would perhaps be reasonable to oppose the outward orientation and 
de-linkaging of Sahelian economies and to make optimum use of 
local resources. Protection will clearly have its price. Consideration 
must be given to how that price could be shared by consumers, 
public funds and foreign aid, and to whether it would not be more 
beneficial to use foreign aid to cover part of the cost of protection 





 Should protection be national or regional? Each government 
should be responsible for defining its own policies, but the future of 
Sahelian countries depends on regional cooperation, which will 
make it possible to make the most of the complementarity that exists. 
This involves cooperation among Sahelian countries on the one 
hand, and between inland Sahelian countries and coastal countries on 
the other. 
The legitimacy of a strong 
debate in the context of a highly complex 
problem is highlighted. Notice the use of 
“the meeting,” not “the group”; a 
meeting is one step removed from people 
and the use of this word suggests 
detachment and objectivity. 
 
Tasks to be done are 
immediately noted, further suggesting 
both consensus and practicality. Again, 
it’s the meeting that issues commands. 
 
Future dialogues and 
discussions are announced, the agenda 
set; this suggests continuity rather than 
discord. 
Although the meeting was not overly surprised that a 
consensus could not be reached on the significance of protection 
for development of Sahelian cereals production, participants 
were particularly impressed by the objectivity of the exchange of 
views on such a complex question.  
 
The meeting asked CILSS to identify and analyze 
cereals policy measures that have been taken by Member Countries, 
to disseminate findings and submit conclusions to national 
authorities in order to clarify exchanges of views and guide decision-
makers in their attempts to harmonize cereals policies. The meeting 
further recommended that the study of the role of protection in the 
development of cereals policies should be expanded to cover cereals 
production as a whole, with a view to facilitating the ongoing 
dialogue between Sahelian leaders and donors on this matter. 
In a few strokes, participants are made to feel they have participated in a meaningful discussion, one 
which has moved the agenda forward and which will be followed by precise actions and further discussions.  
 
Participants have in hand a succinct review of all key arguments summarized in a manner that only 
comes with knowledge and long practice. No matter how clumsily the various positions were expressed, they 
come out adding to the pool of shared knowledge. 
 
Last but not least, all members have in hand a balanced report to draw from when they report back to 
headquarters; note should be taken that a draft version of this summary was read at the last sitting of the meeting. 
 
Work to be performed before the next meeting is clear and the ongoing dialogue may continue.  
 
In essence, anyone reading this text will come out with the feeling that money spent on gathering people 
from various countries was a good investment. 





Subsection 4.3 - The syntax of the communiqué 6
 
“The communiqué represents the concrete, public outcome of the confidential debates 
that take place during the annual meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level. At first 
there was a tendency to let the communiqué run on at great length; in time it came to be thought, 
however, that a shorter and more incisive text was more likely to capture media attention and 
interest. The current product represents something of a compromise that will vary from year to 
year. As opposed to what one might think, the communiqué is not an instant product, but the 
result of a lengthy process of preparation. 
 
The draft communiqué is prepared by the Secretariat and distributed to member states 
several weeks before the ministerial meeting. Putting this draft together demands a very subtle 
and balanced approach on the part of senior Secretariat staff, which must assess carefully the 
current status of the various issues that are being put to ministers and the decisions or quasi-
decisions that can reasonably be expected from the meeting. The draft is the subject of 
interminable negotiations among diplomats and experts from member states. Representatives will 
suggest the amendments their country would like to see, knowing perfectly well that they will be 
unacceptable to one or more of the others: they will argue them out first with their colleagues, 
then within the specialized organs, and finally it will be the turn of the permanent representatives 
or ambassadors. 
 
The discussions will carry on for many long days, producing a series of successive 
versions in which differences are gradually eliminated. Little by little, debate will come to focus 
on a few points of divergence, which will vary from one year to the next, and on which 
representatives stick to their positions, under instructions from their authorities, or for that 
matter their head of mission. The end result of this process is an agreed text with alternative 
wordings in square brackets on a few points (the number of which will vary from year to year), 
reflecting the differences of opinion that persist at the end of this first phase. 
 
The second phase takes place on the margins of the Council meeting itself. Ministers' 
personal representatives will huddle together, chaired by the Deputy Secretary General (who is 
assumed to be both completely neutral as well as thoroughly familiar with the subject matter) in 
an effort to find wording that will be acceptable to all. 
 
Any remaining differences are put to the ministers themselves, and they will attempt to 
sort things out during a ministers-only working luncheon hosted by the Secretary General. At this 
point, the ministers’ senior advisors will be set up in a separate room, where they can follow the 
discussion with earphones. They will, of course, be anxious to see whether their ministers have 
had the time to digest the disarming arguments and debating points that their staff will have 
developed and whispered into their ears on the way to the meeting room or the luncheon. In the 
entire history of OECD, there has yet to be a case where this process failed to produce a text that 
could be approved at the final session of the Council. In fact, it can be said to be an absolute 
requirement that, before the ministers and their entourage get on the plane to return home late on 
the second day, a compromise version of the communiqué must have been agreed. 
 
By way of illustration, we refer to the nine-page communiqué that resulted from the 
Ministerial meeting of May 21-22, 1996, a session that was particularly fertile in terms of debate 
and decisions. That communiqué set out the policy directions and the mandate adopted by 
                                                     
6 This section has been translated from Chavranski, 1997, pp.45-48 and is reproduced here with 




ministers for the coming year. It did no more than summarize the issues dealt with during the 
Council since, as the communiqué notes, ministers based their discussion primarily on three 
reports, the first on investment, the second competition, and the third on employment and labour 
standards. 
 
The constants [“The Boilerplate”] 
 
The text of that communiqué may strike the reader as somewhat puzzling and prone to 
gobbledygook. Yet its meaning can for the most part be deciphered by comparing it with 
communiqués from previous years and with the many declarations and statements made by 
ministers to the press during the Council meeting. This of course presupposes some familiarity 
with the way the organization works. Comparing these declarations can help us appreciate the 
intentions of the different parties and, up to a certain point, the meaning that should be given to 
wording that is sometimes ambiguous or vague on points where agreement was particularly 
difficult. 
 
It is interesting to note that many of the formulations we found there showed up a few 
weeks later in the communiqué from the G-7 Summit. The Summit and the OECD Ministerial 
meetings debate much the same issues, and indeed it would be surprising if the positions taken at 
the end of May by the 24 (now 30) OECD countries were not reflected by the G-7 a few weeks 
later, even if the latter gathering takes place at the level of Presidents and Heads of Government. 
The OECD ministerial Council is therefore increasingly seen as a stage in the process of 
consideration leading up to the Summit, as a kind of "trial run" that gives smaller countries not 
attending the summit a chance to make their views known and to inject ideas into the debate. 
 
The text of the communiqué contains self-evident observations that no one would 
contradict, statements of principles underlying the policies pursued (or that should be pursued) 
by governments of all member states and, finally, agreements (or the outline of agreements) that 
have been reached on specific points that were up for debate. On the negative side, the points 
where there was no agreement can also be detected – they will either be left out of the text 
completely, or they will be given wording that can be interpreted in several ways. 
 
The communiqué is clearly too long to comment on in its entirety. We may, however, cite 
a few examples. Some paragraphs are statements of fact (“the strong fundamentals in many 
OECD countries strengthen prospects for better economic growth …high budget deficits and 
public debt remain key problems…unemployment remains unacceptably high…to take advantage 
of these prospects for improved living conditions and progress, individuals, enterprises and 
countries must show themselves capable of rapid adjustment and continuous innovation,” etc.). 
Later paragraphs confirm the principles of action on which there is a general consensus 
(“implementing macroeconomic and structural policies that are mutually reinforcing and that 
will raise growth potential, increase job creation, maintain inflation at a low level and promote 
sustainable development, giving priority to combating unemployment, strengthening structural 
reforms, etc.”). 
 
The Variables [“The Real Meat”] 
 
All of the foregoing is no doubt useful and important to remember, if only to banish any 
idea that these basic principles have been in some way abandoned or modified. But the real 
importance of the communiqué lies elsewhere. In the first place, there is the consideration of 
progress reports on issues where negotiations are under way but not yet completed: this was the 




undertook to reach an agreement by 1997 that would include “high standards of investment 
liberalization and protection and effective dispute settlement procedures and aim at achieving a 
higher level of liberalization” and to “engage in an intensified dialogue with non-member 
countries, in particular those interested in acceding to the MAI.” 
  
This is particularly true for new points that were not at issue in previous years. We can 
give several examples here. The sharp debate over the U.S. Helms-Burton law, which raises the 
issue of extraterritorially enforcing the American embargo on Cuba, might have been expected to 
produce a clear condemnation of unilateralism: in the face of US opposition, however, the final 
wording was cast in a positive if rather convoluted way: “(Ministers) reaffirm the very high 
priority they attach to an effective and dynamic multilateral trading system, in particular by 
…working to strengthen the confidence in and credibility of the multilateral trading system by 
avoiding taking trade and investment measures that would be in contradiction with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules and OECD codes." All delegations were able to take comfort in this 
wording – some, because it showed the question had been explicitly raised and the basic 
principles had been confirmed, others because their policies had not been specifically challenged. 
 
In 1996 the issue of international air transport was raised for the first time (Paragraph 9, 
viii). Ministers committed themselves to “further work for liberalizing, in the interests of all, 
international air transport within bilateral and multilateral frameworks in order to ensure that 
the aviation sector contributes fully to economic development in OECD countries and in the 
world more generally.” 
 
As well, for the first time in a Ministerial communiqué, explicit reference was made (in a 
thoroughly torturous paragraph) to the issue of tax deductibility for bribes paid to foreign 
officials, something that had until that time been limited to internal discussions in which there 
were significant differences of opinion (Paragraph 9, x).  
 
Although one highlight of the 1996 Ministerial was no doubt the arrival of an official and 
quite unexpected application for membership from Russia, Ministers carefully limited themselves 
in the communiqué to supporting further cooperation with that country, without making any 
reference to the specific request received (Paragraph 15, xxi). 
 
Finally, Ministers called on OECD to address issues relating to the setting of priorities in 
a manner consistent with available resources (paragraph 16). The Organization’s 1996 budget 
crisis at least had the merit of provoking some urgent thinking about these issues. It remains to be 
seen whether the special Council meeting that is to deal with this matter will be able to reach 
agreement on the steps to be taken. 
 
These examples show that the annual communiqué is to a large extent a reflection (even 
if this is hardly evident to the casual observer) of the various debates under way at any time 
within the organization, and of the trends they are taking. Rarely will the communiqué reveal any 
abrupt shifts of position – that sort of thing simply does not happen within OECD. As some see it, 
the communiqué is merely a rhetorical exercise intended to persuade public opinion that the 
Organization is moving forward and is adopting a definite policy in the many areas of its 
jurisdiction, even if the wording that is so painstakingly created is promptly forgotten. This is 
surely a pessimistic way of viewing things. For others, every sentence, every phrase, represents a 
commitment, a benchmark, on the basis of which all member states will be expected gradually to 






Sub –section 4.4 - The Syntax of Peer Reviews 
 
Peer reviews are at the core of all documents produced by OECD. They must, at all 
times, embody the high quality of OECD’s drafting capacity. Peer reviews represent a dual 
challenge and thus a most complex balancing act. They must be critical of a country’s activity, 
while fully respecting its culture. One should never lose sight of an important feature of a 
sovereign nation’s capacity to create nuisance issues. Review writers are caught between their 
professional ethics and practical considerations. Following are some tricks of the trade. 
 
The traditions upon which OECD’s respectability is based rest on well-established 
scientific traditions. Thus, everything starts with the establishment of a solid factual foundation. 
Facts, however, are elusive because they often depend on the perspective of those who look at 
them. Over the years, OECD has contributed to the building of rock-solid data-gathering 
mechanisms and truthful national accounts. Not every fact is captured or described by measurable 
data (see earlier discussion), however attempts should be made to make full use of data produced 
by the member country and agreed by it. Any error, misinterpretation, or distortion at this level 
must be corrected in the early stages of informal discussions with the country.  
 
This also applies to the establishment of the factual basis upon which analysis will be 
made. A shared interpretation of facts must be agreed upon early and informally. In this regard, a 
form of scientific humility combined with poise and self-assurance are a must for analysts. Truth 
is elusive, and must be found through persistent, probing, and courteous discussions, not through 
intellectual smugness or doctrinaire argumentation. The establishment of facts is likely to become 
a solid element of the analysis if and when it has been fully agreed upon by all parties. This is 
more likely to happen when facts are based on data and evidence provided by the country itself. 
 
Once this has been achieved, then and only then can the Secretariat proceed with 
formulating its own analysis. The analysis has always clearly been the prerogative and the 
responsibility of the Secretariat. In making the critical analysis of the country’s performance, the 
analyst is confronted with a multitude of choices: what must be underscored without any 
compromise, and what must be dropped. Each case is specific and there exist no hard and fast 
rules to govern this careful selection. To help in the selection of issues, I used the following 
simple structure.  
 
Table of decision for difficult issues 
 Issues that 
are relatively easy to 
raise with the country 
Issues that are difficult to discuss 
Issues that 
must absolutely be 
included in the 
analysis 
To treat with 
usual rigour and 
courtesy. The argument 
must be persuasive, not 
just well put. 
To treat with utmost circumspection. 
Facts must be thoroughly researched using 
appropriate methodology to arrive at impeccable 
conclusions. Language must be guarded, prudent, 
and devoid of any emotional content. Objectivity 
must be obvious, thus care must be taken in 
recognizing achievements by the country before 
entering into criticism. The argument must be 
judged for its capacity to be persuasive.  
Issues that 
are secondary, or 
embellishments 
To treat with 
the same rigour and 
courtesy, but always 













In the metro, there are two rails upon which the train rides: one can walk safely on them, but one 
must beware of the third one, which transports electricity. In an analogous manner, there exist some issues 
that are most politicized in one country. A third-rail issue is immune to objective discussion and is 
generally politically touchy. Third-rail issues are most difficult to deal with, yet, they are often most 
important in the search for economic growth and good governance. What is taboo in one country is 
generally considered open for discussion in others. For example, Japan does not consider immigration a 
solution to its depleting and aging work force. Furthermore, it is not interested in entering into debates 
within OECD about this subject, despite the fact that all other members have more or less adopted such a 
practice as an element of the solution when faced with a similar problem. 
 
Third-rail issues are different from other difficult issues in the sense that there is no hope of 
change in the short term. Japan, to continue on the same example, is facing difficult restructuring of its 
economy, as the 2002 economic survey makes clear. Dealing with weak banks, however, once the pride of 
Japan can be considered and discussed openly. But third-rail items must be given very special treatment; 
which is discussed below. The analysis of the way the economic department of OECD has dealt with those 




Dealing with “Third-Rail” Subjects--A Few Examples 
 
 
Canada and the export of water 
 
In Canada, the idea of selling water in bulk or through diverting large bodies of water is a very 
sensitive issue, one that politicians seldom discuss. Objectively, economists will argue that exporting 
water, especially for a country that owns 40% of the world’s drinkable water resources, is a perfectly 
legitimate issue to consider. 
 
 
In the adjacent paragraph, 
notice the prudence used by OECD 
drafters in raising the issue and in 
constructing a favourable argument for 
the eventual sale of water.  
• At first, a recognized fact 
leads to a recognized cause (1). 
• Followed by an accepted 
solution (2). 
• This leads to a broader and 
more encompassing opening, i.e. 
transferring water rights; notice 
the careful caveat: provided it 
does no harm to the ecosystem… 
This could have been left implicit 
 
“ […] (1) overuse of water, because it is under-priced, 
has become a problem is some regions, despite the abundant 
supply overall. While the government has been endorsing the 
principle of “economic pricing” of water for some time, 
provincial and local government, which are responsible for 
water management, are moving only slowly in this direction 
[…] To bring about more efficient water use, provincial and 
territorial (2) governments should therefore implement the 
principle of “economic pricing,” without delay, (3) while 
making water rights transferable in problem areas (provided 
that does no harm to the ecosystem). This requires substantially 
increased use of water metering, which is still far from 
universal, and the elimination of quantity discounts. Such a 
policy would be consistent with the recent decision to ban bulk 




without any danger, but it was 
essential to placate Canadian 
anxieties (3). 
• In other words, there exist 
overriding non-economic factors 
at play. (4) 
• OECD will only raise, in 
measured and calculated terms, 
the prospect of exporting water 
(5). 
very high implicit social valuation of water. Nonetheless, (5) a 
carefully designed export licensing system might allow Canada 
to reap some benefits from its abundant aggregate water 
resources, while at the same time preventing harmful 
environment effects.” 
(Economic Survey of Canada, 2000 –Policy Brief, p.6-
7, OECD 2000)  
Switzerland and Banking Secrecy 
 
Swiss people look upon their banking system with great pride, and generally view its rigorous 
secrecy as a clear asset for the economy. They are extremely reluctant to introduce measures to make 
it more transparent as a result of foreign pressure. Furthermore, this is a rare occurrence. However, 
reforms about money laundering or tax evasion require everyone’s collaboration. 
 
• Positive aspects are carefully 
noted before entering into the 
argument (1). 
• And things could be improved 
further if…regional government 
interfered less (2). 
• The raison d’être of such 
interference is fully qualified: in 
other words, no reader of the 
Survey could be left in doubt as to 
the good motivation of Swiss local 
governments (3). 
• In the same sentence, an 
advantage for local legislators is 
highlighted: they could achieve 
the same results more 
transparently and with a better 
assessment of the real costs (4). 
• Notice again that something that 
might remain implicit, is made 
explicit, thus reducing any 
possible ambiguity as to the real 
intentions of the OECD; thus 
further placating the country 
representative’s fears or 
susceptibility (5). 
 That being said, Peers and the 
Secretariat remain concerned 
about the effectiveness of changes 
in Swiss legislation and this 
concern is dutifully noted (6).  
“Concerning money laundering, (1) legislation is very 
strict; it relies on the control of four supervisory authorities and 
on self-regulation organizations. Regarding the latter, their 
effectiveness will have to be assessed. The resources of the 
agency that oversees the fight against money laundering in the 
parabanking sector, while having increased, are still limited. 
That said (1) the good overall performance of Swiss financial 
institutions could be improved further (2) if the management 
and credit policy of cantonal banks were less subject to local 
political interference; (3) social and regional policy objectives 
could be achieved (4) more transparently by other means, which 
would allow an assessment of their costs.” 
 
(Economic Survey of Switzerland 2002 – Policy Brief , 





“Another area of concern refers to the preferential 
treatment of foreign investment. As noted in the previous 
Survey, the fiduciary investments made by Swiss banks on 
behalf of their clients in foreign jurisdictions where no 
withholding tax is levied on capital income potentially enables 
these clients (as well as resident taxpayers) to escape taxation on 
that income. Although this would not be different if the 
taxpayers were directly investing in foreign jurisdictions, the 
Swiss bank secrecy (5) – provided no tax fraud has been 
perpetrated – additionally impedes the countries of residence to 
properly tax the capital income under consideration. Since the 
scope of the Swiss withholding tax has been up to now limited 
to Swiss-sourced income (6), there is still a concern on how to 
effectively discourage such tax evasion. This problem was the 
subject of OECD Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
published on 12 April 2000, and which was adopted by all 




Switzerland, are in process of reviewing their laws and practices 
and will report back by the end of 2002.” 
 
(Economic Survey of Switzerland, 2000 – Policy Brief, 
p.3-4. – OECD 2000) 
 
The American Health Insurance Issue 
 
A decade ago, President Clinton tasked his wife with finding a more appropriate Health 
Insurance scheme for Americans. Following a thorough study and a protracted legislative 
negotiation, the idea of universal health insurance was shelved. Since then, political wisdom dictates 
that American politicians stay clear of that issue. It has become a third-rail subject. Increasingly, 
American delegations to OECD have become impatient with the attitude shared among many other 
OECD countries that consider the US a backward country for not having a universal health system.  
 
 
Despite American annoyance, 
OECD considers the issue important 
enough to devote almost two pages (of 
a total of seven) to deal with this 
matter.. 
 
• As customary, the good 
features of the system are fully 
recognized (1). 
• But the downside is quick to 
come. Notice the cool and 
clinical language being used 
(2) . 
• It rests on fully recognized 
facts, based on data that the 
US itself provided. 
Furthermore, it sustains the 
following analysis on solid 
forecast: by 2011, the cost will 
represent 17% of GDP (3). 
• The conclusion is pure 
mastery of the 
economic/diplomatic 
language. Rather than bluntly 
suggesting the US move 
toward universal coverage, 
the drafters emphasized 
“promoting larger risk pools 
at the state and local level” 
(4). 
 
In the end, the respect for 
facts, combined with respect for 
susceptibilities through careful usage 
of the language makes it very difficult 
for the delegation to object further. 
 
[…] (1) The US health-care system is unique in 
the OECD area. It is responsive, adapting quickly to 
changes in consumer preferences. Moreover, most 
Americans are highly satisfied with the care they receive. 
However, (2) despite spending vastly more than other 
Member countries, both per capita and in relation to 
GDP, its relative performance on various measures of 
health status is only about average among OECD 
countries, and there is evidence to suggest that the same 
clinical outcomes could be achieved using fewer 
resources. Furthermore, the US system is the only one 
among the wealthier OECD countries that does not 
provide universal insurance coverage. After broad 
stability relative to national income over most of the 
1990s, (3) health spending has re-accelerated and is 
projected to rise from 14 per cent of GDP today to 17 per 
cent in 2011, just as the ageing of the baby-boom 
generation gets underway. The expansion of managed care 
succeeded temporarily in limiting cost increases, both by 
curbing prices paid to providers and reducing use of 
inpatient hospital care. With providers now exploiting 
more effectively their bargaining power with health plans 
and patients pressing for greater choice of providers and 
treatments, the managed-care approach seems to have 
largely exhausted its cost savings potential. As a result, (3) 
premiums for private health insurance are again rising at 
double-digit rates. Public programs are also facing 
unsustainable cost increases. 
 
[…] Finally, the problem of cost induced 
shrinkage in insurance coverage by firms using the small-
group market should be addressed by promoting larger 





(Policy Brief: Economic Survey of the United 
States, 2002, p.3-5, OECD 2002) 
Table 24 Dealing with “Third-Rail” Subjects--A Few Examples 
 
Forecasting is more than just one additional feature of a solid analysis; it plays a dual 
role. It serves as a test of the analytical ability of the Secretariat staff. It acts as a measure of 
overall competence in a manner analogous to profit in a private company. It is a form of bottom-
line. In the context of third-rail issues, it builds confidence in OECD’s ability to see clearly 
through foggy circumstances. The result is that countries generally seek its advice once they 
decide to deal with one of these most difficult issues.  
 
In conclusion, it is useful to remind ourselves that the OECD process is multiform, and 
valid outputs characterize its work. It may be difficult to draft the perfect Peer Review every time, 
but other outcomes are equally essential. OECD is a learning organization and what participants 
learn about themselves, about their neighbours, and about the best way to do things remains an 
essential and useful outcome. It is also a laboratory for new ideas: many of its discussions act as 
quasi-brainstorming sessions between states to develop new products and new ways to govern 
and to provide services to citizens. In essence, it may be that a country under review will benefit 




 Organization of Meetings: From Workshops and Seminars to 
Committees and Plenary 
 
The OECD technique for managing meetings forms another component of its negotiation 
methodology. The success of meetings in achieving their objectives depends in large measure on 
precise and detailed preparation and careful attention to organizational procedures for each phase 
of the negotiation process. Meetings, whatever form they take (workshops and other technical 
meetings or high level conferences and plenaries) are never improvised. No detail is trivial and 
left to chance. Full consideration is given to various elements that have a direct or indirect 
bearing on the meeting’s outcome. 
 
Subsection 5.1 Expectations and results 
 
The most significant result of the seminar will be to change the way participants view or 
understand a problem. This shared new perception or paradigm shift in fact constitutes a 
significant product. If such change involves managers and decision-makers, and if they have been 
fully engaged in the discussion, the new vision that they will take back to their home institution 
will often be enough to induce major changes in their behaviour, and above all in the policies 
pursued by their ministries or agencies. 
 
Academics and researchers, for their part, generally consider the emergence of new 
knowledge as an acceptable final product, provided it involves publication. Decision-makers, on 
the other hand, will not feel that such an outcome justifies their time commitment, even if it is 
recognized that this could lead to a great many changes: they prefer activities that will help point 
the way to future actions, and perhaps even result in an action plan. This difference of perspective 
as to the outcome of the debate, or as the experts like to call it, the "output," can lead to 





This difference of perspective leads to different ways of addressing problems and 
pursuing solutions. To put it simply, the world of researchers and academics is dominated by "the 
problem," and they spend most of their life in the "problem zone." They will therefore always be 
very circumspect, cautious, and even sceptical about committing themselves to a solution. 
Moreover, they will do so only with rigorous regard for research standards. Intuition plays a role 
in this process, of course, but it will always be subject to verification of any hypotheses. Once a 
solution is found, researchers will generally disengage themselves and move on to a new 
problem. 
 
In contrast, managers generally spend their life in the "solution zone." They will 
generally have attended good universities where they will have learned scientific method, but 
they will be promoted on the basis of their ability to "make things happen" and their reputation 
for "decisiveness." They must be able to transform a "solution" into action promptly -- for 
example, by ensuring that legislation is actually adopted and carried out to the letter. 
 
What is defined as "a problem," then, rarely involves questioning the solution, and is 
scarcely an invitation to innovate: rather, managers will turn to an old and tested inventory of 
practical solutions within which they must choose. 
 
In many cases, the problems that managers deal with are primarily of a scientific nature: 
for example, the fisheries ministry's division of fishery resources will be made up of scientists, 
and their debate will focus on scientific subjects. But this is not always the case, and in many 
ministries managers tend, instead, to be generalists. 
 
This helps us to differentiate the approach of each of the various OECD committees. It is 
common in a seminar to see administrators fidgeting and becoming impatient when the debate 
over the analysis of a problem drags on. They are often more disposed to rely on their own 
experience and intuition to decide what action should be taken, and they are reluctant to question 
the rules and procedures that guide their actions. 
 
Yet the fact is that if a subject is on the OECD agenda, it is precisely because the old 
rules and the old ways of doing things have posed problems. What is needed, then, is to rethink 
the problem, often in terms not previously considered, and to undertake an objective and 
scientific process to find new approaches. To do this, it is recognized research methods that will 
offer the best approach, assuming that managers have the appropriate experience and an in-depth 
understanding of the constraints. 
 
Researchers and decision-makers, then, often work at a rhythm and pace that are totally 
different, and this can be a major problem when a “wise director” is trying to put together the 
agenda and to harmonize debates among representatives of these two broad schools of thought. 
The wise director will often choose to listen to the two sides separately, and to rely on a support 
team to make the difficult transition between the issue as defined by the researchers and the 
solution preferred by the decision-makers. But this is not always possible or even desirable, and 
so seminars must be held where government representatives and experts can work things out 
together. Moreover, it is important to manage the agenda and all available resources, including 
time, in a calculated and harmonized way. 
 
 





A specific strategy for the agenda 
 
The agenda must always be conceived to achieve the maximum of objectives and to 
ensure significant forward movement. Moreover, when a meeting is open to many kinds of 
delegations, it is absolutely critical to prepare a very clear and precise agenda. 
 
The Secretariat will generally have done its work, and a summary of the current state of 
knowledge on the subject will be made available to all participants well before the meeting. It is 
important to go beyond what is already known internationally, by supplementing general 
knowledge with the specific experience of researchers and participants. 
 
Experience shows that any debate will usually involve four distinct moments or points in 
time. Failure to take account of this rhythm often leads to tensions and reduces the prospect that a 





The first item on the agenda should achieve four complementary objectives: 
 
1. This is the most critical moment for clarifying the issues for debate, and for setting limits 
to expectations, to avoid discussions based on unreasonable hopes.  
2. It must help to "warm up" the atmosphere and integrate all participants into the group.  
3. It must also provide a platform for participants to express their values and to make clear 
their field of expertise, from which they will later draw conclusions: in this way, a 
common language can be built.  
4. Consequently, the output from this first moment, which must be as positive as possible, 
makes all participants feel that they belong to the group and ensures a constructive 
approach to the preparation of a consensus. 
 
It is important, then, to introduce the subject properly and to ensure that the first two or 
three interventions set the proper tone and direction for the meeting. 
 
At the outcome of this first session, participants should share “roughly” a common vision 





The second item involves reflection. This is inevitably an iterative process, and may be 
painstaking and torturous. Contradictory ideas will be put forth, either openly or indirectly, and 
sometimes even surreptitiously. Misunderstandings and divergent opinions will inevitably arise, 
and the meeting must try to anticipate and deal with them as successfully as possible. 
 
This difficult moment should be followed by a lengthy break. It should be organized so as 
to facilitate interaction among participants with diverging views. If it is a one-day meeting, the 
lunch hour will provide an opportunity that must not be missed to facilitate the natural 







This should be considered the most productive moment: it is where a consensus (or at 
least a partial one) begins to emerge. The discussions must be pursued in the most positive and 
constructive way possible. It is too late to undertake any new substantive debate, and there will 
not be enough time left to resolve any conflict that emerges at this moment. For example, no 
participant should be put on the spot or have his actions questioned. 
 
All the items on the agenda should be managed so that it will be perfectly clear to all 




This is the moment when the meeting's "productive" output becomes apparent. Here we 
are looking for concrete and practical elements to demonstrate clearly that the seminar is making 
progress. If differences of view persist, as is generally the case, the group will simply take note of 
them: they can then be set aside for subsequent debate. 
 
Subsection 5.3 Time management 
 
The principal resource that participants in a seminar consume is time. It is important, 
then, to have a careful measure of the time available before discussion begins. 
 
For each day of the meeting, there will generally be nine hours available. From this total 
we must subtract the time that will inevitably be taken up by coffee breaks, the time for 
participants to assemble in the meeting room, and the time needed for lunch. 
 
We have no more than about 6 hours, then, for all participants to express their views. 
This also includes the time needed for servicing the meeting (introduction, summaries, 
administrative announcements).  
 
This constitutes an absolute constraint, and one that it is essential to take into account in 
organizing the seminar. The time resource must be used in the most productive way possible, 
taking full account of things that are "inevitable." We must never forget that we are dealing with 
groups from different cultures: in their effort to make their thinking intelligible to everyone, it 
will be difficult to expect them to take shortcuts. This will inevitably have a great impact on the 
time required. 
 
Following are some important items that must be taken into account when it comes to 
time management: 
 
• If a number of participants feel that they have been unable to explain or discuss their 
points of view, especially if they have travelled great distances to attend a meeting, the 
result will be hostility or disappointment. Experience shows that when participants from 
different cultures meet together for the first time on an issue that involves values, 
opinions, new facts, or vital interests, every intervention will last an average of 10 to 13 
minutes. When participants are better acquainted with each other, and especially with the 
subject of the agenda, statements may be kept to 7 to 9 minutes. Finally, when a meeting 
ends on a subject that is thoroughly under control, where the objective is practical and 
concrete, we can expect short interventions averaging 2 to 3 minutes. 
• As a rule of thumb, every participant will take the floor 1.75 times on a major topic. 
Before finalizing the agenda and deciding how long the meeting will take, we must 





There are measures that can help reach objectives while reducing tensions, conflicts, and 
disappointments: 
 
• Documents and the agenda for the meeting should reach participants not less than one 
week in advance. This documentation will be designed to make clear the object of the 
discussion while avoiding any ambiguity. The list of invited guests may contain 
biographical notes if this is perceived as essential for the group. Guests should be 
arranged alphabetically around the table (in order to facilitate the Chair's work) and each 
should have a nameplate that is clearly visible from all directions. These measures will 
reduce the time needed for participants to get to know each other. Participants wishing to 
speak could up-end their nameplate and leave it there until they have finished their 
intervention. In this way, everyone can see how many people have requested the floor. 
Depending on the number, participants will often tailor their interventions accordingly. 
By exercising such restraint, the group accepts co-responsibility for time management.  
• Some participants will have a very precise role that will have been communicated to them 
in advance and discussed with them before the meeting. This applies, for example, to the 
Chair, the rapporteurs, the "topic introducers" the "practitioners," the first two speakers, 
and a "wild card" (see the section on "roles ascribed to participants" in Section 6). The 
two coffee breaks, and the midday meal in particular, should be structured so that they 




Each participant should receive an information package in preparation for the meeting, 
one week in advance. It should contain:  
• A clear and concise statement of the objectives of the seminar.  
• Annotated agenda. 
• List of participants as well as their biographical notes. 
• Basic documentation. 
 
Subsection 5.4 Real cost of an international seminar 
 
A lack of cost awareness unfortunately often leads to lax behaviour in preparing and 
conducting a seminar. What follows is, in our view, the best way to estimate the real cost of an 
event. We may distinguish three kinds of costs: direct costs, hidden direct costs, and indirect 
costs. It is the total of these three categories that will provide the true measure of the resources 
that must be devoted to a meeting, and it is on this basis that we must assess whether the benefits 
are worth the costs. 
 
Direct costs: normally covered by the conference budget 
 
• Professional fees, travel costs and per diem for participants and invited guests.  
• Rental of the meeting room and equipment.  
• Interpretation, secretarial services, photocopying, and communications.  
• Reception expenses. 
 





• Salaries for all participants (delegates and secretariat staff) for each day of the meeting, 
plus travel time.  
• Travel and per diem expenses for every day spent away from the office. 
 
Hidden indirect costs: generally ignored 
 
• Days worked to prepare for the seminar in the Secretariat, in delegations, and in national 
capitals. 
 
The scenario set out in annex one has been based on rather conservative assumptions that 
underestimate, in particular, the considerable overhead costs of public administration. We have 
calculated that a three-day international seminar involving delegates from 30 member countries 
(or associated countries) of OECD will cost at least US$600,000, when all the preparation time 
needed by each of the delegations is taken into account. The amount directly budgeted is at most 
US$80,000. In other words, the submerged portion of this "iceberg" is 6.5 times greater than the 
openly recognized and budgeted cost. 
 
The only conclusion we can draw from such a calculation is that it is important to invest 
all the time and all the effort needed to ensure maximum output from these consultations. In an 
international seminar, nothing is too trivial to be neglected or left to chance. 
 
Subsection 5.5 Managing Workshop Meetings: Room Set-up 
 
There are some fundamental principles that contribute to a successful network such as 
OECD: 
 
$ The president of a committee is no more than a first among peers: all participants are 
equals and should feel as such.  
$ No participants should be left idle: everyone is present to work toward a common 
solution, not to receive orders and/or to adopt a passive attitude. 
$ Participating meaningfully in a group involves more than standing up in turn and 
expressing one’s opinion. It involves eye contact, being aware of body language signals 
and taking action when appropriate, thereby drawing other partners into the discussion. 
$ A true consensus is not the result of passive actors who have been lured into not 
objecting, but the result of a committed group of individuals who have come to design 
and adopt wilfully a common position. 
$ Some room and worktable arrangements are conducive to conflicts and passivity, while 
some arrangements have proven to assist significantly in building up true consensus. 
Experiments carried out by specialized research institutions have demonstrated the 
usefulness of paying great attention to the physical set-ups to increase the probability of a 
successful outcome. It has been observed that most people react to the size of the room 
and its general allure. They notice, for example, the absence of windows or the colour of 
the walls and many other details. The seating arrangements have a significant bearing on 
the outcome of the meeting. For research purposes, an American university randomly 
selected students and had them discussing the same topic in two identical rooms. The 
only difference was that in one of the rooms, all the chairs had their front legs shortened 
by two centimetres. On average, the discussions in that room ended aggressively, 




























For small groups (6-12 participants), this is clearly the 
best arrangement. It explicitly suggests a meeting among peers. 
The round table allows every participant to establish eye contact 
and the chairperson can see who wishes to talk and who should 
be drawn into the discussion. This set-up suggests active 








For practical reasons, it is difficult to 
build or assemble from modules, very large 
round tables. Square, oval and rectangular 
tables are therefore the next best alternative for 
larger groups of 18 to 30 participants. Large 
square tables have the inconveniences of 
leaving out certain participants, particularly 
hose seated on each side of the chairperson. Indeed the latter may not be visible to these 
articipants and/or see them. However, nothing is perfect and one has to manage with whatever is 
ractical. One of the preferred alternatives are the rectangular tables that will sit five to eight 
eople maximum at the head table and between 10 and 15 on each side table. If the side tables 
an be somewhat angled out to form a wide v, or the equivalent of a six-sided table, then we have 
 most desirable arrangement.  
 
The important features are: establishing eye contact between as many participants as 
ossible, including the chairperson; suggesting equality among participants; inducing active 
articipation; and making it as awkward as possible for anyone to become passive.  
 
Hole in the middle 
 
Many people are afraid of emptiness, and the hole in the middle of an arrangement can 
epresent a challenge. Various means are used to fill this hole, for example putting a large flower 
ouquet in the middle. However, one should note that the optical illusion of emptiness is not that 
mportant. The more significant issue remains the distance between people. If participants cannot 
ee each other nor establish eye contact, the group is likely to be less productive. When asked, 
eople will often underestimate the distance between tables where there is a gap and overestimate 
he distance when a table is full. This suggests that the mind fills in the gap and is awed by a flat 
urface.  
 
Empirical tests conducted in United States universities have led to the conclusion that a 
ap does represent a challenge, however, it does induce individuals to communicate more and 
etter rather than less. People seem to want to bridge the gap and reach out across the void. A 
arge but empty flat surface can be intimidating and may induce people to take their distance from 





















It is difficult to run a workshop or a seminar 
with more than 20-24 four active participants in one 
session, including the chairperson. To have an active 
meeting implies that each participant must speak once 
at the very least. A long session leaves no more than 
80 minutes of working time. This is all the time that is left for interventions, after factoring in 
ecessary pauses and the chairperson’s summaries and probing. Each participant will therefore 
ave access to an average of seven and a half minutes of speaking time. This might mean one 
ingle intervention from the participant of seven minutes or two of a little over three minutes. 
uite obviously anything above 24 participants suggests that only a few people will have access 
o the only common resource to be shared, which is time.  
 
However, sometimes more individuals attend the seminar or the meeting than can be 
ccommodated. This situation often happens when national delegations are invited and decide to 
end more delegates than planned for. It is better then to add rows of chairs behind each national 
elegation, thus turning some individuals into passive spectators, than to enlarge artificially a 
orking table to sit everyone around. Delegations may then rotate between sessions or leave 
ome of their delegates as ringsiders for the full duration of the seminar without impairing the 
roup’s capacity to function as a group. 
 
 




The T-square style is favoured in situations demanding command and control. This set-up is often found 
in Russia and Ukraine where it garnishes the office of 
directors and deputy ministers. In this set-up, the leader of the 
meeting sits at the head of the T-square and participants line 
up on each side. The T-square may be useful for a colonel 
issuing marching orders to his officers; however, it is the 
worst manner for conducting a discussion among peers, 
especially in a network made of representatives of sovereign 
nations or international organizations. It pervades the group 
dynamics and impacts on the results of the process in many 
ways. A true consensus may therefore be elusive. 
 




The long narrow table was very 
much of a Cold War device. This set-up 
allowed head to head confrontations and 




factions. Sitting face to face in the middle of the long table, head of delegations discussed pre-
scripted positions that did not involve participation from the underlings who sat in hierarchical 
order on each side of their “leaders.” This set-up has the advantage of sorting out ranks so that 
generals and captains facing each other may be called upon to resolve discreet issues at their own 
levels.  
 
As with the T-square table, this set-up is highly counterproductive when trying to create a 
spirit of collaboration within a network and even worse when the network is composed of various 
sovereign states. Indeed, the long narrow table will lead to tensions and conflicts if used for that 
purpose. The participants sitting face-to-face have a tendency to be combative and easily lose 
sight of all others situated parallel to them. As a result, the group becomes fractious, 
undisciplined, and cantankerous. Furthermore, in this set-up, the chairpersons are seldom able to 
manage traffic, as they cannot see who wishes to talk at the other end of the table. No less 
important, they hardly can stimulate and draw into the discussions those that have opted out and 
remain silent and uninvolved. 
 
 
The classroom  
 




the “teacher” and no one else, and it has the calculated effect 
of shutting out as much as possible any interaction between 
the students. It is, in effect, a favourite for situations 
demanding command and control. One should notice how 
difficult it is to participate in group discussions in this kind of 
set-up. This set-up leads to passive groups in the best of 
circumstances and, since it works against active participation, 
is seldom conducive to problem solving.  
 
 
Opera house and podium 
 
This set-up is another soviet heritage. The opera house is a 
set-up whereby a large group of people are seated in an 
arrangement similar to an opera house, with a long and imposing 
table, positioned above the audience. This set-up is worse than the 
classroom arrangement to induce dialogue and generally stifles 
participation. It requires so much boldness to dare ask a question 
or voice an opinion, that generally the participants hear only 
opinions and concerns expressed by either extremists or by 
disgruntled individuals who believe they should also be sitting on 
he podium. No consensus is to be expected from such a set-up. Any pretence to having reached a 








Cost simulation for a three-day seminar held at OECD 
headquarters (US$) 
 
Typical direct costs   
 Budget Total 
Experts and consultants7 $35,000 plus $6500  
Invited guests8 $3750 plus $6000  
Logistic expenses9 $9600 plus $10,000  
Unexpected reception 
expenses10
$4500 plus $4000  
  $79,300 
Hidden direct costs   
Salaries of delegates11 $135,000  
Salaries for days of travel12 $73,500  
Travel expenses13 $51,000 $259,500 
Hidden indirect costs   
Days worked in capitals and 
in delegations14
$225,000  
Days worked in the 
Secretariat15
$40,000  
  $265,000 
Grand total  $603,800 
                                                     
7 Two experts, at a rate of $700, will have worked 20 days to prepare the working document, to 
which we must add five days devoted to participating in the meeting, or $35,000. In addition to their round-
trip air ticket e.g. $2000 for a trans-Atlantic trip), we must add five days per diem at $250 ($6500). 
8 Three guests from a remote region: five days of per diem ($250 X 3 X 5 = $3700) and travel 
expenses ($2000 X 3 = $6000) 
9 Four interpreters for three days ($800 X 4 X3 = $9600), secretarial and miscellaneous expenses, 
including room rental ($10,000). 
10 A cocktail for all participants, their ambassadors, and a selection of key personnel, or 90 
individuals X $50 = $4500. 
11 The cost figure of $1000 per day for senior officials from OECD member countries seemed to 
us a fairly conservative estimate. It takes into account departmental overhead and the fact that those 
involved in policymaking are always at a fairly senior level. Hence, 1.5 delegates for 30 delegations X 
three days X $1000 = $135,000. 
12 We may distinguish three zones: those who live in Paris (1 X 1.5 X 0), those who live in nearby 
countries and come by train or airplane on the morning of the meeting, and who will travel for a total of no 
more than half a day (6 X 1.5 X 25 days X $1000 = $4500), and finally all those who will have to devote 
two days to travel (23 X 1.5 X 2 X $1000 = $69,000), or a total of $73,500. 
13 (23 X 1.5 X 5 X $250 = $43,125) plus (6 X 1.5 X 3.5 X $250 = $7875) or $51,000 
14 For each major item on the agenda, we estimate that it takes at least 2.5 person-days of work to 
prepare and harmonize each national position, to prepare briefing notes, etc. A three-day seminar is sure to 
contain three major items, and so we must calculate 30 X 3 X 2.5 X $1000 = $225,000. 
15 It is normal for an officer to devote one month to the meeting, to which we must add 10 days 




Chapter : why does it work? 
 
 
Why does OECD work? This remains a perplexing question and many external observers 
are still sceptical. OECD has challenged a number of preconceived ideas regarding the 
management of international affairs. The international system has always been based on the 
sovereignty of nation-states and relations based on national interests. How can the pursuit of 
collective interest overcome these tendencies? How can we explain the survival and success of 
OECD?  
 
Traditional responses, particularly the numerous protectionist measures, which we 
referred to as “mercantilism,” led to the escalation of conflicts in Europe in the first half of the 
20th Century. In addition, armed conflicts became bloodier and more devastating with 
improvements in the art of war and warfare. More than 74 armed conflicts have been recorded 
between 1816 and 1965. Of those, the four deadliest occurred in the 20th Century: the two world 
wars, the Chinese-Japanese war of 1937 and the Korean War. Each has resulted in at least one 
million deaths. In contrast, the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870 resulted in 150,000 deaths. 
(Hobsbawn, p.47) 
 
A new approach was therefore needed to prevent more deadly conflicts. In Chapter 1, we 
describe a number of instruments that were put forward to deal with the situation. However, the 
situation in Europe needed to be addressed in a particular way so it would not overtake the fragile 
balance that was being established. 
 
With the Marshall Plan and the creation of OECE (later OECD), a new alternative was 
proposed that tried to maintain this equilibrium (see Chapter 3). This institutional creation, which 
is unique in its approach to interactions between nations, can be regarded as a “social invention.” 
It will have filled the inter-state institutional void that Homer-Dixon calls “the ingenuity gap.” 
This new invention created in return technological and scientific innovations as well as social and 
political ones that, not only have sustained economic growth of OECD member countries, but 
also contributed to its international expansion. OECD released an explosion of creativity, 
ingenuity, and diversity. It is an invention to deal with this growing complexity of the world.  
 
Section 1  
OECD and complexity 
 
Complexity has taken over our world, posing another great challenge to OECD. A 
number of authors have reflected on this growing complexity. With technology and scientific on-
going progress, human relationships have multiplied and have become more complicated to 
manage. Communication networks have also exploded; our environment is being bombarded by 
information that leaves the great majority of us with an overload of information in our work 
environment as well as in our daily life. Every decision we make concerning, for example, our 
lifestyle or as consumer has become more complicated as we always seem to need more 
information and better organization. 
 
Systems put in place by humans to deal harmoniously with all sorts of interactions, as 
well as with their complexity, also follow this same trend. Political, administrative, and 





What today is called “globalization” is truly the world’s new complexity and is the 
consequence, direct or less direct, of the explosion of innovation in the technological, scientific, 
social, and political fields. The words “complexity” and “globalization” tend to be the flavour of 
the day and are used in any possible occasion. Faced with this complexity, individuals as well as 
societies tend to retract and prefer denial and isolation rather than forcing themselves to face 
changes and risk committing errors. However, this is not an adequate response to the complexity 
as it only delays the ultimate deadline where the challenges of complexity will have to be 
addressed. In order to meet these challenges with wit and delicacy, one has to understand the 
nature of complicated things, the nature of complexity. 
 
Subsection 1.1 The nature of complexity 
  
There are six features that are essential to grasp fully the nature of complexity and complex 
systems (Homer-Dixon, 2001, p. 111-115). 
 
1. “An obvious feature of complex systems is that they are composed of a multiplicity of 
things; they are made up of a large number of entities, components or parts.[…] 
 
2. “There is a dense web of causal connections among the components of complex systems; 
in other words, their components have so many links to each other that they affect each 
other in many ways […] The more causal connections, in general, the greater the system’s 
complexity. A particularly important result of all this dense connectivity is causal feedback, 
in which a change in one component affects others in a way that eventually loops back to 
affect the original component. […] Furthermore, sometimes, components in a highly 
connected system are tightly coupled. This means that a change in one component has 
rapid, multiple effects on other components. 
 
3. “A third feature of complex systems is the interdependence of their components. A good 
way of measuring interdependence is to divide a system into pieces and then see how the 
change affects the property and behaviour of the pieces. The larger the part that can be 
removed from a complex system without affecting the whole system’s behaviour, the more 
resilient the system. 
 
4. “The fourth feature of complex systems is their openness to their outside environment: 
complex systems are not self-contained, but are affected, sometimes profoundly, by outside 
events. As a result, it is often hard to locate a complex system’s boundary – that is where 
the system ends and the outside world starts. […] 
 
5. “Complex systems normally show a high degree of synergy among their components – a 
fifth common feature. Synergy means, in everyday language, that the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts. The combined effect of changes in two or more of a system’s 
components differs from the sum of their individual effects. […] 
 
6. “Complex systems exhibit non-linear behaviour – we can’t count on things developing in 
tidy, straight lines. This means that a system can produce an effect that is not proportional 
to its size: small changes can produce large effects and large changes can produce small 
effects.” 
 





Systems may also become more complex through a process B. Arthur (quoted by Homer-
Dixon, 2001) calls “growth in co-evolutionary diversity.” In a “coevolationary’ system, entities 
that make up the systems (for example, organizations, corporations) start to compete fiercely. 
Over time, the system’s entities can develop webs of interdependence. With the increase of these 
interactions, whether they are competitive, cooperative or symbiotic, “new opportunities” or 
“niches” emerge among the entities. This growing complexity of the system, in the form of 
greater diversity and more intricate webs of interactions, tends to bootstrap itself upward over 
time. With entities providing niches and niches making possible the creation of new entities, the 
system can feed upon itself. Diversity within the system can provide the fuel for further diversity. 
 
If systems become more complex and more diverse, they can also improve. On occasion, 
within the system, a new entity replaces another entity that is more basic or fundamental. This 
change eliminates the niches linked to that more basic entity. Therefore, “the introduction of 
radically new, simple systems can sometimes sweep away complex earlier systems that have 
become encrusted with additions and complications.” The system has changed, it has adapted 
itself, it has simplified. 
 
Diversity and complexity are strongly interrelated. Those societies or groups of 
companies willing to try to adapt and embark on what can be a rocky ride, are generally rewarded 
by a creative explosion generally mixed with growth (economic or other, depending on the nature 
of the entity). Those who will not, or cannot, take on complexity, diversity, and the creation of 
new entities “will remain quiescent indefinitely.” In other words, passiveness or withdrawal in 
front of complexity can result in stagnation or even underdevelopment.   
 
In 1947, the world of European Nations was extraordinarily complicated. In the 
preceding 30 years, all the achievements of the 19th Century had literally evaporated. The list of 
catastrophes is impressive. Treaties among Nations signed in the period prior to 1914 led to the 
First World War; treaties signed in 1918 were incapable of avoiding a subsequent catastrophe. 
Two great wars, that involved two-thirds of humanity, killed 15 million (1914-17), and 50 million 
(1939-45) individuals and destabilized all previous equilibrium. In addition to losing millions of 
people, a large portion of the casualties were productive and trained adults. A substantial 
proportion of fixed capital was also destroyed during 1939-45 (USSR lost 25%, Germany 13%, 
Italy 8%, France 7%, and UK 3%). (Hobsbawn, p.77) A major economic recession (1929-38) of a 
size unheard of expanded throughout the globe. Fascist or communist regimes replaced most 
democratic institutions created during the liberal era of the 19th Century. All the empires created 
in the previous centuries were destabilized and even deconstructed, including Turkey and Russia, 
leading to a period of decolonization and the creation of a large number of new countries. And the 
Society of Nations, created in 1918 to avoid international dislocation, had failed miserably.  
 
In essence, it can be argued that Europe was crumbling under a super dose of complexity. 
It was in dire need of simplification. However, simplification was not enough; the process of a 
massive amount of information was also needed.  
 
Another way of understanding the way complexity affects behaviour and adaptation may 
be found in the concept of “brain size.” For years scientists have argued about the reasons that 
explain the different sizes of brain among primates - chimpanzees, baboons, and humans having 
the largest brains of all mammals. What seems to correlate with brain size is group size (Dunbar 
in Homer Dixon, 2001). If you look at any species of primate (or at every variety of monkey and 
ape) the larger their neocortex is, the larger the average size of the group they live in. Brains 





After the Second World War, it was clear that the number of interactions among nations, 
or the group size, had expanded to a degree that surpassed the existing brain capacity of the 
whole. At the time, our collective brain could not handle the complexity of relations within so 
large and diversified a group. Systems of treaties, as was the usual practice from “times 
immemorial,” defeated the security purpose for which they were initially created. 
 
Simplification had therefore to be combined with a collective and larger brain able to 
handle more complex issues and help the region deal with complicated problems effectively. 
 
 
Subsection 1.3 The creation of OECD: an injection of simplicity and 
intelligence 
 
The creation of OECD (and of course of its particular and distinctive method) was a 
response to the complexity present at the time. It was a simplified response to the complicated 
definition of relations among nations; it offered to deal with the growing complexity of the world. 
With rules as easy to follow as the rules of a game of checkers came the end of secrets, and 
ambiguous, contradictory agreements. The rule of the game became extremely simple: agree by 
consensus to a common agenda and rely on peer pressure to make things work.  
 
OECD also provided a second element essential to the emergence of complexity: a 
mutation in the collective brain size, in other words, the European invented a collective 
instrument for analyzing complex political and economic problems, thus allowing the collectivity 
to deal with them. This mutation injected competence and simplicity in relations more numerous 
and complex.  
 
The first task OECD members were to address (done successfully) was the reduction of 
obstacles to financial transactions. This issue was taken on after it had been established that it was 
a central issue, but also that the tasks in this area would be feasible and would not encounter 
major opposition. But methods that had been previously applied were of no use in this case; a 
new approach had to be taken. 
 
The OECD method has allowed its members to deal with an enormous amount of 
information. This method not only simplifies overall comprehension and discussion of 
information by harmonizing and analyzing, but also manages to find solutions that could be 
practicable and applicable by all. Since there was no need to subscribe to a formal agreement 
(always difficult to reach), the transition (each at its own pace) could be made from a simple and 
easily applicable solution to a more complex set of solutions. Since the 1960s, the mobility of a 
number of things has become less complicated: for example, capital and technology can move 
more freely. This simplification has led to innovation, creativity, diversity, as well as new entities 
(most notably the EU)…and a new complexity.   
 
What is most striking when one examines and tries to understand the OECD method is 
the extraordinary simplicity of the whole mechanism. Let us remind ourselves that we are faced 
with an advanced form of collective intelligence. For the community (or “entity”) to accede to 
this intelligence, or rather to initiate its operation, a few simple rules have to be understood and 






Section two  
Examples of what works and what doesn’t 
 
To fully understand the effect of complexity on policy-making but also the use of the 
OECD method to deal with it, let us now look at three examples of complex issues that the OECD 
deals with or tried to deal with.  
 
The first example examines how OECD handled the health issue. This issue is 
particularly interesting because health systems are complex systems. If examined closely, these 
systems even reveal the six features of complexity. The OECD faced with the complexity of 
health systems developed both a “simplified” and “intelligent” solution, the Health Project. It 
exemplifies the current evolution of OECD, whereby it is often becoming more important to 
collectively understand a problem than to arrive at a negotiated consensus. Countries are not in 
competition with each other with respect to Health Services Delivery. But they can work together 
to learn how to improve the way they deal with this issue and benefit from each other’s 
experience. It is a clear example of the power of intelligence that we reviewed in the preceding 
pages. 
 
The subsequent two examples, the Bribery Convention and the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI), illustrate the way OECD’s method was used to deal with complicated 
issues. The first example shows how the method can lead to success; the second, how it also may 
be overstretched.  
 
Subsection 2.1 OECD and Health: Facing Complexity 
 
Health systems are of crucial importance to OECD member nation economies. In fact, in 
order to flourish as citizens, workers, and consumers, individuals need to be in good health. This 
helps to explain why OECD countries devote an average of 8-10% of their GDP to healthcare 
(see Table 25). Until recently the scale of health policy work at OECD had been relatively small 
and fragmented across several directorates. However, in the last few years, the OECD 
involvement in the health issue has increased in direct response to the greater attention given to 
the costs and impacts of ageing and healthcare financing.  
 
OECD countries have agreed for many years on the importance of collecting data on the 
health systems to compare (or benchmark) their growth and performance. In response, OECD has 
built up the leading international data-set on health system activity, inputs, and expenditure. In 
2000, the Secretariat of OECD proposed a three-year program, the Health Project, to complement 
measurement of the performance of health systems with a series of policy studies to investigate 
the causes of variations in performance across systems, and to identify evidence-based policies to 
improve performance. It covers four main areas: performance measurement and improvement, 
explaining variation in performance, essential ameliorative care, and overall system assessment. 
To launch this project, Canada, as a voluntary contribution, hosted a conference that brought 
together the main players (policymakers, medical staff, health economists, and civil societies) to 
contribute to an international dialogue on health issues. The three-day conference in November 
2001 was entitled “Measuring Up: Improving Health Systems Performance in OECD Countries.” 
 
The Secretary-General of OECD declared that “the OECD Health Project is one of the 
most important undertaken by the organization in recent years […] our aim is a very practical 
one: to help public policymakers meet the health challenges of the 21st Century” (Johnston in the 




issue. In fact, health systems are truly complex systems: Homer-Dixon’s six features of 
complexity can be found in different aspects of the health system. 
 
Multiplicity: multiple health systems, multiple policy challenges 
 
One of the first signs of the complexity of healthcare is the existence of different types of 
health systems in the OECD area. These systems can be based on private or social health 
insurance, private or public provisions, although actual health systems are often a mixture.  
 
However, whatever the type of health system, one major preoccupation in all OECD 
countries remains: to improve the performance of the healthcare system16. Most OECD member 
states seem to face multiple policy challenges in assuring and improving the performance of their 
system. These challenges include the demand for healthcare that has been rising exponentially 
because of new medical techniques, ageing of populations, and increasing public expectations.  
 
Several main topics can be found on the health policy agenda that are now currently 
being examined in the perspective of performance and improvement. There are concerns about 
the efficiency of the health system and containing costs, as well as improving health status (life 
expectancy, mortality, general health), since there are still some strong variations among OECD 
countries in this area (Table 26). The responsiveness of the system as well as the improvement of 
safety or reduction of medical errors also raises concerns in many countries. Finally, although 
average levels of health have risen in OECD countries, concerns remain as to whether inequalities 
in health can be reduced.  
 
The most difficult part of improving health system performance is to put policies into 
action. In this area, there is also complexity: multiple actors are involved in the process. In 
general, successful action will involve changing the behaviour of the actors in the health system. 
However, the aims of the four key sets of actors (consumers, professional providers, managers, 
and governors) may not be the same aims of those trying to influence them. 
 
Causal connection and feedback in the health system 
 
One of the actions taken by some OECD countries to improve the performance of their 
health systems was to address the problem of length of waiting times for elective surgery. For 
example, in recent years, to reduce the waiting time the British Government launched a number 
of initiatives in this area targeted at managers and providers. At first glance, these initiatives met 
with success. However a survey of surgeons conducted by the National Audit Office revealed that 
surgeons would often reshuffle waiting lists so that no patient would wait for a long period. In 
effect, the average waiting time remained the same as before. This is a clear example of feedback 
in a complex system. 
 
Interdependence in health systems  
 
A complex system can also be defined by the interdependence of its components. In 
health systems, when appropriate information and appropriate incentives are not aligned, progress 
toward performance improvements may be disappointing. For example, in France, regulatory 
practice guidelines were introduced to improve health outcomes, to avoid dangerous medical 
practices and to contain costs. However, physicians considered that reducing cost was the only 
                                                     
16 See, « Performance Measurements and Improvements in OECD Health Systems: Overview of 




objective and were against these guidelines. The main principle behind the guidelines was not 
promoted well enough to get the support of the physicians and the public.  
 
This example, as well as the British initiatives in the area of elective surgery, shows that 
it is hard to change the characteristic behaviour or “signature” of health systems, and also that 
elements of the complexity of health systems always emerge when actions are introduced. 
 
Health systems are open and affected by outside events  
 
Policy challenges in the healthcare area are clearly influenced by the outside 
environment. For example, new discoveries in other scientific fields can lead to the development 
of new medical techniques. Although these techniques are welcomed, they are often more 
expensive than the ones they replace. The ageing population has also a direct effect on health 
systems. Older citizens need more healthcare: the over-65 group accounts for 40-50% of 
healthcare spending. 
  
The openness of health systems has been taken into account in the OECD Health Project; 
the project involves contributors from various OECD directorates, including inter alia, social and 




A complex system normally shows a degree of synergy among its components. Logically, 
a health system will only perform well if both clinical decision-makers and managers and 




Finally, health systems also present non-linear behaviour. If we take the example of an 
epidemic, we can see that the treatment of a single patient, who suffers from an infectious 
disease, especially if this disease is deadly, can have a major effect on health systems. Depending 
on the response of the system and the treatment of the patient, the whole system could be lightly 





Many of the difficult issues that arise in the health field concern tradeoffs. They are 
clearly not linear and health policies are constantly challenged by the inherent complexity of the 
entire system as we have just demonstrated. In particular, causal connections and feedback render 
tradeoffs fuzzy in the best of circumstances. Furthermore, the endless changes that characterize 
health compound the difficulty. Like other industrial sectors, technology is constantly changing, 





Total Expenditure on Health, 1980-1998 
 




 1980 1998 
Canada 7.2 9.5 
France  7.4 9.6 
Germany  8.8 10.6 
Hungary (new 
member) 
7.8 (1992) 6.8 
Japan  6.5 7.6 
Poland (new member) 5.3 (1990) 6.4 
Switzerland 6.9 10.4 
United Kingdom  5.7 6.7 
United States  8.9 13.6 
Ukraine * 3 2.96 
Russia ** 4.1 4.56 
Source: OECD 2002 * Human Development Index, ** World Bank 
Table 25 Total Expenditure on Health, 1980-1998 
 
 
Health Status- Life Expectancy 
 
Country (selection) Life expectancy at birth, 1998 
(except Canada, 1997 data) 
 Female  Male 
Canada  81.4 75.8 
France  82.2 74.6 




Japan  84 77.2 
Poland  77.3 68.9 
Switzerland 82.5 76.5 
United Kingdom  79.7 74.8 
United States 79.4 73.9 
Ukraine * 73 62 
Russia * 75 66 
Source: OECD 2001 * Human Development Index 





Subsection 2.2 The Bribery Convention, an unambiguous success story 
 
In 1977, the US congress voted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a law that made it 
illegal for American business to pay bribes to officials in the context of international tenders. This 
act had the immediate effect of putting American companies at a disadvantage when competing 
against other industrial country firms that were in a position to meet local demands for bribes. 
The US Government tried to persuade the United Nations to adopt similar regulations and to 
restore in this fashion American industry competitiveness, but was unsuccessful.  
 
By 1988, the American Congress was prepared to abrogate this law, but President Clinton 
found it hard to go against the position of one of his predecessors. It was then decided to confront 
European countries with it: if they turn it down, then the US would be fully justified to abandon 
its “holier-than-thou” stand.  
 
In 1989, a modest attempt was made by OECD to placate American pressure. An ad Hoc 
Working Group was tasked with dealing with the issue. Many OECD delegates, however, were 
highly sceptical: “ We have laws in each OECD country safeguarding the integrity of our own 
public administrations; why should we try to export our rigor and discipline to non-members? 
Should they not be the ones passing laws in their own country to improve transparency and 
integrity? What if we (OECD members) all refrain from paying bribes and thus allow jobs and 
markets to be taken over by Newly Industrialized Countries?”  
 
In keeping with OECD traditional methodology, the first task of the Working Group was 
to gather comparative data about each member’s national legislation, and to clarify all related 
concepts dealing with offence of corruption committed wholly or partially abroad. In addition, 
many large and wise texts were drafted, dealing essentially with the feasibility of reaching a 
consensus on this issue. Also keeping with OECD tradition was the decision to seek a “soft law” 
instrument, i.e. a recommendation inviting member states to confront bribery with dissuasive 
actions outside of criminal law, to remove any provisions that might facilitate bribery. […]  
 
In 1994, OECD Council adopted at ministerial level a first recommendation to that effect. 
A new mandate was approved for the Working Party: it charged the Group with examining how 
member countries intended to follow the recommendation, studying critical areas for feasible 
further initiatives, and formulating criminal law principles to combat corruption. Properly named 
The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, it was signed in December 1997. It entered into force one year later after Japan, 
Germany, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, as well as a few other countries 
ratified it. By June 2000, 21 signatory countries had deposited their ratifications (Sacerdoti, p. 
41). 
 
It soon appeared that differences in the structure of national criminal codes rendered the 
adoption of a classical international convention impossible. The innovative concept of “functional 
equivalence” helped resolve this conundrum: “Differences would not matter and would be 
admitted, provided they led to equivalent results, namely effective prosecution and sanctions. The 
Group moved ahead, formulated eight “Agreed Common Elements of Criminal Law and Related 
Measures”. By May 1997, it was agreed to act on a Recommendation on Combating Bribery and 
to search for a Convention that was eventually agreed upon in 1997. 
 
It is now in force and the numbers of Peer Reviews that have been initiated testify to 





Why did it succeed? 
 
From the outset, (and still today) Professor Mark Pieth of Basel chaired the Working 
Group. He corresponds to the Maverick Chair profile described in Chapter 4. It could be argued 
that his character fitted the task. A complex blend of vested interests, fears and scepticism even 
cynicism pervaded all debates. Combating bribery is a high moral issue with enormous financial 
and economic consequences. It is also one where the honour of a country is at stake. By 1990, the 
costs of bribes were mounting, but neither firm nor country wanted to be the first (and maybe the 
only one after the US) to forfeit business.  
 
In commenting on his way of chairing the Committee, Professor Pieth admits he is not 
always polite; he may rough-handle delegates who procrastinate or get lost under politically 
correct language; he makes regular and often blunt “suggestions from the Chair” and puts things 
squarely on the table. As a Swiss, he feels his nationality scares few delegates, but this gives him 
freedom from etiquette. Giorgi Sacerdoti, an Italian Professor of Law, equally invested with the 
passion and mission to “make a difference” and improve international codes of behaviour, has 
supported him strategically. Together they have moved the agenda forward significantly. Much 
remains to be done, however, as it is not yet a Standing Committee. Its work cannot benefit from 
the full forces of a well-endowed unit within the OECD Secretariat that could document bribery 
cases and draft in-depth Peer Reviews. The request for the establishment of such a unit does not 
rally consensus; one member still objects. Nevertheless, immense progress has been achieved in 
the relatively short time of less than 15 years.  
 
Tactically, the key to success was twofold. A common language was soon arrived at 
allowing members to get into the real task of searching for a common solution. The construction 
of “functional equivalence” is similar to the concept of Agricultural subsidies indices, ESP, and 
ESC. Once a form of Esperanto has been drafted, participants are free to seek practical solutions 
and may find it harder to pretend otherwise. OECD had resolved a similar problem a few years 
earlier concerning money laundering. The techniques and, most importantly, the sequencing used 
to agree on measures to combat money laundering were copied in order to move this agenda 
forward. In particular, breaking down a large problem into smaller discreet issues, and resolving 
them one at a time, proved to be an essential way to deal with a protracted and complex problem 
such as this one. 
 
Second, the environment changed. In France, Germany, Italy, and UK, many scandals 
erupted to the consternation of governments and became the focus of public attention. In addition, 
the failure of Eastern Europe to control exportation of its internal corruption added pressure on 
everyone. By 1994, the International Chamber of Commerce and other NGOs such as 
Transparency International started pushing toward improvements. By then, the passive resistance 
that had characterized the complacent attitude of a number of delegates changed for the better. 
Everyone realized it was time to act, and if all acted in unison, then chances were that such an 
initiative could succeed.  
 
The American Government, sensing this, decided to mount “Peer Pressure” against all 
resistance. This will serve as a good example of how this typical OECD policy instrument can be 
put to work. Off the record interviews with former colleagues revealed for example that the US 
Secretary of State at the time, Madeleine Albright, sent strong instructions to all American 
Ambassadors in OECD countries, inciting them to raise this issue in forceful terms at every 




Affairs, Allan Larson, even wrote an article in the prestigious German magazine “Der Spiegel” 
suggesting his German counterpart was condoning corruption. 
 
In essence, this is a remarkable example of an OECD achievement. Its success rests 
essentially on all the methods described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5: the use of peer pressure, the 
dedicated pursuit of consensus, and the usage of a variety of tools and skills. Together these 
methods allow a complex objective to be reached gradually in a ratchet-like fashion. 
 
When asked about a significant anecdote concerning his 14-year experience as Chair of 
the Working Party, Professor Pieth recalled the following haunting and enlightening story. “A 
few years back, I was invited to deliver a speech at the prestigious IFRI 17 breakfast. A man 
approached me afterward and said: “I am number two at Dassau and as such I am an arms 
salesman. You will become a hero because you have pushed down the commission we have to 
pay from 25% to 11%”…! This enigmatic statement can be interpreted various ways. Taking into 
consideration that the arms sales represent on average about US$30 billion, it follows that the 
amount of hidden money in the hands of corrupt officials may have been reduced from US$7.5 
billion to 3.3. This is a significant achievement. One may feel cynical, however, and focus on the 
remaining 11%.”  
 
Either way one looks at it, the Bribery Convention is a clear example of how OECD can 
influence policy in its member states and even beyond its membership. We have already 
described similar achievements concerning agricultural subsidies (see Chapter 3) and the 
improvement of national accounts (see Chapter 2). Many other such stories endow the history of 
the Organization.  
 
Subsection 3.3 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), A bridge 
too far… 
 
In May 1995, according to a report presented to OECD Council meeting at Ministerial 
Level: “The time [was] ripe to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) in the 
OECD […] an agreement [was] needed to respond to the dramatic growth and transformation of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) which has been spurred by widespread liberalization and 
increasing competition for investment capital.”18 Work on the multilateral agreement on 
investment had been conducted in OECD since 1991, by the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and by the Committee on Capital Movements 
and Invisible Transactions (CMIT). In 1994, five working groups composed of independent 
governmental experts were set up to explore the issues to be dealt with in this agreement, and 
undertook technical and analytical work. A year later the Council agreed to start negotiations in 
OECD of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).  
 
Negotiations began in September 1995. All OECD member countries at that time, plus 
the Commission of the European Communities, took part in them. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong 
Kong, and China also participated as observers, and this from an early stage. Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic later joined as observers. The MAI proposal was built around 
three main pillars: investment liberalization obligations (including the codification of existing 
                                                     
17 IFRI gathers top executives from French industries once a month for a breakfast discussion with 
a well-informed and often-prestigious guest. 




liberalization measures and new disciplines or “special topics”), investment protection, and 
dispute settlement.19
 
Rapid progress was made in the area of investment protection. There was broad 
agreement that the MAI should provide comprehensive coverage through a broad definition of 
investors and investments. The Negotiation Group first worked toward the objective of reaching 
an agreement by spring 1997. However, in 1997 the Negotiation Group recognized that more 
work was needed to realize the set goals. In addition, civil society had become concerned by the 
negotiations and many NGOs denounced the “secrecy” surrounding them.  
 
In the beginning of 1998, an agreement was reached on a number of essential elements. 
They included a broad asset-based definition of investment covering foreign direct investment 
with MAI disciplines to apply to all economic sectors, and at all levels of government. The group 
also agreed to non-discriminatory treatment of investors and investments, and to certain elements 
of a dispute settlement mechanism for state-state and investor-state disputes.20 Agreements on 
main political issues remained to be found. A broad, though not unanimous, support had emerged 
concerning labour and environmental issues. In fact, some of the strongest concerns expressed 
about the MAI had been raised by environmental NGOs.  
 
Discussions were also needed to determine the treatment of intellectual property and of 
exceptions with respect to national security and public order. In addition, no agreement could be 
reached regarding measures taken in the context of a regional economic integration organization 
and in the areas of culture, subsidies, health, social services, and aboriginal and minorities issues. 
Finally, the importance of an effective dispute settlement mechanism also remained a central 
issue and generated many discussions; a number of delegations still had strong concerns 
particularly in the area of investor-state dispute settlement. 
 
 Even though there had been progress, negotiations could not be concluded by April 1998 
as scheduled. In May 1998, negotiations were suspended for six months, for “a period of 
assessment and further consultation between the negotiating parties with interested parts of their 
societies [… and of] active public discussions on the issues at stake in the negotiations”.21 In 
October 1998, France officially pulled out of the negotiations; many countries followed and 
withdrew their support. Negotiations ceased in December 1998. 
 
Why did it fail? 
 
Interviews with OECD officers reveal two complementary reasons that might explain this 
failure. First and foremost, the desire to reach a “binding treaty with a dispute settlement 
mechanism” while retaining a very high standard, created undue pressure on participants. As we 
explained earlier, reaching a high standard consensus is already an arduous task. It is rendered 
possible because states know they will be allowed the necessary time and adaptations to reach 
these new standards; peer reviews and peer pressure will gradually push each of them toward the 
collective goal; member states will not be penalized as they move along. However, the 
introduction of a dispute mechanism that is likely to sanction delinquent states, incites members 
to agree to less stringent conditions, or to attain the lowest common denominator. This was a 
unique challenge within OECD and it did not seem to fit with the tools available within this 
organization.  
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The obligation to reach a binding agreement on a very complex and contentious subject 
raised the visibility of the negotiating process at a time when the anti-globalization lobby was 
emerging as a force to contend with. Ministers attended negotiating sessions, compelled by their 
press and their electorate to take positions and be seen as fighting hard to protect national vested 
interests. This further reduced the ability of OECD to deal with these difficult negotiations. The 
involvement of the media in this complex process generated a problem for OECD by putting the 
organization at a disadvantage as preferred outcomes are generally based on subdued discussions, 
on scientific (and subtle) evidence, and patient negotiations between “happy accomplice” public 
servants. The western media, forever in search of news with “solid entertainment value,” tend to 
trivialize complex issues or polarize debates to make them more lively and interesting to the 
viewer, or to the reader. In that sense, there is an interesting case to be made about keeping 
OECD away from the limelight and to retain the mundane and uninteresting character of its 
negotiation process. 
 
Subsection 3.4 The Club du Sahel; A unique experiment 
 
In 1973, over 200,000 people died as a result of severe drought conditions that affected 
the West African region of the Sahel from Cape Verde to Chad. A massive combined effort by 
various donors was launched to save starving populations stranded in remote areas of the Sahel. 
 
The Sahelian governments decided to create CILSS (Comité Inter-États de Lutte contre la 
Sécheresse au Sahel) in December 1973 to try to extend the spontaneous (and somewhat 
unexpected) emergency assistance into long-term development assistance. The countries 
concerned included Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mali, 
Niger and Senegal. Their message was that they wanted help to build the means necessary to 
avoid any recurrent crisis such as this one, and support to ensure their food security and to fight 
desertification. As part of this initiative they quickly compiled a wish list of project proposals 
that, it was hoped, would attract a substantial inflow of aid support.  
 
Aid agencies were profoundly sceptical. As much as they wanted to help, they had doubts 
about the quality of those projects and about the policies sustaining those programs. Many 
believed that the food pricing mechanisms were awry, resulting in increased desertification when 
compounded by uncontrolled cattle breeding. Some experts were so pessimistic that they bluntly 
recommended against further aid to the region, which could have forced its population to migrate 
to better-endowed lands further south in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Guinea. Repeated 
donor "pledging sessions" held in 1974 and 1975 led nowhere.  
 
Subsequently, the President of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, Maurice 
Williams, suggested the creation of a "Club des amis du Sahel" as a friendly donor consortium 
intent on providing policy advice and support to the region. As it happened, circumstances in the 
United States became suddenly propitious for aid to Sahelian Africa. For one thing, the transition 
from the acrimonious Gaullist era opened up a window of opportunity for US cooperation with 
France in development assistance. For another, an increasingly articulate Black Caucus in the US 
Congress was demanding enhanced commitments toward African development as their litmus test 
for a foreign policy they could support politically. They spoke of "a contract of a generation" (a 
20 year span) of development cooperation with Sahelian populations. US aid to the Sahel was 
now given a special line item in the US budget, with a proviso that disbursement would be strictly 
conditional on the establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure the sound management 





The initial response of Sahelian governments was negative. There was concern that the 
creation of a donor-based coordination mechanism would compromise their ability to determine 
their own policy agenda over the long term.  
 
The deadlock was broken when Canada suggested the inclusion of Sahelian governments 
into the proposed coordinating mechanism. The President of CIDA, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, delivered 
a speech in Dakar in December 1975 in which he said: "this Club is for all concerned parties, 
yourselves first and foremost as well as for your friends, the various donors. Let's speak in the 
future about a "Club du Sahel". 8 This rallied the Sahelian countries around the first-ever 
combined consortium mechanism involving recipients and donors in a cooperative regional 
development initiative. This consortium mechanism was meant to test a new and different 
modality for aid coordination and policy discourse. To be sure, OECD was (and is) neither a 
funding nor a program delivery agency; nevertheless, the bilateral donors invited OECD to make 
an exception and to take upon itself the management of this exceptional initiative. The 2003 
members of the Club are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
In May 1977, Ottawa hosted the first conference of the Club du Sahel. The conference 
witnessed the launching of a large and well-coordinated plan of action, composed of a series of 
projects to rehabilitate the region and to build its agriculture and environment. Of even greater 
significance, the Ottawa conference witnessed the first policy dialogue between donors and 
African governments. In typical OECD tradition, the policy discourse was open, candid, and 
forthrightly reciprocal: donors insisted on reform and liberalization of agricultural policies, while 
the Sahelians responded that they needed demonstration of the advantages of this approach with 
well-documented case studies. The Sahelians also countered that donor government restrictions 
on aid to support recurrent costs, which at that time was not allowed under existing aid 
definitions, made it impossible for very poor countries to undertake the massive infrastructure 
investment needed without some flexibility in this regard. 
  
This dialogue engendered the first research work plan for the Club du Sahel. In two early 
studies, an American economist, Elliott Berg, submitted a cogent and devastating report on 
Sahelian food policies, while a Canadian scholar, André Martens, formulated the first conceptual 
approach to sustainable projects and the means to deal with the problem of recurring costs.  
 
How did it work? 
 
 
Aid agencies are compelled to follow objectives of their own national policy, which often 
creates confusion and induces a lack of coordination between them and their partners. This has 
plagued aid delivery for decades, and various methods have been tried to circumvent this 
tendency or to reduce its ill effects. In the mid 1970s, the Club du Sahel was formed because 
donors recognized the immensity and the complexity of the environmental problem that 
challenged a suffering population spread over seven countries (later enlarged to nine). It was 
understood that resolving such a problem required sound policies and a general plan of action 
could be designed, agreed upon, and implemented. As an experiment, donors and recipients asked 
OECD to manage such a policy coordination process. To achieve the desired synergy among 
various partners, the Club applied OECD's own specific methods that had proven effective in 
promoting policy consensus.  
 
After 20 years of operation, the Club du Sahel’s effectiveness and modus operandi have 




of the OECD model for negotiating policies, and undertaking large, complex, and long-term 
financial commitments. This unique initiative in international and regional development 
cooperation is today judged a groundbreaking success. Its proponents make the case that this 
model could be emulated in other areas where major international challenges require 
collaboration, sound planning, and the combined efforts of donors and regional governments. In 
many ways, parallels may be drawn between that particular experience and the rehabilitation of 
the Dnieper River Basin: they both require massive efforts, sound policies, a well understood plan 
of action, and remarkable cooperation based on true confidence between many different partners, 
including the riparian governments, foreign donors, and local institutions and stakeholders. In 
this, the experience undergone in 1976 to deal with the complex environmental problems of the 
Sahel using the OECD method provides interesting insights and useful lessons.  
 
Despite the scepticism of many, this cooperative club arrangement stood the test of time. 
Over the years that followed, the policy dialogue, which itself was based on the OECD method, 
built up the confidence of donor agencies in the capacity of the Sahelian countries to coordinate 
and to manage their development agenda. Conversely, the self-esteem of Sahelian Governments 
grew along with the acquired confidence in their new development partners, western aid agencies. 
As a consequence, aid volumes grew despite the absence of any geo-strategic or even commercial 
significance to the Sahelian region. By 1980, more than US$1 billion was disbursed annually in 
the Sahel, growing to more than US$2 billion at the end of that decade, astounding pessimists and 
naysayers.  
 
The consequences for the Sahelian societies themselves were no less astounding. 
Significant progress was made at a country and regional level to sustain food availability despite 
tremendous ecological and human challenges. For fifteen of the past twenty years the Sahel has 
received below average rainfall; a major drought struck the region in 1985, to a degree far worse 
than the devastating drought of 1973. Donors responded with a large-scale and well-coordinated 
emergency food aid effort and starvation was averted. By 1997, food aid accounted for a small 
fraction of total food availability. The Sahel is no longer food-dependent on donors, despite a 
doubling of its population during the past two decades (from 23 to 46 million). Cities have 
expanded almost tenfold during this time, and yet these societies have been by and large free 
from conflict. Critical social and technological changes have taken place, and there are 
indications of incipient political changes. Environmental policies designed to combat 
desertification in this region were endorsed for their relevance at the global level by the 1992 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment. The Sahelian countries have weathered adversity and are 





The OECD method has proven to work through a great variety of successes. We have 
given various examples throughout this text. Hopefully other researchers will look into this matter 
and find many more success stories. Upon closer analysis, it is not as surprising as it seems. True 
enough, the OECD model differs significantly from other better-known management methods, as 
they are common among Multinational Organizations. But it works well and is clearly 
accountable for a significant number of positive changes in its Members’ governance. 
 
Here are a few other characteristics that are worth mentioning as they further explain why this 





• Stove piping is broken. In many instances relations between ministries did not exist 
before OECD convenes a multisectoral meeting (also referred to as horizontal). This 
creates cognitive bridges that allow surmounting structural dysfunctionalities in 
governments. These cognitive bridges function through the use of data gathering, 
analysis, and through the accumulation of “best practices/promising practices.” 
 
• It works because it is less dogmatic and more pragmatic than most other models. For 
instance, OECD economists and specialists constantly refer to “the standards of the 
profession,” meaning that they keep abreast of any new development in their respective 
field of expertise. One might argue that the basic economic outlook resembles that of the 
World Bank and of the IMF. Economists in Washington and Paris are constantly in touch 
with each other, and they read the same books. But OECD experts have a difficult day 
when they try to change governance principles in their constituency. They meet with 
pugnacious representatives from member states. They are forced to document empirically 
and practically the wisdom of their point of view before it is generally accepted. 
Furthermore, each prescription must be tailored to each and every member’s traditions, 
culture, and habits. In Chapter 4, we have explained the manner by which they manage to 
gradually move the agenda forward while respecting local susceptibilities. 
 
• Last but not least, OECD is a powerhouse for innovations at various levels. A number of 
powerful ideas were born in its midst. Sometimes these ideas became associated with 
OECD, but often they were allowed to be born there but were popularized elsewhere. We 
have alluded to the fact that the idea of tackling the difficult and practical issue of coal 
and iron was first discussed within OECD. From there, it blossomed and eventually gave 
birth to the related and extremely powerful idea of a European Community. It is another 
little known fact that environmental concepts such as “Polluter-Pays-Principle,” or the 
notion of sustainable development, were first discussed within OECD. New methods and 
tools, such as the concepts of Purchasing Power Parity, or Agriculture Subsidy-
Equivalent have allowed discussions and negotiations to move ahead when they were 
stalled.  
 
• In the end, cost sharing principles are the litmus test and the proof that members believe 
in it. It is a real measure of their commitment to it. States that want to change and 
improve must be prepared to pay the price for it. Two measures ensure the strength of a 
true network: sharing costs and benefits among all members and a real commitment from 
every actor in the system. This includes member states, the secretariat, committee chairs, 










The NASA Dilemma 
 
In 1986, the Challenger space shuttle, carrying seven astronauts and commissions 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, exploded on take-off. It was shown that the accident was 
predictable and therefore avoidable. The cause of the tragedy was the O-ring: NASA employees 
had identified the defect, but no preventive measures had been taken. The authorities decided 
that the launch should not be delayed. The dilemma seemed insoluble: if NASA delayed the 
launch to replace the defective joints, everyone would know exactly how much the delay had 
cost, but it would be impossible to prove how many lives and how much money had been saved 
because the precaution would have destroyed all proof that there had been cause for worry 
(Guilmette, 1995, p.6). 
 
Table 27 The NASA Dilemma 
 
In Chapter 1, we highlighted the fundamentally conflicting preventive nature of the 
cooperation paradigm. Considering the Challenger example, to anticipate an aborted crisis or 
conflict is a process by which, to the extent that it is successful, will usually obscure the proof of 
its own success. This metaphor will help us appreciate the inherent difficulty involved in 
undertaking and maintaining interest in a lengthy, tedious, and costly process that was intended to 
help prevent conflicts through economic growth and increased trade among nations. To the extent 
that OECD’s work is aimed at preventing new economic and political crises, it will always be 
difficult to appreciate its full value. Who can say with certainty how many crises, or possibly 
wars, may have been avoided as a result of its persistent work over the last 55 years? Who can 
deny that there has been such an impact? 
 
There are a few questions that I wish to share: 
 
• What of the future of OECD? Members are currently confronted with a real challenge as 
many countries graduate into the group of so-called industrial economies, and are anxious 
to join the select brotherhood of rich democracies. As we have seen, the governing rules 
of OECD are numerous, subtle, and demanding. Time is required before a new player can 
master them and participate meaningfully in the rule of consensus. In addition, more 
participants increase the overall complexity of negotiations. Essential eye-to-eye contacts 
and familiarization with other cultural contexts are an essential component of progress. 
What is difficult to forecast, because there exists no empirical evidence, is when a group 
becomes too large to benefit from the OECD way of doing things.  
• If that is so, what other scenarios can be envisaged? Should the OECD or its members 
invest time and resources helping other regions create their own OECD, in a manner 
analogous to the way the World Bank concept gave rise to other regional development 
Banks, such as the Asian, the Inter-American, and African banks? One could even 
envisage that these networks could come together to negotiate intra-network issues of 
concern for the entire group. 
• What is the right time to start up? We have seen that the circumstances that surrounded 
the creation of OECD were historically special: European countries were in dire need of a 




about it. Furthermore, the American Government was at its very best, so to speak. The 
US has a history of interspersing isolationist cycles with expansionist foreign policy. The 
Second World War marked an era when the US had self-confidence, felt it could afford to 
be generous, and acted in a most enlightened manner. Its consistency and determination 
to assist European countries was a determining factor in the build-up of OECD. Those 
were exceptional circumstances that cannot be duplicated. Analogous circumstances may 
exist however. 
• Can this experience be tried in a smaller dimension? This is the hypothesis we started 
with; the resolution of problems related to the clean-up of the Dnieper River Basin, 
involving three nations and possibly a number of donor and partner organizations, 
seemed a promising testing ground for such a hypothesis. Maybe other groups of 
countries will be inspired by the method and use it to pursue common goals. 
• What are the most effective development policies? This was the key question that OECE 
members attempted to address in 1947. This probing interrogation is still at the forefront 
of debates within the OECD. Much of the Development Assistance Committee’s agenda 
deals with the best way to induce development in poor countries. Maybe the time has 
come to invest more in spending and more time listening than designing responses to this 
haunting question. 
• What are the drifts and counterweights that keep Eastern European and African societies 
in balance? Those are not well known and research that would provide empirical 
evidence is lacking. In the absence of this knowledge, it is difficult to inspire relevant 
development strategies and embark into multicultural negotiations. Development 
cooperation would greatly benefit from building its doctrine, plans, and priorities from 
empirical evidence and research conducted by those ;who will always be accountable for 
the end results, the beneficiaries of the aid. 
• How can profoundly divergent paradigms be introduced, such as win-win negotiations in 
new social and political environments? The win-win approach to negotiation was 
anchored at first in the private sector. In effect, how does one know it will benefit from 
such a different way of dealing with divergent interests? Profits at year-end provide a 
clear answer to that question; however, bureaucracies do not have any similar type of 
overall and immediate performance indicators. In the 1970s, training consultants and 
management specialists were the vector for transferring this idea. What’s to be done in 
Ukraine or Russia where private sector traditions do not exist and where any idea that 
comes from it is treated with suspicion by civil servants? This is going to be a most 
difficult challenge for OECD partners, if and when former Soviet countries become 
members of the Organization. 
 
In this book, I have tried to demonstrate the nature and extent of commitment on the part 
of OECD members. It is my belief that OECD is directly accountable for a large quantity of 
positive changes in its members’ governance, enough to have helped sustain growth, distribute 
wealth within its population, and establish generally sound policies. We hope readers will now 
take a second look at this extraordinary organization the next time they hear on the news: “OECD 













Defines the qualitative outcome of a discussion or 
negotiation. The participants not only agree with the 
recommendations/decisions of the meeting, but also modify the 
way they view or understand the problem, take this new vision 
back to their domestic institutions, and start to behave differently 
upon return to their home country. It is content driven as opposed 
to formal rights and rituals.  
AGENDA An annotated well-structured summary, featuring the key 
points of the discussion, which serves as the indicator or 
guidelines for all members of the meeting: help them to prepare 
themselves for the discussion and keep their focus on the main 
issues in order to achieve the maximum of planned objectives and 
ensure movement forward.   
 
AID, ASSISTANCE The words "aid" and "assistance" refer to financial flows 
that qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official 
Aid (OA). See the definition of ODA. 
ANGLO-SAXON 
CHARACTER 
Historically cultivated type of organizational behaviour 
applied within OECD. It refers to understanding and following the 
unwritten rules within the organization (the OECD’s “etiquette”), 
use of the gentlemen’s agreements and unwritten conventions, 
implementation of the primary commitments of States and use of 
the juridical system traits based on jurisprudence or case law (such 
as English law). 
APPROPRIATION Making use of ideas, concepts, techniques, or 
technologies that are being transferred to developing countries 
through technical assistance or capital projects.  
Also an allocation of money that has been set aside from 




The process by which individuals, organizations, 
institutions, and societies develop abilities (individually and 
collectively) to perform functions, solve problems, and set and 
achieve objectives. It is a powerful combination of people, 
institutions, and practices that permits countries to achieve their 
development goals. 
Capacity building is the development of an organization’s 
core skills and capabilities, such as leadership, management, 
finance and fundraising, programs and evaluation, to build the 
organization’s effectiveness and sustainability. It is the process of 
assisting an individual or group to identify and address issues and 
gain insights, knowledge, and experience needed to solve 
problems and implement change. Capacity building is facilitated 
through the provision of technical support activities, including 
coaching, training, specific technical assistance, and resource 
networking. 
 
The expression came into vogue in the early 1990s 





Bank and UNDP. 
CASE LAW Making use of ideas, concepts, techniques or 
technologies that are being transferred to developing countries 
through technical assistance or capital projects.  
“CHECKS AND 
BALANCE” SYSTEMS 
A mechanism used to prevent the infringement of the 
American political system, which is based on the principle of 
separation of powers (legislative, executive, and judicial), from 
excess influence by either of the other branches.  
“CHESS” STRATEGY The objective is to capture, and kill the rival king. The 
supreme goal is to eliminate the opposing side and to destroy the 
king and rivals; alliances form an integral part of the game 
strategy. There is no ambiguity in purpose, values, or ends, which 
gives the image of the centralized state, of duelling and 
tournaments.  
CLUB OF ROME A global think tank and a centre of innovation and 
initiative with the mission to act as a global catalyst of change that 
is free of any political, ideological, or business interest. This 
powerful NGO brings together scientists, economists, 
businessmen, international senior civil servants, heads of state and 
former heads of state, who are convinced that each of us can 
contribute to the improvement of our societies. Club of Rome 
seeks solutions to what it calls the world problematique - the 
complex set of the most crucial problems – political, social, 
economic, technological, environmental, psychological and 
cultural - facing humanity.  
http://www.clubofrome.org/ 
COMECON (1950 – 
1990)  




The Soviet analogue to the network on international 
level, which was created for the purpose of regrouping of Eastern 
and Central European economies under the Soviet regime. Its 
members included Albania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany 
(GDR), Hungary, the USSR, Poland and Romania. 
One of the main aims of the Comecon was to promote, in 
the context of the western embargo, mutual economic co-operation 
and arrange trade between the former Communist countries. In 
practice it benefited the Soviet Union more than the other 
countries. Oil was traded at an artificially low price but so were 
the products of the other members.  
As an economic community its main defect was that there 
was no market. Investment decisions were made using non-
economic criteria. (e.g. Czechoslovakia specialized in streetcars, 
Hungary in buses, Poland in trucks. The result tended to be one 
huge factory, which was always inefficient in comparison to a 




CAP was established in the 1960s to secure Europe's food 
supply and to stabilize prices for the benefit of both producers and 
consumers. CAP encouraged a constant supply of home-produced 
food by providing farm price supports. The policy was set up 
against a backdrop of food shortages and rations following World 
War II, and had five founding aims: increased productivity, a fair 
standard of living for farmers, stable markets, regular food 
supplies, and reasonable prices for consumers. It was based on 
three principles: a single market in farm products with common 
prices and free movement of agricultural goods within the 





Although spending on CAP has been reduced in recent years, it 
still consumes almost half the EU budget and represents one of its 
biggest policy concerns. With forthcoming accession of countries 
like Poland and its expanse of poor rural areas, there is a question 
of how to adapt CAP to the conditions of an enlarged Europe. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/capreform/
COMMUNIQUE An official, concrete public announcement or bulletin, 
which summarizes the outcome of the confidential debates and the 
issues dealt with during meetings at the Ministerial level. The text 
contains self-evident observations, statements of principles 
underlying the policies pursued by governments, and agreements 
reached on specific points. It is aimed at the general public. 
CONFIDENCE A concept defined as the confidence in one’s society, 
self-esteem, openness of mind, tolerance of others and of new 
ideas, accountability for one’s actions, responsibility, confidence 
in the value of science and technical inventiveness, acceptance of 
diffusion of one’s culture. It is a generic term that refers to a 
general attitude toward things that seem foreign. 
CONNECTIVITY Refers to the free flow of ideas and goods (material 
products, cultural artifacts, books), which occurs as a result of 
both increased confidence and its driving force. Without 
connectivity, ideas cannot circulate and do their important job as 
leavening agents. Electronic networks, such as Internet, radio and 
television, trade activities may serve as the examples of such 
infrastructure for the end of the 20th Century. The other important 
aspect of connectivity is the development of fast and flexible 
means of transportation through complex communication 
infrastructure (roads, airports, railroads, ports).  
CONSENSUS A process of reconciliation of the diverse opinions, 
values and preferences used in OECD to build a sustainable 
agreement in the course of negotiations. It requires the agreements 
of all members for the proposal to be accepted. It is reached 
through the implementation of iterative peer review and peer 
pressure techniques, the application of common standards, well-
structured meetings, and transparent processes.  
COOPERATIVE 
PARADIGM 
A new pattern of cooperative international relations 
emerged after the Second World War, involving countries of 
Western Europe and North America, which resulted in the 
formation of OECD, EU, and NATO. Characterized by synergetic 
partnering among the countries, increased international 
cooperation, heightened levels of confidence and connectivity, 
free flow of information distributed through the pool of networks, 
and enhanced quality standards, which yields economies of scope 
and scale for creativity and boosts economic and technological 
innovation.  
COUNTERWEIGHTS Culturally specific values (as opposed to weights), often 
linked to legal or quasi-legal requirements, which compensate for 





CULTURE Information (skills, values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
motives) capable of effecting individual behaviour, which they 
acquire from others by teaching, imitation, and other forms of 
social learning. Culture, as a body of learned behaviours common 
to a given human society, acts like a template (i.e. it has 
predictable form and content), shaping behaviour and 
consciousness within a human society from generation to 
generation.  
CYBERNETICS The science of control and communication in the animal 
and the machine. The word originated in the mid 900s, and its 
origin comes from Greek kubernētēs steersman, governor, 
from kubernan to steer (source of English govern). As coined by 
the U.S. mathematician Norbert Weiner in the 1940s (see Weiner, 
1949), and stimulated by the advent of modern computing, the 
term was intended to draw attention to common processes at work 
in systems of all types, whether these be mechanical 
servomechanisms (e.g. a thermostatically controlled central-
heating system), biological organisms, or social systems. Here it is 
used to describe the linear way of communications in the 
companies’ organizational structure. 
  
DRIFT Any tendency, deviation or form of unbalance typical of 
the particular system, which occurs as a result of the repeated 




Reduction in cost per unit resulting from increased 
production, realized through operational efficiencies. Economies 
of scale can be accomplished because as production increases, the 
cost of producing each additional unit falls. 
ECONOMY OF 
SCOPE 
The situation that arises when the cost of performing 
multiple business functions simultaneously proves more efficient 
than performing each business function independently. 
EFFECTIVENESS Refers to producing an adequate or desired result, it is 
more concerned with the impact being made or outcome achieved 
as a result of the meeting rather than with the correct way of doing 
things or following all the procedures. 
EFFICIENCY Refers to the state of being efficient, the ability to 
perform and conduct a well-run meeting in compliance with its 
implicit rules and regulations, ensuring accurate performance of 
all tasks and procedures, thus forming an action-task oriented 
group, which may eventually lead to effectiveness.  
EXTERNALITIES Factors that are not included in Gross National Product 
but which have an effect on human welfare. Pollution is a prime 
example of an external cost imposed on society: national output 
may only be maintained by allowing a certain degree of pollution, 
which detracts from the quality of life. A firm will include the 
private costs of material, labour, and capital used in producing 
goods and services but will not count the social costs of pollution 
involved. On the other hand, positive externalities such as the 
social benefits conferred by firms in training workers who become 






GAME STRATEGY “Strategic games” analysis (Asian game of GO and 
European game of CHESS), as a way to exemplify the values, 
goals, and behavioural patterns that characterize the strategic 
cultures of those societies. 
”GO” STRATEGY The strategic behaviour is based on ambiguity, synergetic 
interplay. The object of the game is to enlarge one’s vital space by 
gaining territory with the use of synergetic strategic outlook. The 
goal is not to kill or avoid being killed but to live and construct. 
Projects the image of the state relying on its masses, individuals 
both showing solidarity and interchangeability.   
HELMS-BURTON 
LAW 
The Helms-Burton law aimed at toughening the embargo 
against Cuba by prohibiting foreign companies to invest or 
purchase property seized after the 1959 revolution in Cuba. US 
Western allies have strongly opposed the law since it was passed 
in 1996. Helms-Burton has helped scare away some potential 
investors, yet while the legislation isn't halting investment, it is 
putting the brakes on, since companies already there aren't leaving, 






English philosopher and political theorist best known for 
his book Leviathan (1651), in which he argues that the only way to 
secure civil society is through universal submission to the absolute 
authority of a sovereign. 
The question raised by Hobbes – the Hobbesian “problem 
of order” – remains a central question in sociology. He held that 
there was a war of each against all; that self-interest was a 
universal law of social psychology and that in the natural state, life 
was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, a phrase which directs 
attention to the question of the source of social organization. 
Hobbes argued for a 'civil order;' one in which the best solution to 
the problem of order is a social contract which puts all power in a 




Thomas Homer-Dixon, is Director of the Centre for the 
Study of Peace and Conflict at the University of Toronto. He has 
led several international research projects examining the links 
between environmental stress and violence in developing 
countries. In recent years, his research has focused on how 
societies adapt to complex economic, ecological, and 
technological change. In 2001 he received the Governor General's 
Non-Fiction Literary Award for his book “The Ingenuity Gap”, 
where he uses his ingenuity theory to suggest how we might 
approach complex problems in our own lives, our thinking, our 
businesses in today’s world. 
HUMAN RIGHTS Is a key component of an emergent knowledge-based 
economy, especially in Western political culture, with respect to 
political values, multiparty democracy, transparency in 





networks, private property and personal rights, and acceptance of 
market rules for management of the economy. This leads to the 





It is a consensus-like legitimate agreement among 
participants, identified by the Chair with the assistance of the 




A renewed dialogue, repeated progressive process of 
policy review among OECD members, aimed at production of 
reasonable, sustainable agreements, such as relevant and timely 
policy outputs, which can be readily adapted to the specific needs 
of the member countries.  
KRASTEV, IVAN Ivan Krastev received his MA in Philosophy from the 
University of Sofia in 1990. In 1994-1996 he was a Lecturer at the 
New Bulgarian University. His doctoral thesis on "Presidential 
Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe" is to be defended. He 
was a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin in 1999-2000; a 
Woodrow Wilson Policy Fellow at Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars, Washington in 1998; and a Fellow at the 
Collegium Budapest, Institute for Advanced Study, where he 
worked on a project entitled "The Rise and Influence of Think 
Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe" in 1997-1998. At present, 
Ivan Krastev is the Chairman of the Board and Research Director 
at the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria. 
MARSHALL 
MCLUHAN 
Herbert Marshall McLuhan, a communication theorist, 
was born on July 21, 1911 in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. 
McLuhan got his MA degree from the University of Manitoba in 
1935. In 1942 he earned a PhD at Cambridge University, and in 
1954-80 he became a professor of English at the University of 
Toronto, where in 1963 he established the Centre for Culture and 
Technology-his intellectual base-camp. From that time McLuhan 
devoted himself to studies of the effect of electronic technology on 
the human community. His ideas had great popular success in the 
1990s with the advent of the World Wide Web. Wired magazine 
has adopted him as their "patron saint" and a number of new books 
have emerged using McLuhan's ideas: The Mechanical Bride 
(1951), The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), Understanding Media 
(1964), and The Medium Is the Message (1967).  
 
For more information see: 
http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/mcl.htm  
www.marshallmcluhan.com
MAVERICK Highly independent type of diplomat, opinionated, 
daring, and expressive character. Acts as a group catalyst when the 
agenda is prolonged, and is useful in situations requiring risk-
taking, enterprising action to break the entrenched resistance and 
move on.  
  
MERCANTILISM A doctrine, developed in the West after the decline of 
feudalism, that the wealth of nations derives from possession and 
control of territories, people, and resources. The assumption that a 





protection of home industries, by increased foreign exports, and by 
accumulating gold and silver, which in turn promoted a collection 
of policies of conquest and protectionism.  




A vision and a program of action for the socioeconomic 
development of Africa, which was formed on 23 October 2001 as 
a merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery 
Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan, dealing with the 
building of infrastructures, including the new technologies of 
information and communication (ICT), education and human 
resource development, health and agriculture. 
NEPAD is a holistic comprehensive integrated 
development plan that addresses key social, economic, and 
political priorities in a coherent and balanced manner. It was 
conceived and developed by African leaders. Its primary objective 
is to eradicate widespread and severe poverty in African countries, 
both individually and collectively. Then to establish a path of 
sustainable growth and development to halt the marginalization of 




NETWORK An arrangement of interconnected people or operations, 
which can be either informal, such as among scientists or 
researchers, formal, with imposing structures and widely respected 
identities, comprising a core of officials serving both the 
institution and the network (such as OECD) or a blend of 
informality within a structured arrangement (World Bank 
consortia meetings). 
OECD The forerunner of The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) was the Organization for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), founded in 1949, 
which was formed to administer American and Canadian aid under 
the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe after World War II. 
Since it took over from OEEC in 1961, OECD provides a setting 
for its 30 Member countries to discuss, develop and perfect 
economic and social policy. Members compare experiences, seek 
answers to common problems and work to co-ordinate domestic 
and international policies that increasingly in today’s globalized 
world must form a web of consistent practice across nations. Their 
exchanges may lead to agreements to act in a formal way - for 
example, by establishing legally binding codes for free flow of 
capital and services, agreements to crack down on bribery or to 
end subsidies for shipbuilding. But more often, their discussion 
makes for better-informed work within their own governments on 
the spectrum of public policy and clarifies the impact of national 
policies on the international community. OECD is a group of 
industrial countries sharing a commitment to market economy, 
democracy, and respect for human rights.   





The OECD online library, Source OECD, possesses a 
great number of books and 24 OECD periodicals, which serve as a 
precious source of information covering 20 subjects. This award-
winning online library is now in its third full year of operation, 
and is loading new e-books every year. At the end of 2001,just 





and 4,000 statistics tables a month from 160,000 user sessions 




Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.  
OECD 
PUBLICATIONS 
OECD is the largest scientific publisher in Europe. It 
possesses great sources of diverse information, such as various 
publications (over 4,000 paperbacks including annual reports, 24 
journals, magazines, studies and conference proceedings), research 
reports, conventions, working papers, country surveys and 
statistics (25 statistical databases on CD-ROM and 700 electronic 
publications on-line) on economics, social issues, trade, 
macroeconomics, education, development, science and innovation. 
OECD statistics are available to the public through electronic and 
paper publications and through the Statistical Portal. The OECD 
reports and statistical data on the economies of member countries 
represent harmonized, validated and comparatively formed up-to-
date sources of information, which can be utilized by the 
governments, businesses, academics, NGOs, researchers, planners, 




Refers to funding offered by governments or aid agencies 
to disadvantaged countries or regions either free of charge or at 
rates below the market rate (also known as cheap or free funding).  
OECD defines it as grants or loans to countries and 
territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing 
countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with 
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main 
objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a 
Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 %]. In addition to financial 
flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, 
loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer 
payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or 
insurance payouts) are in general not counted. 
Ownership Aid agencies have come to use this term in the sense of 
appropriating a concept, an idea, a technique or a particular form 
of know-how. It is often used in that sense as a measure of 
success, as ideas or activities that are not owned or appropriated 
by the recipient are likely to be abandoned once the donor ceases 
paying for it.  
Paradigm A model that forms the basis of something: an example 
that serves as a pattern or concept model, especially one that forms 
the basis of a methodology or theory. In the philosophy of science 
– a generally accepted model of how ideas relate to one another, 
forming a conceptual framework within which scientific research 
is carried out. Paradigms are the ground against which theories are 
formed, which in turn are influenced by the paradigms of the 
culture. 
 Also used to reflect the way that the world is 
experienced or “seen” by individuals or collectivities.  





participate in debates, remains in the background, and satisfied 
with accomplishing the main tasks of the protocol and ensuring 
correct administration of the meeting. Because such behaviour 
does not stimulate group dynamic and enthusiasm, eventually 
would be replaced by more energetic member.  
PEER PRESSURE Effective tool used in the negotiation process, which 
helps to reach consensus; a kind of moral and political constraint 
that countries exercise on each other, but is quite different from 
that flowing from formal agreements.  
PEER REVIEW Tool for cooperation and change, which can be described 
as the systematic examination and assessment of the performance 
of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the 
reviewed State improve its policy-making, adopt best practices, 
and comply with established standards and principles. 
Representatives of other member countries serve as a “jury” to 
evaluate a particular country’s performance. 
PERSISTENT 
DIPLOMAT 
Represents skilled, expert type of diplomat, who has 
extensive successful experience of chairing a number of 
committees, and ability to listen carefully and patiently to other 
delegates for a long period of time, aligning them along the main 
objectives of the meeting.  
POLICY A decision, a course of action or a position to be 
preferred in the pursuit of one or more objectives of the 
government. Always implies a set of processes involving the 
participation of a great number of concerned actors such as other 
governments, international organizations and other government 
levels, representatives of the civil society including users, clients 
and stakeholders, scientists, legislators, and others, who will 
discuss the various alternatives and input into the choice to be 
made. 
POLICY “REGIME” Sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which states or government 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations, 
including subjects such as regional economic cooperation.  
POLICY 
ADAPTATION 
The process of introducing and successfully launching 
new policies in the member country. The vital elements for 
successful policy implementation would be defined by openness, 
flexibility of the political and institutional systems, capacity to 
understand and to accept new foreign concepts, as well as the 
willingness to make necessary changes in the existing policy 
regime.  
POLICY ADOPTION The act or condition of choosing and accepting a policy 
or recommendation for its further consideration. 
POLICY 
COMMUNITY 
Refers to a group of people, usually consisting of 
different backgrounds (parliamentarians, experts, civilians, the 
media, researchers, NGOs) who share and promote a broad single 
interest and form various specialized committees to hear and 
discuss their viewpoints and arguments, thus exercising public 
involvement and citizen participation in policy debates and 
formulation.  
PUBLIC POLICY A decision, a direction, or a position to be preferred in the 
pursuit of one or more objectives of the government, which 
implies a set of processes involving the participation of a great 





organizations, representatives of the civil society – users, clients 
and stakeholders, scientists, legislators) who will discuss the 
various alternatives and input into the choice to be made.  
PUBLIC GOOD, or 
social products, or collective 
products 
Any good or service that cannot be provided other than 
on a group basis because the quantity supplied to any individual 
cannot be independently varied unlike private products. They are 
paid out by general taxation and not by individual consumers 
buying in the market place. These were traditionally few in 
numbers, involving for example, national defence, police 
protection, heavy communication infrastructure. Over the 
Twentieth Century, they have come to include education, health, 
housing, municipal services such as water and sewerage and 
public transport, etc. National accounts and national statistics are 
also considered public goods or institutions, such as the OECD, 
may be included in the definition. 
RITUAL An established and prescribed procedure for a ceremony, 
where form of doing things becomes more important than the 
content. It is a pattern of behaviour repeated (often mindlessly) in 
a fixed form and order as though prescribed by custom or 
authority.  
It occasionally happens that a useful routine or an 
administrative procedure is transformed into a ritual, thus inducing 
mindless and error-prone behaviour. It has been deplored that a 
number of practices introduced by donors have been ritualized , 
and in this process have lost their usefulness. 
ROUTINE A regular course of action, day-to-day copied precise way 
of doing things, a repetitive activity that never changes.  
SAHEL CLUB Was founded in 1975 by OECD as a friendly donor 
consortium intent on providing policy advice and support to the 
West African region. As an informal forum for exchanges of 
views, attuned to African thinking, the Sahel and West Africa 
Club facilitates links between North and South and between 
private and public sectors. It works toward improving 
development assistance and encourages the southern partners to 
control their own development and shape their own strategies. 
SAVVY PRESIDENT Chair/representative who plays the key role in moving the 
agenda forward for the committee, keeps the group focused on the 
substance of the issues, helping the organization to foster 
“cooperation” among its members at all the times. Elected from 
the country members of the committee, subcommittee, or 
workshop based on savvy, knowledge of the subject, leadership, 
interest, and in accordance with the rules, precedents, and habits of 
the organization.  
STANDARDS Documented agreements containing technical 
specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as 
rules, guidelines, or characteristics, to ensure that materials, 
products, processes, and services are fit for their purpose (such as 
internationally accepted ISO 15000 quality standards). Here it 
refers to unification of the quality standards, their harmonization 
and the process of the “common” standards formulation within 
member countries. Such standards allow effective communication 
and exchange: they breed connectivity and confidence between 
trading partners, support increased trade and economic growth of 






STORY LINE A term derived from cinema used here to describe the 
series of sufficient arguments, developed by the delegate and 
acceptable in their own culture, which can be presented to various 
levels of decision-makers and influential parties for a new policy 
to be adopted in any OECD member country. 
SUMMARY RECORD An analytical, descriptive document, usually prepared by 
a Secretariat, which recapitulates the process of the discussion and 
its main points, underscores agreements and consensus reached as 
well as goals achieved and lessons learned. At the same time it 
complements the role of the agenda and provides the delegation 
members with a succinct review of all key arguments, which 
serves as a useful tool to share values and experiences with their 
national policymakers back home, validate the amount of work 
done, while reporting to the headquarters and justifying the cost of 




Co-operation partnering among the countries, which 
creates a state-of-the-art synthesis of knowledge and offers a more 
effective, more efficient, and more resilient approach to enhancing 
the wealth of each country, and all countries through constant 
improvement of their economic efficiency. 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 
Includes both grants to nationals of aid-recipient 
countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and 
payments to consultants, advisers, and similar personnel as well as 
teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries 
(including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this 
kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a 
capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral 
project and program expenditures, and not separately identified as 
technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows. 
TIED AID Type of aid where the giving (or donor) country also 
benefits economically. This happens because the receiving country 
must buy goods and services from the donor country with the 
money provided for that purpose. 
TIME 
MANAGEMENT 
Time management is about controlling and use of time. 
Effective time management necessitates a sense of balance and 
high achievement. High achievement implies the optimal use of 
personal energy and time, purposefulness and effectiveness of the 
actions, as well as flexibility and readiness for new opportunities. 
Balance is about the time distribution in the key areas of your life, 
including family, work, money, health, social, and spiritual areas. 
Balance and high achievement form a foundation for the self-
actualization, career, business, and financial success. Personal 
time management is about the skills, habits, and tools that bring 




Refers to “the sum of information, knowledge, methods 
and tools necessary to use and make useful things” (The Economic 
and Social Council of UN). It’s a “know-how” that is being 
transferred. Such transfer is a process that involves many different 
techniques and methods: Public technology - whatever knowledge 
is in the public domain and can be transferred free; Privately 
owned technology - falls under industrial property rights and must 





techniques that are imbedded with tools, which implies that one 
has to buy the tools along with the manual or training that comes 
with it to master technology or “know-how” specific to that tool. It 
could be an entire industrial process with all management 
techniques that had been recognized as the essential components 
of the process. Thus, transfer of technology may refer to the 
distribution of various knowledge through training and/or through 
the provision of expertise in the form of reports. And lastly, it may 
be related to the provision of specialized equipment. 
TRANSPARENCY Availability, share, and exchange of information, when 
all economic data and analyses, as well as government procedures, 
are made public and are available to international and domestic 
institutions, citizens, domestic critics, and opposing parties. It is 
measured by the degree of its accessibility and distribution within 
the country. 




Established in 1991 as a result of the Rio Conference 
(1990), The Global Environment Facility (GEF) forges 
international cooperation and finances actions that address six 
critical threats to the global environment: biodiversity loss, climate 
change, degradation of international waters, ozone depletion, land 
degradation, and persistent organic pollutants (POPs). GEF brings 
together 175 member governments, working in partnership with 
the private sector, NGOs, and international institutions to address 
complex environmental issues, while supporting national 
sustainable development initiatives. GEF helps developing 
countries fund projects and programs that protect the global 
environment and foster international agreements. GEF has 
allocated US$4 billion in grants and leveraged an additional 
US$12 billion in co-financing from other sources to support more 
than 1,000 projects in over 140 developing countries with 
economies in transition. In August 2002, 32 donor nations pledged 
nearly US$3 billion to fund the work of GEF for the next four 
years.  
http://www.gefweb.org/ 
WEGHTS Specific values, biases, and characteristics of the society, 
which influence its policy decision-making process.  
WIN-WIN 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Reaching agreement, sale, resolution or impasse 
favourable and mutually beneficial to both sides involved in the 
negotiations, and achieved as a result of thorough discussion, 
compromise, and willingness to tackle arising hazards and 
problems. Win-win negotiations preserve the ecosystem and, 
overall, are the most effective means of accomplishing goals as 
they provide the means for achieving better results and terms for 
both parties. “In business you don't get what you deserve - you get 
what you negotiate!” The Golden Rule is to adopt a winning-for-
everyone strategy or getting everything you want by helping 
others get what they want. 
 
WISE DIRECTOR Metaphor used to describe the unit directors in the OECD 
Secretariat. They team act as diplomatic mediator within OECD, 
to ensure successful collaboration between national 
representatives, help them influence each other in a constructive 
manner, find a “common language” and unblock prolonged 





and suspicion. They possess objectivity, moral integrity, 
impartiality, professionalism, intellectual and moral independence, 
balance, and conflict-avoidance talent.  
 
OECD RESOURCES AND OTHER USEFUL LINKS: 
 
 www.oecd.org - The OECD main website 
 
 http://cs3hq.oecd.org/scripts/stats/source/index.htm - Worldwide Statistical Sources 
 
 http://www.oecd.org/EN/about/0,,EN-about-20-nodirectorate-no-no-no-20,00.html - 
OECD Statistical Portal  
 
 http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-notheme-12-no-3-32570-
0,00.html - OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Ukraine - Progress in investment 
reform 2002 
 
 http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00009000/M00009570.pdf - The Centre for Cooperation 
with Non-Members (CCNM), OECD 
      2, rue Andre Pascal,  
      75775 Paris cedex 16 – France 
      Tel.: (331) 45 24 82 00 
      Fax: (331) 45 24 91 77 
      E-mail: ccnmcont@oecd.org 
      Consult www.oecd.org under the rubric 
      “Emerging and Transition Economies” 
 
 http://www.oecdmoscow.org/ - OECD Moscow Office 
      c/o The Institute for the Economy in Transition 
      Building N3, Gazetny per. 5  
      103918 Moscow-Russia 
      Tel.: (7 095 ) 229 7089, (7 503) 956 4721,  
      (7 095) 956 4721 
      Fax: (7 503) 956 4722 or (7 095) 956 4722 
      E-mail: oecdmo@glas.apc.org
 
 CCNM Activities: Tax Policy via OECD Multilateral Tax Training Centres, the Joint 






OECD and Western Europe Co-
operation Outcomes: 
USSR and Eastern Europe Isolation 
Outcomes: 
Promotion of cooperation among 
countries  
Excluded from the synergy of international 
development 
Financial and technical assistance Economy degeneration 




Stabilization of the political situation Vertically structured network 
Information sharing (transparency) Poor connectivity (its absence) 
Constant economic policy reviews Antidevelopment syndrome  
Reducing the barriers of trade Ambiguous quality standards 
Emerging of many great ideas within 
OECD 
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nonverbal communications in the context of “technical negotiations” 
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Statement of preliminaries for the creation of the OECD 
 
CONSIDERING that economic strength and prosperity are essential for the attainment of 
the purposes of the United Nations, the preservation of individual liberty and the increase of 
general well-being;  
BELIEVING that they can further these aims most effectively by strengthening the tradition of 
co-operation which has evolved among them;  
RECOGNIZING that the economic recovery and progress of Europe to which their participation 
in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation has made a major contribution, have 
opened new perspectives for strengthening that tradition and applying it to new tasks and broader 
objectives;  
CONVINCED that broader co-operation will make a vital contribution to peaceful and 
harmonious relations among the peoples of the world;  
RECOGNIZING the increasing interdependence of their economies;  
DETERMINED by consultation and co-operation to use more effectively their capacities and 
potentialities so as to promote the highest sustainable growth of their economies and improve the 
economic and social well-being of their peoples;  
BELIEVING that the economically more advanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the 
best of their ability the countries in process of economic development;  
RECOGNIZING that the further expansion of world trade is one of the most important factors 
favoring the economic development of countries and the improvement of international economic 
relations; and  
DETERMINED to pursue these purposes in a manner consistent with their obligations in other 
international organizations or institutions in which they participate or under agreements to which 
they are a party;  
HAVE THEREFORE AGREED on the following provisions for the reconstitution of the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development:...PARIS 14th December 1960 
 
